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INTRODUCTION
For years at a time, the debate about whether organizations which are
tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code' should be
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erine Wambsgans.
1. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West Supp. 1987). Section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code
exempts from the corporate income tax, among others, organizations described in section
501(c)(3):
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety,
literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur
sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of
athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or
animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying
on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation, (except as other-
wise provided in subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or intervene
in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign
on behalf of any candidate for public office.
Id.
Section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code allows corporate and individual taxpayers to take
an income tax deduction for any "charitable contribution," which it defines to include:
a contribution or gift to or for the use of ... [a] corporation, trust, or community
chest, fund, or foundation ... organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or
international amateur sports competition ... or for the prevention of cruelty'to
children or animals ....
Id. § 170(c)(2)(B).
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allowed to participate in the formulation of public policy neither quiets
completely nor rises above a murmur. Periodically, however, the volume
increases. Recently, the discussion has again taken on a renewed vigor. In
November 1986, the Treasury issued proposed regulations2 to implement
changes made in the restrictions on section 501(c)(3) lobbying by the Tax
Reform Act of 1976. 3 The regulations, which had been awaited for ten
years, 4 drew an immediate, intense, and almost entirely negative reaction
from leaders of exempt organizations,5 legal practitioners, 6 and members of
Congres' 7 In response, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) announced that
although it would reconsider some aspects of the proposal,8 it expected to
2. Prop. Treas. Regs. §§ 1.170A-1, 1,501(c)(3)-1, 1.501(c)(4)-1, 1.501(h)-i, 1.501(h)-2,
1.501(h)-3, 1.504-1, 1.504-2, 53.4945-2(a), 5.6.4911-1 to -10, 56.6001-1, 56.6011-1, 1.6033-2(a)(2)(ii),
7.0(c)(4), 20.2055-1(a)(2), 25.2522(a)-I, 51 Fed. Reg. 40,211 to 40,232 (proposed Nov. 5, 1986).
3. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1307(a), (b), 90 Stat. 1520, 1720-26
(1976) (adding sections 501(h) and 4911 to the Internal Revenue Code). The last episode of
vigorous debate on the issue took place in connection with the 1976 amendments. See infra
notes 107-08 and accompanying text. In the late 1960's and early 1970's, discussion centered
on the activities of private foundations and public interest law firms. See infra notes 56-58 and
accompanying text.
4. Immediately after enactment of the 1976 provisions, commentators repeatedly noted the
importance of prompt promulgation of regulations. See, e.g., 4 S. WErrHoRN, TAX TEcHNiQuEs
FOR FotJNDATIONS AND OTHER TAX EXEMPT ORGANimZnoNs 34-37 (1979 Rev. & Supp. 1980);
Hyslop & Ebell, Public Interest Lobbying and the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 7 ENvTL. L. 283,
288, 291 (1977); Washburn, New Tax Act Defines "Substantial" Lobbying-But Charities Must
Elect To Be Covered, 55 TAXES 291, 295 (1977). The IRS itself noted in 1980 that regulations
on lobbying by section 501(c)(3) organizations would be published "in the near future." Gen.
Couns. Mem. 38,415 (June 15, 1980). As late as January 1987, an experienced and astute
observer of the tax-exempt area offered the opinion that "another year [would] go by without
the publication of proposed regulations." The Nonprofit Counsel (Charitable Prod. Co., Inc.)
at 12 (Jan. 1986) (B. Hopkins ed.).
5. See, e.g., National Head Injury Foundation Voices Objections to Proposed Lobbying
Regulations, 35 TAX NoTEs 236 (1987); Independent Sector Urges Charities to Lobby Against
Proposed Regulations on Lobbying by Charities, 34 TAX NoTEs 456-57 (1987); Texas Family
Planning Association Opposes Regulations on Lobbying, 34 TAX No-Es 208 (1987); Commen-
tators Say Regulations on Lobbying by Tax-Exempt Organizations Are Too Restrictive, 34 TAX
NoTEs 19 (1987); Don't Cripple the Nonprofits, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Mar. 26, 1987, at 10-
B, col. 1; Charities Lobby Hard to Save Their Right to Lobby, Wall Street J., Mar. 11, 1987,
at 1, col. 1.
6. See, e.g., Sheppard, Sweet Charity and the Lobbying Taint, 34 TAX NoTEs 848 (1987);
Simpson & Guray, Lobbying by Public Charities Under the IRS Proposed Regulations: We
Know Lobbying When We See It, 12 TAX MGMT. EST. G'rTS & TR. J. 39 (1987); Teuber,
Mentz Says IRS Needs More Weapons to Police Tax-Exempt Organizations, 34 TAX NOTES
1038, 1040 (1987) (quoting Walter Slocombe, partner with Caplin and Drysdale, who suggests
regulations be withdrawn because "they are clearly not what Congress intended" and because
organizations concerned with public policy will "simply be put out of business").
7. See, e.g., Congressional Taxwriters Seek Withdrawal of Proposed Regs on Lobbying
by Tax-Exempt Groups, 34 TAX Nomns 929 (1987) (reproducing a letter from sixteen members
of the Senate Finance Committee to IRS Commissioner Gibbs); Sen. Simon Says Lobbying
Rules Run Contrary to Congressional Intent, 34 TAX NoTEs 861 (1987).
8. See Service Agrees to Revise Proposed Lobbying Regulations, 35 TAX NoTEs 626 (1987);
Service Announces that Final Public Charity Lobbying Regs Will Be Prospective Only, 35 TAX
NoTEs 131 (1987); Desruisseaux, IRS Modifies Proposed Regulations on Lobbying by Non-
Profit Groups, Chron. of Higher Educ., Apr. 22, 1987, at 31, col. 1. The Commissioner
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retain the basic sense of the regulations as proposed. 9
Newspaper accounts of blatant misuse of the section 501(c)(3) exemption
added fuel to the fire. They revealed that the National Endowment for the
Preservation of Liberty (NEPL), a section 501(c)(3) exempt organization,
had allegedly used profits from arms sales to Iran, 0 as well as most of the
contributions it had received," to lobby for Contra aid and to campaign
against members of Congress who opposed such aid.12 The unfolding NEPL
story attracted the attention of Congress. 3 By the time the organization's
president and public relations expert had pleaded guilty to charges of con-
spiracy to defraud the federal government by funneling supposedly deductible
contributions to the Contras, 4 and the IRS had revoked the organization's
exempt status, 3 the Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee
Subcommittee on Oversight had informed the nonprofit organization com-
munity that exempt organization lobbying and campaign activity would be
a "first priority" of the Subcommittee. 6 The Subcommittee held hearings 7
appointed an advisory group of experts in the area of exempt organizations to assist in the
reformulation of the regulations. Non-Profit Organization Tax Letter (Org. Mgmt., Inc.) at 1
(June 30, 1987). In addition, the IRS heard from interested parties at hearings held on May
11 and 12, 1987. Broaddus, Revision Begins: IRS Opens the Door to Criticism of Its Proposed
Regulations on Lobbying by Charities, FoUNm. NEws, May-June 1987, at 62.
9. Broaddus, supra note 8, at 62. See also IRS, Possible Alternatives Regarding Proposed
Regulations on Lobbying by Public Charities that Elect Under Section 501(h), in Commis-
sioner's Exempt Organizations Advisory Group Discussion and Background Material at Tab A
(1987).
10. Iran-Contra Aid Scandal Develops Tax Twist; Pickle Meets with Gibbs to Discuss
Activities of Tax-Exempt Organizations, 33 TAx Noras 1093 (1986) [hereinafter Iran-Contra
Scandal].
11. See NEPL Tax Return Shows It Used $2.34 Million to Lobby for Aid to Contras, 34
TAx Noas 76 (1987) (NEPL's 1985 tax return showed that NEPL collected $3.3 million in
contributions and used $2.34 million to lobby for the Contras and to pay its top officers).
12. See Edsall, Tax, Election Law Questions Arose on Activist's Pro-Contra Efforts, Wash-
ington Post, Dec. 18, 1986, at A30, col. 1; Hosler & West, Chavez Reportedly Went to North
to Get Channell's Campaign Ads Stopped, Baltimore Sun, Dec. 18, 1986, at 24A, col. 1
(reporting that Maryland Republican Senate candidate Linda Chavez approached Oliver North
to seek help in stopping NEPL-financed television spots attacking her opponent, Barbara
Mikulski).
13. Ohio Senator Howard Metzenbaum raised questions about the status and activities of
NEPL in April, 1986. Iran-Contra Scandal, supra note 10, at 1093 (1986). He raised similar
questions again in December. Id. See also H. Metzenbaum, Press Release (Dec. 17, 1986)
(available in TAx NoTas Microfiche Database Doc. 86-7925 (Dec. 29, 1986)).
14. The Nonprofit Counsel (Charitable Prod. Co., Inc.) at 8 (June 1987) (3. Hopkins ed.).
15. Id. (citing IRS Information Release IR 87-60 (Apr. 30, 1987)).
16. Congressman J.J. Pickle Remarks to the Washington Non-Profit Tax Conference, March
6, 1987, Non-Profit Organization Tax Letter (Org. Mgmt., Inc.) Special Insert 1987-2 (Mar.
27, 1987). The issue had been on the Subcommittee's agenda for two years, but consideration
had been postponed in favor of other topics. Id. Congressman Pickle was one of the targets
of NEPL's negative advertising campaign. See Iran-Contra Scandal, supra note 10.
17. See Teuber, supra note 6; Lobbying Rules Hearings Held, Set; Debate Intensifies, The
Nonprofit Counsel (Charitable Prod. Co., Inc.) at 1 (Apr. 1987) (B. Hopkins ed.); Summary
of Comments Made at Pickle Hearings, Non-Profit Organization Tax Letter (Org. Mgmt., Inc.)
at 1 (Mar. 27, 1987).
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and generated a list of recommendations as a "conceptual starting point for
legislation" to address the perceived problems.' 8 In July, Subcommittee
Chairman J.J. Pickle and Ranking Minority Member Richard T. Schulze
introduced a bill which would incorporate some of the recommendations
into the Internal Revenue Code. The Pickle-Schulze proposal was incorpo-
rated into the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Bill of 1987, which was passed
just before Congress adjourned at the end of 1987.19
Although charitable organizations have a long tradition of advocating
social change, over the last three decades they have expanded both the
amount of their advocacy activity and their repertoire of advocacy strategies.
Increasing numbers of nonprofit organizations have come to believe that the
traditional beneficiaries of "charitable" activity are only incompletely served
by activities that simply respond to individual problems which are over-
looked, or even created by, the laws and public systems devised to address
the needs of society's least fortunate. These organizations have turned their
efforts to raising public awareness, demanding accountability from govern-
mental agencies, and pressing for changes in the law, all in an attempt to
serve the collective interests of those whose needs are ill-served by the status
quo. Legal services organizations which were established to provide direct
representation for the indigent have undertaken law reform efforts in the
courts2 and in the legislative arena2' in order to challenge the broader,
systemic problems that face their clients. Other groups have been created
for the express purpose of bringing about social change. Some claim to
speak for the general population on issues of broad public concern, such as
consumer rights, environmental quality, and nuclear arms control." Others
18. Teuber, Ways and Means Oversight Lobbying and Political Activity Recommendations
Finalized, 35 TAX NoTs 1046 (1987). The recommendations, submitted on June 8, 1987, include
additional reporting requirements, disclosure of affiliated groups and interlocking directorates,
new definitions of some key terms, and provision for excise tax penalties for violations. Id.
See also Recommendations on Political Activities of Exempt Groups Receive Lukewarm Reac-
tions, 35 TAx NOTES 1263 (1987).
19. Pub. L. No. 100-203.
The Pickle-Shulze proposal was introduced as H.R. 2942, The Tax-Exempt Organizations'
Lobbying and Political Accountability Act of 1987. See Teuber, Ways and Means Tackles
PBGC, Exempt Group Lobbying in Reconciliation Mark Up, 36 TAX NoTES 352, 353 (1987).
The bill was approved by the Ways and Means Committee as an amendment to H.R. 3545,
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987. The Budget Reconciliation Act, with the
Accountability Act attached, was passed by the House of Representatives on October 29, 1987.
The Senate version of the Budget Reconciliation bill did not include the Accountability Act;
the Conference Committee version of the Act adopted the Pickle proposals with slight modi-
fication. See H.R. CoNt. REP. No. 495, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
20. See Feuillan, Making Peace with Poverty: Legal Services Under Fire, 3 LEGAL SERViCEs
REp. 1 (1973); Hollingsworth, Ten Years of Legal Services for the Poor, in A DECADE OF
FEDERAL ANi-PoVERTY PRoORAms 285-314 (R. Haveman ed. 1977).
21. See 31 CONG. Q. WaEKLy REP. 1754 (1973).
22. See, e.g., 1979 CONG. Q. ALMANAC app. D., at 5, 17 (1979) (describing the lobbying
efforts of Common Cause and Public Citizen); CoUNcIL FOR PtmuC INTEREST LAW, BAwcNc
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define their missions as the protection of particularly vulnerable subpopu-
lations.Y These advocates have demanded recognition of, and respect for,
the rights of individual clients within public social service systems.2 They
have fought to obtain and maintain the allocation of public resources to
programs serving the poor, the old, the young, and the ill,2 and they have
monitored the performance of government in its role as provider of social
services and promoter of general well-being.
26
Although this activism may not fit comfortably within the narrowest and
most traditional sense of "charitable" enterprise, many believe that the roles
of advocate and improver of social systems,27 empowerer of citizens, 2 and
critic and monitor of government policies and programs29 are among the
most crucial functions of the nonprofit sector. In sum, "the voluntary sector
[provides] countervailing definitions of reality and morality-ideologies, per-
spectives and world views that frequently challenge the prevailing assumptions
about what exists and what is good and what should be done in society;
[and] is most likely to say that the emperor has no clothes." 30
Federal tax law restricts the ways in which and the extent to which
organizations that qualify for exemption and donor deductibility under sec-
tion 501(c)(3) (section 501(c)(3) organizations) may participate in political
and governmental reform. As these organizations have shifted their focus
Tm SCALES OF JUSTICE: FInANCING PuBLc INTEREST LAw IN AmJRICA 118-32 (1976) [hereinafter
COuNcrL FOR PUBuc INTrREST LAW] (describing the beginnings of various consumer, environ-
mental, general public interest, and civil rights public interest law organizations).
23. Examples are child advocacy and welfare rights organizations. See CouNcE FOR PUBLIc
INTEREST LAW, supra note 22, at 100-18 (describing a variety of public interest law organizations
formed to address the problems of the poor, racial and ethnic minorities, children, women,
and prisoners).
24. See, e.g., Glasser, Prisoners of Benevolence: Power Versus Liberty in the Welfare State,
in W. GAYLIN, I. GLASSER, S. MARCUS & D. RonmsA, DOING GOOD: THE Ln&Ts OF BaN v-
OLENCE 97, 127-30 (1978).
25. See, e.g., Coleman, Education to Handicapped Seen as Policy Success Story, 43 CONG.
Q. WEEKLY RP. 2375 (1985).
26. See, e.g., O'Connell, The Negative Effect, FOUND. NEws, Jan.-Feb. 1981, at 2 (noting
the efforts of charitable organizations to limit budget cuts to social programs under President
Reagan's Economic Recovery Program).
27. See, e.g., Carey, Philanthropy and the Powerless, in 2 COMISSION ON PRrvATE PI-
LANTHRoPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS, RESEARCH PAPERS 1109 (1977); Jordan, We Cannot Live for
Ourselves Alone, in AmEIUcA's VOLUNTARY SPRIT 401, 403 (B. O'Connell ed. 1983).
28. See, e.g., Asher, Public Needs, Public Policy, and Philanthropy: An Analysis of the
Basic Issues and Their Treatment by the Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public
Needs, in 2 COMMISSION ON ParvATE PrILANmTRoPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS, RESEARCH PAPERS 1069,
1072 (1977); McFarland, Public Interest Lobbies Versus Minority Faction, in INTEREST GROUP POL-
rncs 324, 350-51 (A. Cigler & B. Loomis eds. 1983).
29. See, e.g., Donee Group, Private Philanthropy: Vital and Innovative or Passive and
Irrelevant, in I COMMSSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS, RESEARCH PAPERS
49, 59 (1977); Winnet, Feeding the Watchdogs, FOUND. NEws, May-June 1978, at 8.
30. Cohen, Some Aspects of Evolving Social Policy in Relation to Private Philanthropy,
in 2 COMMIssION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLC NEEDS, RESEARCH PAPERS 657, 667
(1977) (QUOTING D. SMITm, VOLUNTARY ACTION RESEARCH 388 (1973)).
19871
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
from clients to systems, the restraints on system reform activity, long present
in the Tax Code and its elaborations, have increased in number, complexity,
and importance. An organization that elects to serve its beneficiaries by
pursuing system reform rather than, or in addition to, supplying direct client
services will find that its activities are subject to different constraints, de-
pending upon the strategy selected. For example, the Tax Code imposes no
direct limits on advocacy directed toward administrative agencies,3 but sig-
nificantly and elaborately restrains legislative involvement.3 2 Pursuit of system
change through issue-oriented litigation is subject to detailed prescriptions
regarding issue and case selection, organization control, and sources of
funding. 33 Tax law limitations on direct involvement in political election
campaign activity virtually foreclose this choice of strategy for section 501(c)(3)
organizations, although they may engage in some peripheral, arguably elec-
tion-related, activity. 34 In all cases, the organization is subject to the re-
quirement that section 501(c)(3) organizations be "operated exclusively" for
"charitable," "educational," "religious," or other specified purposes. 35 Al-
though the "operated exclusively" requirement is, in theory, uniformly ap-
plicable to all section 501(c)(3) organizations, in practice it takes on a
different meaning when applied to organizations which focus on system
reform rather than direct client service.3 6
As the charitable sector has grown increasingly vocal and articulate about
the state of the emperor's wardrobe, its activist role has become the object
of mounting scrutiny. While the precise question has varied, depending upon
the context in which it has been raised, the issue that has emerged is one
of basic definition: does the fact that an organization directs its energies
toward system change, rather than direct service delivery, disqualify it for
tax-exempt status or render it ineligible to receive contributions which are
deductible to the donor? The question, in one variant or another, has been
posed repeatedly since the beginning of the century. Many times the answer
has been, "yes, it does indeed." And when the answer has been "no," it
has frequently been couched in terms of particular circumstances which
justify deviation from a general assumption that, for purposes of tax clas-
sification, "charity" does not seriously address itself to social change.
Although developments in the last twenty years have probably expanded
the degree to which organizations may safely devote their resources to the
pursuit of system change, the adjustments, for the most part, have been
31. See infra notes 127, 138, 140; text accompanying note 127.
32. See infra notes 101-72 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 53-72 and accompanying text.
34. See infra note 373.
35. See infra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
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piecemeal, superficial, and ad hoc. Unfortunately, even now it is not clear
just how much of what kind of activity, addressed to which social issues,
will so color the character of an organization that it no longer qualifies for
exemption and donor deductibility under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code.
All indications are that neither Congress nor the Internal Revenue Service
will turn away from the issue of exempt organization political activity without
some further attempt to amend the controls. The desire to revise is under-
standable; few would argue that the law's present approach to exempt
organization involvement in the formulation of public policy is satisfactory.
The fact that Congress and the IRS are being urged both to tighten up and
to lighten up"7 is not simply a manifestation of the opposing perspectives of
those whose attention is drawn by apparent abuses and those whose activities
are constrained. The perception that the law is both too lax and too restrictive
reflects basic shortcomings of the restrictions. The law is fundamentally
flawed in its conception and its application, The limitations have often come
from hard cases of the sort that tend to make bad law. The constraints
appear to be drawn from a mix of historical accident, assorted political
pressures, and conclusions (perhaps unfounded, perhaps not) about tradi-
tional notions of "charity" and Congressional motivation. Only occasionally
do they represent thoughtful responses to legitimate policy concerns. In short,
these constraints have never been addressed as elements of a unified response
to a set of coherent underlying principles.38
The underlying principles can and should be identified; the law can and
should be designed to reflect them, The tax law limitations on the various
kinds of reform activities and uncertainty about the boundaries of those
limitations have an important shaping effect on the composition, structure,
and function of the nonprofit sector. To ensure that the shaping is deliberate,
thoughtful, and reflective of valid social policy considerations it is essential,
first, to articulate the goals of regulation and, second, to understand the
effects, both intended and unintended, of regulation. Only upon such a
carefully constructed foundation can we hope to build a legal framework
which is efficient, effective, and equitable.
37. See, e.g., The Political Activities of Exempt Groups-What the Experts Say, 34 TAX
NoTEs 1147, 1148 (1987).
38. In his seminal article criticizing the limitations on lobbying by exempt organizations,
Professor Clark observed that "the restriction on political activities illustrates all the difficulties
of attempting to fashion one rule to cover an infinite variety of dissimilar situations." Clark,
The Limitation on Political Activities: A Discordant Note in the Law of Charities, 46 VA. L.
REv. 439, 466 (1960). Nearly three decades later, the criticism remains apt. The numerous
modifications and instances of interpretation in the intervening years have only exacerbated the
problems which arise from failing to carefully tailor the rules to fit the reasons for the rules.
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I. Tm PRESENT LIMITATIONS ON SYSTEM-FOCUSED ADVOCACY BY
SECTION 501(c)(3) ORGANIZATIONS
A. The "Organized and Operated Exclusively" Requirement
Any advocacy strategy an organization might choose is subject, as are all
its activities, to the limits implicit in the section 501(c)(3) requirement that
it must be "organized and operated exclusively" for "religious," "chari-
table," or "educational" purposes.39 If the written instrument by which an
organization is created limits the organization's purposes to one or more of
the exempt purposes described in section 501(c)(3) and does not expressly
authorize activities which are prohibited by section 501(c)(3), the organization
will be found to be "organized exclusively" for exempt purposes. 40
The operational test is of much greater consequence. Although the Internal
Revenue Code's requirement that the organization's purposes be "exclu-
sively" charitable, educational, or religious is not literally applied,4' the
presence of a single significant non-exempt purpose will disqualify the or-
ganization under the operational test 42 even if it is clearly subsidiary to the
primary pursuit of undeniably charitable or educational goals. The standard
formulation of the operational test focuses not upon the nature of the
activities undertaken, but rather upon whether those activities are designed
39. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West Supp. 1987). Section 501(c)(3) also provides for exemption for
organizations whose purpose is "scientific," "literary," or "testing for public safety." Id. In
addition, organizations formed for "the prevention of cruelty to children or animals" and
some organizations which "foster national or international amateur sports competition" are
eligible for the section 501(c)(3) exemption. Id.
40. The necessary provisions must be included in the organization's creating document;
provisions in the by-laws cannot remedy a defect in the underlying instrument. By-laws which
authorize legislative activity when the creating document is silent on the issue have been held
to violate the "organized exclusively" requirement.
An organization must meet the organizational test independently of any consideration of its
activities. Thus, if the organization's stated purposes are broader than those allowed by section
501(c)(3), the organizational test is failed, even if the actual operations of the organization
have been entirely within section 501(c)(3)'s purposes. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b) (1959);
Exempt Organizations Handbook, 4 Int. Rev. Man.-Admin. (CCH) §§ 330-338.
The Exempt Organizations Handbook states that "[a]rticles of organization that fail to meet
the organizational test are ordinarily amendable. . . .Therefore, in most cases, the status of
an organization depends ultimately on the operational test." Id. § 324.
41. An organization is regarded as " 'operated exclusively' for one or more exempt purposes
only if it engages primarily in activities which accomplish" its exempt purposes. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(l) (1959). See also World Family Corp. v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 958 (1983).
42. Better Business Bureau of Washington, D.C. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945)
("[T]he presence of a single [non-exempt] ... purpose, if substantial in nature, will destroy
the exemption regardless of the number or importance of truly [exempt] purposes.").
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to further the organization's exempt goals.4 3 This approach has been followed
in the context of system-change advocacy, but not evenly and not easily.
The IRS has recognized that non-traditional advocacy activities do not
necessarily undermine an organization's claim to charitable or educational
status. For example, the IRS justified the eiemption of an organization
which mediated international environmental disputes with the statement that
"[t]he law of charity provides no basis for weighing or evaluating the
objective merits of specific activities carried on in furtherance of a charitable
purpose, if those activities are reasonably related to the accomplishment of
the charitable purpose, and are not illegal or contrary to public policy."-
However, groups which have proposed to pursue their charitable ends by
means of somewhat unorthodox advocacy strategies have sometimes found
the IRS reluctant to apply the general principle to their specific circumstances.
For example, the IRS insisted that the Center on Corporate Responsibility,
an organization which proposed to engage in proxy contests in order to
promote corporate social responsibility with respect to the impact of cor-
porate policies on problems of employment discrimination, pollution, and
conservation of natural resources, was not entitled to exemption under section
501(c)(3). 4 Rather, the Service maintained, proxy contests are "business
processes" with "no community benefit," regardless of their ultimate ob-
jective." Although not necessary to its holding in favor of the Center, 47 the
District Court for the District of Columbia took pains to address the issue
in a long footnote, where it asserted that the Center's purpose of encouraging
corporate management to "assume some of its duties as a member of the
community," clearly carries a public benefit, and remarked that proxy con-
tests, as a "direct and effective instrument ... by which the charitable
purposes are accomplished for the public good," are charitable activities
and thus meet the operational test.4 8
Even after the court's statement in Center on Corporate Responsibility,
the IRS denied the section 501(c)(3) charitable classification to an organi-
zation which proposed to orchestrate a nationwide boycott of Nestl6 products
to protest the way that company was marketing infant formula in the Third
43. Goldsboro Art League, Inc. v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 337 (1980); Pulpit Resource v.
Commissioner, 70 T.C. 594 (1978) (commercial activities). See also Rev. Rul. 69-572, 1969-2
C.B. 119 ("The performance of a particular activity that is not inherently charitable may
nonetheless further a charitable purpose. The overall result in any given case is dependent on
why and how that activity is actually being conducted.").
44. Rev. Rul. 80-279, 1980-2 C.B. 176, 177. See also Rev. Rul. 80-278, 1980-2 C.B. 175
(organization which intended to engage in environmental litigation as party plaintiff).
45. Center on Corporate Responsibility v. Schultz, 368 F. Supp. 863, 867 (D.D.C. 1973).
46. Id. at 874 n.21 (citing Priv. Ltr. Rul. 52-0899187 (May 16, 1973)).
47. The Center had amended its application for exempt status to delete proxy contest
activities from its proposed operations and had formed a separate, non-exempt affiliate to
pursue the proxy contests. Id. at 866.
48. Id. at 874-75 n.21.
1987]
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World. 49 Only after the group filed suit to challenge the denial did the Service
change its position and grant the exemption. 0 Thus, despite indications that
the IRS has brought its approach to evaluating advocacy activities into line
with its approach to evaluating social and commercial activities," it is not
at all clear that strategies which are novel or threatening to the status quo
can pass the operational test without a fight.52
B. Using Litigation as a Strategy for Reform
Indeed, despite its apparent focus on an organization's ultimate purposes,
the operational test has long been a mechanism by which exempt status has
been denied to groups seeking to change public systems and policies based
upon the means selected for mounting the challenge, even where the means
involved were not nearly so novel as proxy fights or commercial boycotts.
For example, choosing litigation as the means by which to pursue a charitable
cause has sometimes brought into question an organization's claim that it
is being operated exclusively for charitable purposes.
Charitable organizations are not newcomers to the courtroom. Providing
free individual legal representation to indigent or otherwise disadvantaged
clients fits comfortably within even a narrow defimition of "charity. ' 3
Indeed, this variety of advocacy has long been accepted as quite compatible
with section 501(c)(3) exempt status.5 4 In addition, litigating to defend the
human and civil rights of racial, social, and political minorities has tradi-
49. See B. HOPKINS, THa LAW OF TAx-ExEMPT ORGANIZATONS 289 (5th ed. 1987).
50. Id.
51. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,858 (Feb. 16, 1979) (noting that rent strikes, economic
boycotts, picketing, and mass demonstrations are not necessarily impermissible means of pur-
suing charitable or educational purposes, but that the "inherent nature of-the activities should
be carefully analyzed for legality, for compatibility with public policy, and for reasonable
relationship to the accomplishment of the organization's purpose"); supra note 43 and accom-
panying text.
52. See Ginsburg, Marks & Wertheim, Federal Oversight of Private Philanthropy, in 5
ComtssioN oN PRIVATE PHnAtNTHRoPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS, RESEARCH PAPERS 2575, 2587 (1977)
(noting that ambiguity of the operational test "accords to the Service a breadth of interpretive
discretion that is relatively untrammeled").
The declaratory judgment provisions of section 7428 of the Internal Revenue Code, added
in 1976, may have a moderating influence. Hopkins suggests that it will be the courts' refusal
to permit denials, rather than the IRS's inclination to grant exempt status to sucti groups, that
will sustain the principle that choosing advocacy as the means to achieve otherwise exempt
ends does not cause an organization to fall the operational test. B. HOPKINS, supra note 49,
at 292.
53. See infra note 240 and accompanying text.
54. See Rev. Rul. 69-161, 1969-1 C.B. 149. For a detailed discussion of the roots of public
interest law practice, see Houck, With Charity for All, 93 YALE L.J. 1415, 1439-40 (1984);
Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L. Rzv. 207,
207-31 (1976).
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tionally posed no obstacle to eligibility for exempt status."5 However, the
use of litigation to pursue a cause or to establish a principle that does not
implicate the rights or interests of a particular poor or otherwise disadvan-
taged client has been questioned, even where the cause or principle, if pursued
by other means, concededly falls within the scope of the section 501(c)(3)
exemption.
The issue of whether law reform litigation is an appropriate section 501(c)(3)
activity came into focus in the 1960's. Inspired, perhaps, by the success of
broad-focused reform litigation undertaken by the American Civil Liberties
Union, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People,
and traditional legal aid groups, organizations concerned with issues closer
to the edges of the broad outlines of section 501(c)(3) recognized that a
carefully planned litigation program could be an effective, and perhaps
essential, strategy for achieving their goals.5 6 The IRS responded by granting
exempt status to some of these organizations and denying it to others, then
declared a moratorium on exemption rulings for public interest law firms
other than those providing legal representation to "specifically identified
groups, such as poor or underprivileged people that are traditionally rec-
ognized as objects of charity."57 The moratorium, and the swift and loud
reaction it evoked from the public and the Congress, led to the unusually
prompt promulgation of guidelines intended to distinguish litigation activity
that will defeat exempt status from that which will not." These guidelines
define the limits on the use of litigation by section 501(c)(3) organizations.
55. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 75-285, 1975-2 C.B. 203 (organization providing technical assistance
to attorneys bringing suit on behalf of minorities seeking employment in construction trades);
Rev. Rul. 73-285, 1973-2 C.B. 174 (organization providing funds to defend members of a
religious sect in actions raising constitutional issues of state infringement of religious freedom).
The ACLU and the NAACP offer longstanding and highly visible examples of this variety
of legal advocacy, having engaged in litigation of this sort since the early part of the century.
See Houck, supra note 54, at 1440-41.
56. Houck, supra note 54, at 1440-41. See also Berlin, Roisman & Kessler, Public Interest
Law, 38 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 675, 678 (1970); Halpern & Cunningham, Reflections on the
New Public Interest Law: Theory and Practice at the Center for Social Policy, 59 GEo. L.J.
1095, 1096-97 (1971); Comment, The New Public Interest Lawyers, 79 YALM L.J. 1069, 1077
(1970).
57. Houck, supra note 54, at 1444 (quoting IRS News Release 1069, Oct. 9, 1970). See
also B. HoPKIns, supra note 49, at 127; Frank, Public Interest Law Meets the Government-
Tension Can Be Healthy, TRuAL, Feb. 1976, at 18.
58. Critical reaction to the moratorium was heard from the press, the legal community,
academics and government administrators. See Adams, Responsible Militancy-The Anatomy
of a Public Interest Law Firm, 29 REc. N.Y.C. B.A. 631 (1974); Houck, supra note 54, at
1445.
The Senate Subcommittee on Employment, Manpower, and Poverty scheduled oversight
hearings to take place just five weeks after the issuance of the IRS press release. Days before
the hearings were scheduled to begin, the IRS announced it would resume issuing exemption
rulings for public interest law firms and released guidelines by which eligibility for exemption
would be evaluated. Houck, supra note 54, at 1445-46.
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The guidelines, set out in Revenue Procedure 71-39, 59 do not define "char-
itable" litigation in terms of the substantive issues addressed. They reflect
a decision that the only sound way to evaluate whether proposed litigation
activity (beyond traditional kinds of charitable legal representation) involves
sufficient public benefit to justify exemption is to focus on whether the
organization's methods of operating set it apart from the ordinary practice
of law. Where an organization's litigation activity is purportedly on behalf
of a diffuse public interest, it must be undertaken in ways which mark it
as being different from litigation which could be pursued without the publicly
supported benefits of exempt status. 60
One of the guidelines sets the theme. In order to be charitable, it is
necessary that "[tihe engagement of the organization in litigation can rea-
sonably be said to be in representation of a broad public interest rather than
a private interest," and that "[tihe litigation is designed to present a position
on behalf of the public at large on matters of public interest." 6' The guide-
lines indicate that involvement in cases which implicate substantial private
financial interests that would "warrant representation from private legal
sources" will defeat qualification for exempt status. Conversely, involvement
in "class actions in the public interest, suits for injunction against action
by government or private interest broadly affecting the public, similar rep-
resentation before administrative boards and agencies, [and] test suits where
the private interest is small" would be compatible with section 501(c)(3)
exempt status. 62 Other more specific guidelines address control of the or-
ganization and its agenda.63
59. Rev. Proc. 71-39, 1971-2 C.B. 575.
60. See Tax Exemptions for Charitable Organizations Affecting Poverty Programs: Hearings
Before the Senate Subcomm. on Employment, Manpower, and Poverty of the Senate Comm.
on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 18, 25-26 (1970) [hereinafter Hearings](testimony of Commissioner Thrower). Commissioner Thrower stated:
I think we were somewhat diverted initially by looking at causes, but we did
conclude that we could not pick and choose between causes and say litigation on
behalf of this cause is good but litigation on behalf of that cause is bad....
Nevertheless there are many instances where the private interest is not such that
there can be represented through the normal commercial sources a public voice.
This is what we are talking about-the representation of a public voice that has
no substantial private interest.
Id. See also Houck, supra note 54, at 1448-51.
61. Rev. Proc. 71-39 § 3.01, 1971-2 C.B. 575.
62. Id.
63. Revenue Procedure 71-39 requires that the policies and programs of the litigating
organization be determined by a board or committee that is both beyond the control of the
organization's staff and is "representative of the public interest." Rev. Proc. 71-39 § 3.05,
1971-2 C.B. 575, 576. While Revenue Procedure 71-39 does not explain what it takes to constitute
a group that is "representative of the public interest," later application of the guidelines to
an organization seeking exemption found a board consisting of "prominent attorneys, law
professors, and leaders of public interest organizations" to satisfy this requirement. Rev. Rul.
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The remaining guideline, that "[t]he organization .. not accept fees for
its services except in accordance with procedures approved by the Internal
Revenue Service,"" was not given content until 1975, when the IRS ruled
that a public interest law firm may not solicit or accept attorney's fees from
its clients. 6" According to the Service, acceptance of even reduced fees,
tailored to the circumstances of clients who are willing and able to pay
something for representation although they are unable to pay usual market
rates, prevents the organization from being sufficiently distinguishable from
traditional, private sources of representation and thus defeats the organi-
zation's claim that it is operating exclusively for charitable purposes." An
organization may accept attorney's fees, but only if they are paid by an
opposing party as a result of a court or agency award, or if they are approved
as part of a settlement agreement.67 Further, the organization must take care
that the possibility or probability of a fee award does not influence its case
selection." Finally, the organization is barred from accepting even court-
awarded fees in excess of half of the operating costs of the organization's
legal functions over the five years leading up to and including the year in
which the fees are awarded.6 9
75-74, 1975-1 C.B. 152.
The guidelines further require that the organization not be "operated, through sharing of
office space or otherwise ... so as to create identification or confusion with a particular
private law firm," Rev. Proc. 71-39 § 3.06, that there be "no arrangement to provide, directly
or indirectly, a deduction for the cost of litigation which is for the private benefit of the
donor," id. § 3.07, and that the organization provide the IRS with an annual description of
cases litigated and the rationale for their selection, id. § 3.04.
The guidelines also require that the organization's activity not entail "a program of disruption
of the judicial system, illegal activity, or violation of applicable canons of ethics," id. § 3.03,
and that the organization comply with the provisions of section 501(c)(3) that limit lobbying
and election campaign activity, id. § 3.08. These last two guidelines simply restate conditions
that apply in any case. All exempt organizations, quite independently of Revenue Procedure
71-39, are held to the principle that activities "may not be illegal or violate established public
policy." Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 587 (1983). The lobbying and campaign
activity restrictions, of course, would apply without being reiterated here. See infra notes 101-
72 and accompanying text.
64. Rev. Proc. 71-39 § 3.02, 1971-2 C.B. 575, 576.
65. Rev. Proc. 75-13, 1975-1 C.B. 662.
66. Rev. Rul. 75-75, 1975-1 C.B. 154. A different rule applies to traditional legal aid
organizations which provide direct representation for indigent individuals. In that context, the
IRS has ruled that charging fees based on clients' ability to pay does not "negate or significantly
detract from the substantial economic relief provided to the poor and distressed by the organ-
ization" and, consequently, does not undermine the organization's claim that it is operated
exclusively for charitable purposes. Rev. Rul. 78-428, 1978-2 C.B. 177.
67. Rev. Proc. 75-13 § 3.02, 1975-1 C.B. 662; Rev. Rul. 75-76, 1975-1 C.B. 154, 155. Fee
awards must be paid to the firm rather than to individual staff attorneys and must be applied
to the organization's normal operating expenses. Rev. Proc. 75-13 §§ 3.04-3.05, 1975-1 C.B.
662.
68. Rev. Proc. 75-13 § 3.03, 1975-1 C.B. 662; Rev. Rul. 75-76, 1975-1 C.B. 154, 155.
69. Rev. Proc. 75-13 § 3.04, 1975-1 C.B. 662.
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It might be argued that guidelines which require drawing a distinction
between financial interests that are sufficient to "warrant representation
from private legal sources" and those that are not, and which require
evaluation of whether an organization's policy-setting body is "representative
of the public interest," confer an unacceptable measure of administrative
latitude. Certainly, the birth of the guidelines was attended by no little
controversy, 70 and their recent application has been criticized.7' For the most
part, however, a reasonable reading in light of the stated objective-that is,
to reserve the exemption for representation of broad public interests that
cannot command representation in the traditional marketplace for legal
services-reveals that the limitations on the use of litigation to influence
systems and policies are fairly straightforward and not terribly restrictive.
While the practicalities of funding may impose limits, nothing in the tax
law prevents an exempt organization from committing virtually unlimited
amounts of organizational resources and efforts to this strategy! 2
70. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
71. The criticisms tend to center not on complaints of overly restrictive application, but
rather on the failure of the IRS to apply the guidelines restrictively enough. Recent commentary
describes the growing phenomenon of exempt "public interest law firms" whose positions on
environmental, consumer, and other public interest issues track those of the substantial private
interests which provide both funds and policy direction for the exempt organizations. For an
especially thorough and well-crafted description and critique of this phenomenon, see Houck,
supra note 54. See also O'Connor & Epstein, Rebalancing the Scales of Justice: Assessment
of Public Interest Law, 7 HAxv. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 483 (1984); Singer, Liberal Public Interest
Law Firms Face Budgetary, Ideological Challenges, 11 NAT'L J. 2052 (1979); Weiss, Pacific
Legal Foundation: The Right Sees Wrongs, FoUND. NEws, May-June 1978, at 34.
72. An exempt organization that wishes to use litigation as one strategy in the context of
other kinds of activities is also relatively free to do so and, in fact, may be even less constrained
than the public interest law firm whose primary activity is litigation. In a 1980 ruling on the
eligibility for exempt status of an environmental organization that engaged in litigation as a
party plaintiff, the IRS appeared to reverse the position it had taken in Center on Corporate
Responsibility, Inc. v. Schultz, 368 F. Supp. 863 (D.D.C. 1973), that litigation is an inherently
non-charitable activity unless it is conducted within the guidelines of Revenue Procedure 71-
39. Rev. Rul. 80-278, 1980-2 C.B. 175. In the General Counsel Memorandum that provided
the basis for Revenue Ruling 80-278, the IRS noted that when the organization's purpose is a
recognized charitable one, "the means or activities employed ... do not have to be per se
charitable, so long as they are in furtherance of the exempt purpose and one reasonably related
to the accomplishment of such purpose." Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,661 (Aug. 30, 1978). The
ruling's statement that "the correct analytical approach in a case . .. in which an issue arises
as to the propriety of a particular activity is: first, is the organization's purpose charitable;
second, are the organization's activities neither illegal, contrary to public policy, nor in conflict
with express statutory restrictions or limitations; and third, are the activities of the organization
in furtherance of its exempt purpose and reasonably related to the accomplishment of such
purpose," id., seems to suggest that the guidelines of Revenue Procedure 71-39 are irrelevant
in this context.
Professor Houck proposes that Revenue Ruling 80-278 suggests a categorical exemption for
environmental organizations from the constraints of Revenue Procedure 71-39 and the later
Revenue Rulings and Revenue Procedures that amplified its limitations on attorney fees. Houck,
supra note 54, at 1454 n.164. Indeed, it seems that the ruling might be read even more broadly-
that is, to substitute its broader principles for the specific constraints of Revenue Procedure
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C. Changing Systems by Raising Public Awareness
Getting one's message to the public is often a crucial component of
advocacy efforts intended to change systems and policies. Treasury regula-
tions provide that "education" embraces not only formal instruction of the
individual, but general dissemination of information as well, 73 and that
advocacy with the intent of molding public opinion toward acceptance of
social change can be "charitable." 74 Nonetheless, there can be little dispute
that the Internal Revenue Code, as amplified and interpreted, imposes sig-
nificant, if not always clear, limits on a section 501(c)(3) organization's
pursuit of its goals through the means of public education.
The limitations arise from a longstanding pattern of IRS and judicial
attention to whether an organization which addresses its message to the
public is advocating a position, and, some have suggested, whether it is
advocating the wrong positionY The earliest Treasury view was that advocacy
was not education for purposes of tax exemption and deductibility of con-
tributions; simple promotion of a position, extreme or not, provided the
basis for denial of "educational" status. 6
71-39, Revenue Procedure 75-13, and Revenue Rulings 75-75, 75-76, and 76-5 for any organ-
ization that defines its purposes in terms of recognized charitable ends. Under this reading,
only public interest law firms which do not identify their purposes in such terms, but rather,
in terms of providing otherwise unavailable representation on issues determined as they arise
to implicate the public interest, would be held to the guidelines.
It is not entirely clear, however, that the ruling totally removes the guidelines' constraints,
even from an environmental organization that engages in litigation as a small part of its total
activities. The General Counsel Memorandum notes that "[o]bviously, . . . if evidence arises
that a suit was brought for harassment, the suit involved sufficient private interests to warrant
private representation, or the suit was for the private interests of the plaintiffs, the Service
could properly conclude that such litigation was not a charitable activity." Gen. Couns. Mem.
37,661 (Aug. 30, 1978). While the first and last factors would reasonably support a conclusion
that the activity is not in furtherance of a charitable purpose, the middle element seems
inexplicable except as an indirect reiteration of the basic premise of Revenue Procedure 71-39.
73. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(3) (1959).
74. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-I(d)(2) (1959).
75. Lehrfeld, The Taxation of Ideology, 19 CATm. U.L. REv. 50, 59 (1969); Comment, Tax
Exemptions for Educational Institutions: Discretion and Discrimination, 128 U. PA. L. Ray.
849 (1980); Note, Big Mama Rag: An Inquiry into Vagueness, 67 VA. L. Rav. 1543 (1981).
76. Thompson, The Availability of the Federal Educational Tax Exemption for Propaganda
Organizations, 18 U.C.D. L. REv. 487, 498 (1985).
The controversiality of an organization's issue or position appears to have played a role in
at least some early determinations of eligibility for exempt status, although there is disagreement
as to how important a role. See, e.g., Lehrfeld, supra note 75, at 60; cf. Thompson, supra,
at 498 n.29 ("no evidence suggests that the Service actively discriminated against organizations
that advocated extreme viewpoints, or in favor of organizations that advocated mainstream
viewpoints").
The earliest Treasury regulations defining "education" for purposes of exemption excluded
dissemination of "controversial or partisan propaganda." Treas. Reg. Art. 517 (Revenue Act
of 1918) (1919), in T.D. 2831, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 285 (1920). Although it is unclear just
how the Treasury applied that provision, see Thompson, supra, at 498, Lehrfeld notes that
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While merely taking sides on an issue is no longer grounds for denial of
exemption, IRS disapproval of the substance or tone of an organization's
public education efforts continues to provide a basis for adverse rulings.
Treasury Regulations, and cases interpreting them, continue to suggest limits
on advocacy of a position, even absent legislative involvement. In 1959, the
Treasury specified by regulation that "[advocating] social or civic changes
or [presenting] opinion on controversial issues with the intention of molding
public opinion or creating public sentiment to an acceptance of its views"
does not prevent an otherwise "charitable" organization from qualifying
for exemption under section 501(c)(3), so long as it is not an "action
organization. '"77 At the same time, the Treasury defined "educational" to
include promotion of a particular position or viewpoint so long as the
advocating organization presents, not "unsupported opinion," but "a suf-
ficiently full and fair exposition of the pertinent facts as to permit an
individual or the public to form an independent opinion or conclusion. '78
most of the early cases dealing With the question do not indicate whether the litigation followed
adverse private rulings by the IRS or whether the organizations and individuals ignored the
ruling process. Lehrfeld, supra note 75, at 56.
Early judicial responses to advocacy at least gave lip service to, and may have pivoted on,
the notion that organizations advocating change ought not to be given exempt status or be
designated eligible for deductible contributions. See, e.g., Leubuscher v. Commissioner, 54 F.2d
998 (2d Cir. 1932), modifying 21 B.T.A. 1022 (1930); Cochran v. Commissioner, 30 B.T.A.
1115 (1934), rev'd, 78 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1935); Weyl v. Commissioner, 18 B.T.A. 1092 (1930),
rev'd, 48 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1931); Slee v. Commissioner, 15 B.T.A. 710 (1929), aff'd, 42 F.2d
184 (2d Cir. 1930); Fales v. Commissioner, 9 B.T.A. 828 (1927). Thompson, supra, at 498-
501, suggests that the real focus of the courts in these early cases was the legislative activity
of the organizations. With a few exceptions, the cases seem to support this contention at least
as convincingly as they support the proposition that advocacy per se or controversiality was
the basis for denial of exemption or deductibility. See, e.g., Cochran v. Commissioner, 78 F.2d
176 (4th Cir. 1935), rev'g 30 B.T.A. 1115 (1934); Slee v. Commissioner, 42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.
1930); Watson v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 463 (1932); Leubuscher v. Commissioner, 21 B.T.A.
1022 (1930), modified by 54 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1932); Slee v. Commissioner, 15 B.T.A. 710
(1929), aff'd, 42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930); Fales v. Commissioner, 9 B.T.A. 828 (1927).
Even after 1934, when Congress incorporated into the Code an explicit limitation on legislative
activity, courts continued to note whether a challenged organization was taking sides on an
issue and whether its issue, or its position on the issue, could be classed as "controversial."
Some courts held that advocacy alone should not defeat exemption. See, e.g., Seasongood v.
Commissioner, 227 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1955); Girard Trust v. Commissioner, 122 F.2d 108 (3d
Cir. 1941); Old Colony Trust v. Welch, 25 F. Supp. 45 (D. Mass. 1938). Others maintained
that advocacy was inconsistent with exemption, see, e.g., Estate of Blaine, 22 T.C. 1195 (1954),
or that the controversiality of the organization's position was an appropriate focus of inquiry
in making the determination, see, e.g., Dulles v. Johnson, 273 F.2d 362 (2d Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 834 (1960) (deduction allowed because organization's position was not con-
troversial); Marshall v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1945) (too controversial, although
no legislative activity). During this period, the Treasury took the position that advocacy per
se was not a bar to exemption, so long as the organization's purpose and activities were
noncontroversial and its presentation was fact-based, objective, and non-inflammatory. For a
discussion of the regulations and IRS policy that formed the basis of this position, see Thomp-
son, supra, at 504-07.
77. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (1959). See infra notes 145-51 and accompanying text.
78. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(3)(i)(b) (1959).
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The "full and fair exposition" standard was not challenged until 1980,
when Big Mama Rag, Inc., a nonprofit feminist organization denied section
501(c)(3) status on the grounds that its publication did not meet the standard,
successfully asserted that the regulation is so subjective and imprecise as to
violate the first amendment. 79 The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit agreed with Big Mama Rag, Inc. that the
regulation defining "educational" was void for vagueness, first, because it
failed to delineate clearly enough which organizations are subject to the full
and fair exposition requirement, 0 and second, because the standard itself
was incapable of principled application.8" The court's rejection of the full
and fair exposition standard82 would seem to remove whatever constraints
there might have been on the pursuit of a charitable or educational purpose
through publication and distribution of an organization's viewpoint, even
when the issues or the viewpoints presented are "controversial."" 3 However,
as a practical matter, the decision most likely has little effect. First, the IRS
is not required to change its practice despite the adverse ruling. 4 More
importantly, the full and fair exposition test seems to have been revived in
substance, if not in form.
79. Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1980). For a detailed
description of the case, see Winslow & Ash, Effects of the Big Mama Rag Decision on Exempt
Education Organizations: An Analysis, 55 J. TAX'N 20 (1981); Note, supra note 75; Recent
Decisions, Federal Income Taxation, 49 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 623 (1981). See also Comment,
supra note 75, at 849 (describing the case and criticizing the district court's failure to invalidate
the regulation).
The regulation may have remained unchallenged for so long because the IRS found few
occasions to apply the full and fair exposition standard and because on those few occasions
when the IRS did apply the test, it usually determined that the standard was met. Big Mama
Rag, 631 F.2d at 1036-37; Thompson, supra note 76, at 510 n.48.
80. Big Mama Rag, 631 F.2d at 1036. The regulation imposed the test only on organizations
which "advocate a particular position." Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(3)(i)(b) (1959). The court
concluded that the IRS policy of applying the full and fair exposition test only to organizations
which addressed controversial issues had the effect of basing the grant or denial of exempt
status on the purely subjective response of Service officials to the content of an organization's
views. Big Mama Rag, 631 F.2d at 1036-37.
81. Big Mama Rag, 631 F.2d at 1038. The court noted that it is impossible to determine
objectively whether expression of opinion is adequately supported by fact, dr whether the
message has crossed the line that separates "appeal to the mind" (which the government
maintained was "educational"), and "non-educational" "appeal to the emotion." Id. at 1038-
39.
82. Id. at 1040.
83. Commentary published immediately after the decision, in fact, assumed that the decision
would have this effect, and criticized the result precisely because it seemed to leave -the IRS
with no way to draw a necessary dividing line between "educational" and "non-educational"
promotion of a cause. See Winslow & Ash, supra note 79; Note, supra note 75; Recent Decisions,
supra note 79.
84. The IRS will often relitigate issues, hoping for a split in the circuits or outright reversals.
B. BrrrKER, FEDERAL INCOME, EsTATE AND Gnr TAx 27 (3d ed. 1964).
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Although the government chose not to challenge the circuit court's holding
in Big Mama Rag,85 it did attempt to resuscitate the full and fair exposition
test in National Alliance v. United States,s6 a case which was underway by
the time Big Mama Rag was decided. In National Alliance, the government
argued that the objectionable vagueness of the test is cured by the explanatory
gloss provided by the Service's "methodology test," which purportedly fo-
cuses on the manner of presentation, rather than on the content of an
organization's viewpoint.8 7 Evaluation of whether an organization's materials
are "educational" under this test is based upon an assessment of whether
"a significant portion" of the materials presents "viewpoints unsupported
by a relevant factual basis;" whether supposedly factual material is "dis-
torted;" whether the materials use "particularly inflammatory and dispar-
aging terms" and express "conclusions based more on strong emotional
feelings than objective factual evaluations;" and whether the materials are
"aimed at developing an understanding on the part of the addressees." '
National Alliance involved a challenge by a white supremacist hate group
which had been denied exempt status. The same court which two years earlier
had voided the "full and fair exposition" standard explicitly declined to
reach the question of whether the methodology test provides clear enough
guidelines to overcome the court's earlier objections to the vagueness of the
"full and fair exposition" standard.8 9 Noting that it need not decide whether
the methodology test is valid in order to decide the case, 9° the court never-
theless took the opportunity to offer its view that the National Alliance
materials would not satisfy the criteria of the methodology test. 9' Perhaps
85. Professor Thompson explains that the government's decision not to seek Supreme Court
review was probably based on factual weaknesses of the Big Mama Rag case, combined with
some uneasiness within the IRS about the regulation's susceptibility to uneven enforcement.
Thompson, supra note 76, at 489 n.4 (citing Action on Decision, Big Mama Rag, Inc. (Nov.
19, 1980)).
It seems likely that the decision may have been influenced by the fact that the Service was
in the process of defending its approach to distinguishing "educational" from "non-educa-
tional" advocacy organizations in a case which offered both stronger facts and a somewhat
modified IRS position, which the Service believed could salvage the full and fair exposition
standard. -
86. National Alliance v. United States, 710 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
87. Id. at 870.
88. Id. at 874.
89. The court rested its denial of exempt status on the conclusion that the organization
could not fit within "any definition of 'educational' conceivably intended by Congress." Id.
at 873. It is interesting to note that the court's rationale for this conclusion focuses heavily on
the same sort of factors which make up the methodology test, that is, distortion, unsupported
opinion, and emotional rather than reasoned presentation in the organization's publications.
The case has been criticized for establishing a new, "within any reasonable interpretation of
the term," test which is even more vague than the "full and fair exposition" or "methodology"
test. Note, National Alliance: A Retreat from Protection of the Right to Freedom of Speech,
29 ST. Louis U.L.J. 229, 240 (1984).
90. National Alliance, 710 F.2d at 876.
91. Id. at 875.
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even more significantly, the court made an express point of commenting
favorably on the test itself, noting that "[tihe test reduces the vagueness
found by the Big Mama decision, and provides 'a carefully charted middle
course' which allows the IRS to draw a reasonable line between those
advocacy organizations that are worthy of exemption and those that are
not." 92
Relying on the court's implicit approval, the IRS has adopted the meth-
odology test as its official policy. 93 The IRS contends that the "methodology
test leads to the minimum of official inquiry into[,] and hence potential
censorship of, the content of expression, because it focuses on the method
of presentation rather than the ideas presented." 94 Nevertheless, there can
be little serious argument that inquiries into whether opinions are adequately
supported, whether facts are distorted, whether terms are "particularly in-
flammatory," and whether conclusions are "based more on strong emotional
feelings than objective factual evaluations" can really be content-neutral. 95
Some have applauded the full and fair exposition test and the methodology
test as reasonable and necessary devices which allow the IRS to make ap-
propriate judgments with respect to groups not worthy of support through
tax "subsidy. ' 96 It is clear, however, that the tests have not been reserved
solely for extremist hate groups like National Alliance. They can be, and
have been, applied as well to groups such as Big Mama Rag, Inc. and the
gay rights group of Revenue Ruling 78-305, 97 whose non-mainstream view-
points apparently caused the IRS some discomfort, although the groups were
ultimately granted exemption. 98 Considering, in addition, the uncertain line
92. Id. at 876.
93. Rev. Proc. 86-43, 1986-2 C.B. 729.
94. 710 F.2d. at 875. See also Rev. Proc. 86-43, 1986-46 I.R.B. 15, 15 ("It has been, and
it remains, the policy of the Service to maintain a position of disinterested neutrality with
respect to the beliefs advocated by an organization.").
95. The district court considering the National Alliance case expressed this very concern,
stating:
"Relevant factual basis," "inflammatory and disparaging terms," and "aimed
at developing an understanding," for example, allow IRS officials at least as
much latitude in passing judgment "on the content and quality of an applicant's
views and goals" as the terms singled out for attention in Big Mama Rag.
81-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9464, at 87,345.
Professor Thompson criticizes the test because of its serious potential for uneven, content-
based application as well as its capacity to diminish public access to a variety of viewpoints
on public issues. Thompson, supra note 76, at 521-22. Cf. Recent Case, National Alliance v.
United States, 53 U. Car. L. R-v. 277, 295 (1984) (approving of the "rescue" of the full and
fair exposition standard).
96. See, e.g., Wimslow & Ash, supra note 79, at 24. It has been convincingly proposed that
when the IRS originally formulated the full and fair exposition test, it was simply fashioning
a policy which it expected to use only rarely, but which would be available when necessary to
bar exemption in extreme cases. Thompson, supra note 76, at 509 n.47.
97. Rev. Rul. 78-305, 1978-2 C.B. 172.
98. Thompson, supra note 76, at 524-28. In concluding that the gay rights organization,
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between dissemination of opinion and legislative activity or election campaign
intervention, 99 it appears that organizations hoping to bring about social
change by raising public awareness of their causes continue to be vulnerable
to loss of exemption based upon a subjective IRS evaluation of the con-
troversiality and validity of the position taken, as well as the style in which
the viewpoint is expressed. 100
D. Reform Through Legislative Advocacy
The tax law imposes explicit and quite narrow limits on the freedom of
section 501(c)(3) organizations to use advocacy before the legislature as a
strategy by which to accomplish their exempt purposes. In large measure,
these constraints are defined by 1976 amendments to the Internal Revenue
Code'01 which allow many section 501(c)(3) organizations' °2 to measure the
although controversial, nonetheless qualified for exemption, the IRS noted that the methods
used to educate the public about homosexuality and foster tolerance and understanding adhered
to the educational guidelines of Treasury Regulation section 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(3); specifically, all
the materials disseminated by the organization were independently compiled and contained full
documentation of the facts upon which the organization based its conclusions. B. HoPKINus,
supra note 49, at 176-77. See also Comment, supra note 75, at 852.
99. See infra notes 142-43, 375 and accompanying text.
100. It has been postulated that if an organization's advocacy is directed to a recognized
"charitable" purpose, it will not be subject to scrutiny for controversiality and validity in the
same way that other "educational" material is. That is, since the goal is "charitable," there
need be no evaluation of the process by which it is pursued to determine whether it satisfies
the "factual support" and "reasoned rather than emotional presentation" criteria applicable
to "educational" advocacy. See, e.g., Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 494 F. Supp. 473,
478 n.5 (D.D.C. 1979) (drawing a distinction between organizations which are "educational"
but not otherwise "charitable," and thus subject to the "full and fair exposition" standard,
and those which fall "wholly within one of the other charitable categories" (emphasis in
original)), rev'd, 631 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See also Winslow & Ash, supra note 79, at
21. This analysis is based on the fact that the reference to the "full and fair exposition" test
appears only in the regulations which apply to "educational" organizations, Treas. Reg. §
1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(i) (1959), and not in the regulations which describe the bounds of permissible
advocacy for "charitable" organizations, Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(2) (1959). While the
distinction is logically satisfying, given the arrangement of the regulations, the IRS does not
apply it in practice. See Comment, supra note 75, at 865. For example, the IRS used the "full
and fair exposition" test to evaluate the publications of Big Mama Rag, Inc., although that
organization probably could have qualified as a "charitable" organization, promoting social
welfare and equality. See Thompson, supra note 76, at 489 n.4 (suggesting that this is one
reason why the IRS did not appeal).
Thus, it seems that any controversiality-based limits which are imposed on "educational"
organizations' advocacy through public information probably apply equally to work on rec-
ognized "charitable" issues. An additional reason for assuming that whatever lines may be
drawn with respect to controversial advocacy by "educational" organizations apply to "char-
itable" organizations as well is that the terms of the "full and fair exposition" standard are
implicated in the assessment of whether the organization's advocacy activities are attempts to
influence legislation. See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
101. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1307(a), (b), 90 Stat. 1520, 1720-26
(1976) (adding sections 501(h) and 4911 to the Internal Revenue Code).
102. Section 501(h)(4) specifies which organizations are eligible to elect: those qualifying
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limits according to a specific formula,'03 rather than by section 501(c)(3)'s
general admonition that "no substantial part" of an organization's activities
may be carrying on "propaganda" or otherwise "attempting to influence
legislation,"' 04 arid by a 1983 Supreme Court opinion' 5 which seems to clear
the way for a section 501(c)(3) organization to establish a separate, less
limited, lobbying affiliate.""
The 1976 amendments to the lobbying restrictions were the culmination
of a long process of proposal and counterproposal'07 rooted in longstanding
under section 501(c)(3) by virtue of section 170(b)(1)(A)(ii)-(iv) (educational institutions, hospitals
and medical research facilities, organizations supporting government schools), or section
170(b)(1)(A)(vi) (organizations publicly supported by charitable contributions); those qualifying
under section 509(a)(2) by virtue of the public support test; and section 509(a)(3) (support
organizations of public charities). Churches and church-affiliated organizations are explicitly
disqualified by section 501(h)(5) from making the election and remain subject to the general
section 501(c)(3) substantiality provision. Private foundations, by their omission from the section
501(h)(4) list, may not elect, and are governed instead by the provisions of section 4945 of the
Internal Revenue Code.
An eligible charity may elect to be covered by section 501(h) at any time before the end of
its taxable year, and the election remains effective for subsequent taxable years unless and until
revoked. Revocation of the election must be made before the beginning of the tax year to
which it is to apply. Thus, an organization may not choose to return to the old substantiality
test for a tax year which has already begun. I.R.C. § 501(h)(6). This provision prevents a
charity which finds itself close to or surpassing the section 501(h) lobbying limitations from
revoking its section 501(h) election during the year in question in order to avoid the penalties.
103. See infra notes 119-20.
104. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West Supp. 1987).
Parallel provisions condition deductibility of gifts for purposes of income tax, gift tax, and
estate tax on a similar restraint by the recipient organization. Most of the challenges to the
limitation have arisen in one or another of the deduction contexts. See, e.g., Christian Echoes
National Ministry v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864
(1973); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. United States, 374 F.2d 427 (8th Cir. 1967); Krohn v.
United States, 246 F. Supp. 341 (D. Colo. 1965); Hammerstein v. Kelley, 235 F. Supp. 60
(E.D. Mo. 1964), aff'd., 349 F.2d 928 (8th Cir. 1965).
A few decisions have rested on other statutes which conditioned some benefit on complying
with similar restrictions on legislative involvement. See, e.g., International Reform Fed'n v.
District Unemployment Comp. Bd., 131 F.2d 337 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 693 (1942)
(church federation exempt from contributing to unemployment compensation fund because its
legislative activities were incidental to its religious and educational purposes); Lord's Day
Alliance v. United States, 65 F. Supp. 62 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (church organization advocating
observance and preservation of the Christian Sabbath exempt from paying Social Security tax).
105. Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540 (1983), rev'g 676
F.2d 715 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
106. See infra notes 152-66 and accompanying text.
107. The revision apparently had its beginnings in a 1968 proposal generated by the American
Bar Association Section on Taxation Committee on Exempt Organizations, which included in
its membership several individuals whose writings had criticized the existing law. A.B.A. Section
of Taxation, Report of the Committee on Exempt Organizations, 21 TAx LAw. 967 (1968).
Although the generally unsatisfactory state of the law was acknowledged during deliberations
which led to the 1969 tax law amendments, the law as passed in 1969 altered the regulation
of legislative activity only with respect to private foundations, leaving the rules for other section
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criticism'018 of the section 501(c)(3) "no substantial part" requirement. The
criticism was well-founded, resting as it did on decades of imprecise and
inconsistent interpretation by the IRS and the courts of an Internal Revenue
Code provision that left a great deal of room for interpretation.'1 9 Cases
501(c)(3) organizations untouched.
The effort to clarify and liberalize the restrictions moved forward in 1971 when Senator
Edmund Muskie introduced Senate Bill No. 1408, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), which reflected
the ABA model draft approach of allowing a charitable organization to carry on legislative
activities with respect to matters "directly affecting any purpose for which it is organized and
operated." Over a period of five years, detailed proposals disappeared and reappeared as
sponsors imagined "ways in which public charities would ostensibly misuse their new lobbying
authority." B. Hoxncs, supra note 49, at 269-70. For detailed descriptions of the proposals
leading up to the 1976 amendments, see id.; Note, Lobbying by Section 501(c)(3) Organizations
Under the Tax Reform Act of 1976: A Proposal for Change, 30 TAx LAW. 214, 229-32 (1976);
Public Charities Lobbying, 1976 CoNG. Q. ALMANAC 486.
108. See, e.g., H.R. REp. No. 1210, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); Caplin & Timbie, Legislative
Activities of Public Charities, 39 LAw & CONTMP. PROBS. 183 (1975); Clark, supra note 38;
Garrett, Federal Tax Limitations on Political Activities of Public Interest and Educational
Organizations, 59 Gao. L.J. 561 (1971); Lehrfeld, supra note 75; Nix, Limitations on the
Lobbying of Section 501(c)(3) Organizations: A Choice for the Public Charities, 81 W. VA. L.
REv. 407 (1979); Troyer, Charities, Law-Making, and the Constitution: The Validity of the
Restrictions on Influencing Legislation, 31 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 1415 (1973).
109. Some of the confusion was introduced even before the reference to legislative activity
was added to the Code in 1934. Revenue Act of 1934, Ch. 277 §§ 23(o)(2), 101(6), 48 Stat.
680, 690, 700. For decades before that, courts had quite regularly premised disallowance of
deductions for gifts to organizations with legislative programs on the non-charitable or non-
educational nature of "political agitation." See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
It has been suggested that the early judicial references to legislative activity were nothing
more than gratuitous rationalizations for the real basis of disapproval, which was that the
questioned organizations were engaged in "offending the prevailing dogmas." Lehrfeld, supra
note 75, at 59. Cf. Thompson, supra note 76, at 498-99 (characterizing the same line of cases
as demonstrating that the concern of the courts was over the coupling of advocacy with legislative
activity). Nonetheless, if the courts were simply upholding the "rule of overdog," Lehrfeld,
supra note 75, at 52, they were, at least, expressing the rule in terms of an objection to the
means used to pursue the challenged organization's causes.
The most noted early statement of the restriction on legislative activity was Learned Hand's
oft-quoted pronouncement in Slee v. Commissioner that "[p]olitical agitation as such is outside
the statute, however innocent the aim." 42 F.2d 184, 185 (2d Cir. 1930). Nothing in the tax
law compelled such a position, and the conclusion was inconsistent with common law notions
of charitable and educational purpose as manifested in the law of every state except Massa-
chusetts. See Clark, supra note 38, at 448 n.44; Thompson, supra note 76, at 513 n.56.
Nevertheless, Hand's characterization in Slee provided the starting point for discussion in
virtually every subsequent legislative activity case, see, e.g., International Reform Fed'n, 131
F.2d at 337; Weyl, 48 F.2d at 811; Davis v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 1091 (1954), and is
generally credited with leading to the amendment of the Tax Code which denies exemption to
organizations that engage in "substantial" legislative activity. See, e.g., Haswell v. United
States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1140 (Ct. Cl. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975); Clark, supra
note 38, at 446-47.
Congress added the explicit limitation on legislative advocacy to the Code in 1934, intending,
it has been variously argued, (1) to signal its agreement with Hand's rule, see, e.g., Baker,
Lobbying by Public Charities: Summary of Proposed Regulations, 34 TAX NoTEs 1145, 1145
(1986); (2) to liberalize the rule by allowing an "insubstantial" amount of legislative activity,
see, e.g., Seasongood, 227 F.2d at 910; Clark, supra note 38, at 449; Fogel, To the IRS Tis
Better to Give Than to Lobby, 61 A.B.A. J. 960, 961 (1975); Note, supra note 107, at 216
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interpreting the limitation gave conflicting signals as to whether the tax law
permitted legislative activity clearly related to an organization's public-serv-
ing, exempt purposes." 0 In addition, the cases disagreed with respect to how
much activity was "substantial," ' and differed as to whether the legislative
effort ought to be measured in isolation (the "quantitative" approach)' 2 or
whether it should be assessed in the context of its importance relative to the
organization's total activities (the "objectives and circumstances" ap-
proach).113
(1976); or (3) to prohibit only selfishly-motivated legislative involvement, see, e.g., League of
Women Voters v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 379, 383 (Ct. Cl. 1960) (Jones, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 822 (1960); Clark, supra note 38, at 447 n.40.
110. See, e.g., St. Louis Union Trust Co., 374 F.2d at 427 (bar association's legislative
activities serve public, not private, interests); Hammerstein, 349 F.2d at 928 (deduction disal-
lowed because medical society's legislative activities designed to serve interests of the profession
rather than the public and not clearly related to exempt purposes); Dulles, 273 F.2d at 362
(bar association's unselfishly-motivated legislative activity in pursuit of exempt purposes does
not defeat deductibility). See also International Reform Fed'n, 131 F.2d at 337; Girard Trust,
122 F.2d at 108; Lord's Day Alliance, 65 F. Supp. at 62; Davis, 22 T.C. at 1091; Old Colony
Trust, 25 F. Supp. at 45 (all holding that legislative activity clearly related to an organization's
exempt goals does not disqualify it for exemption or deductibility). Cf. Kuper v. Commisioner,
332 F.2d 562, 563 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 920 (1964) (stating that "it is immaterial
... that the legislation advocated from time to time was intended to promote sound government
and was for the benefit of all citizens rather than in the interests of a limited or selfish group");
League of Women Voters, 180 F. Supp. at 383 (disqualifying the League on the basis of its
legislative involvement in what the court conceded to be "questions of public interest").
111. See, e.g., Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, 470 F.2d at 849 (organization addressing
only one piece of pending legislation engaged in "substantial" lobbying); Seasongood, 227 F.2d
at 912 (5% of organization's activities not "substantial"); Lord's Day Alliance, 65 F. Supp.
at 65 (legislative activities were "minor," because they "occurred only when the Legislature
was in session, four or five months biennially").
112. See, e.g., Seasongood, 227 F.2d at 912 (since direct contact with legislators consumed
less than 507o of the organization's budget, legislative activity was not "substantial"). Lord's
Day Alliance, 65 F. Supp. at 62.
113. See, e.g., Davis, 22 T.C. at 1099 ("The question is ... to be determined upon the
record of purely charitable activities and activities influencing legislation and a comparison of
the two.").
In Krohn, 246 F. Supp. at 341, the court expressly rejected Seasongood's 5% threshold,
noting that its "apparent certainty ... obscures the basic difficulties of balancing activities in
the context of organizational objectives and circumstances." In League of Women Voters, 180
F. Supp. at 383, and Kuper, 332 F.2d at 163 (concerning the national organization and a local
chapter thereof, respectively), although the League did little or no actual grass roots or direct
lobbying, its contributors were denied deduction of their donations on the grounds that the
League engaged in substantial attempts to influence legislation, which the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals and Court of Claims held to include the time the League spent in studying, discussing,
and formulating positions on public issues.
In 1972, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the tax-exempt status of the Christian
Echoes National Ministry, a nonprofit religious organization headed by Dr. Billy James Hargis.
Christian Echoes National Ministry, 470 F.2d at 849. The organization's extensive publications,
broadcasts, and other activities vigorously reflected its view that the "battle against Communism,
socialism and political liberalism" was an essential part of its theology and its mission. .Id. at
852. Although Christian Echoes had addressed itself to only one piece of pending legislation,
the IRS successfully maintained that the organization's numerous attempts to influence public
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By the mid-1970's, the courts had established no clear principles for
determining whether an organization's activities were substantial attempts to
influence legislation. The IRS tended to follow the views of the most re-
strictive courts. 114 Its position is well represented in its 1966 letter revoking
the exempt status of the Sierra Club."15 In it, the IRS clearly rejected the
notion that any quantitative approach to substantiality is appropriate, dis-
carded the idea that unselfishly-motivated legislative activity should not be
subject to the limitation, and dismissed the contention that only direct
lobbying should be taken into account. In addition to taking a rather ex-
pansive view of the activities which might be counted as lobbying, the Service
characterized the test in terms so flexible as to set no reliable boundaries,
opinion on issues of public policy constituted disqualifying "substantial" attempts to influence
legislation. Id. at 856. To arrive at this conclusion, the court explicitly rejected Seasongood's
percentage test and adopted the Krohn position that the "political activities of an organization
must be balanced in the context of the objectives and circumstances of the organization to
determine whether a substantial part of its activities was to influence or attempt to influence
legislation." Id. at 855. Once the court had taken the position that "[t]he fact that specific
legislation was not mentioned does not mean that [the organization's] attempts to influence
public opinion were not attempts to influence legislation," id., it had no difficulty in concluding
that "[t]he activities of Christian Echoes in influencing or attempting to influence legislation
were not incidental, but were substantial and continuous," and therefore disqualified the
organization under the substantiality test, id. at 856.
The Court of Claims considered the substantiality test in 1974. Haswell, 500 F.2d at 1133.
At issue was the deductibility of contributions to the National Association of Railroad Passengers
(NARP) on the theory that the organization fit the description of section 170(c)(2). That section
does not specify that only gifts to section 501(c)(3) organizations are deductible, but tracks the
language of section 501(c)(3) to describe organizations to which donations are deductible. NARP
had sought and received section 501(c)(4) exempt status, id. at 1137 n.4; Haswell argued here
that the organization nevertheless was described by section 170(c)(2), id. at 1136. Noting that
"[n]either the legislative histories of sections 170(c)(2) and 501(c)(3), nor the cases that have
arisen thereunder, provide specific guidance as to the content of the phrases 'organized and
operated exclusively,' 'no substantial part,' and 'to influence legislation' as used in those
sections," the court joined the IRS and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in the view that
the substantiality limitation applies to unselfishly motivated as well as private interest legislative
involvement and in rejecting any percentage test as the measure of substantiality in favor of
"[balancing political efforts] in the context of the objectives and circumstances of the organ-
ization." Id. at 1142. While rejecting the percentage test approach to determining "substan-
tiality," the court observed that NARP's allocation of approximately 20% of its expenditures
to legislative activities was "an indication of the relative importance of legislative activities in
NARP's total effort." Id. at 1146. To reach its conclusion that NARP's legislative activities
were "substantial," and thus disqualifying under this objectives and circumstances approach,
the court noted that "the legislative program was a primary objective ... and is on an equal
footing with [NARP's] educational and litigative efforts." Id. at 1147.
114. In 1959, the Treasury promulgated regulations which bear on how an organization's
involvement in political issues may affect its exempt status. These regulations specify that no
"action organization" is operated exclusively for exempt purposes, and tie "action organization"
status to substantial involvement in legislative activity. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-I(c)(3) (1959).
They avoid assigning any quantitative content to the term "substantial" and quite clearly
classify not only direct contact with legislators, but also efforts to convince the public to contact
legislators, as "attempting to influence legislation." Id.
115. Letter from District Director to Sierra Club (Dec. 19, 1966), reported in 67 Fed. Taxes
(P-H) § 54,664.
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stating that, in the end, "the determination of whether attempting to influ-
ence legislation is a substantial part of an organization's activities is one of
fact in each case, to be ascertained from all of the evidence." 11 6
As the substantiality test stood before the 1976 amendments, then, it
invited charges that, although important consequences attached to whether
an organization engaged in "substantial" attempts to influence legislation,
it was impossible to predict with any confidence which activities might be
characterized as "attempting to influence legislation" or at what point those
activities could be said to have crossed some line to become "substantial."
Virtually any attention to issues of public policy was susceptible to being
characterized as "legislative activity," and the threshold of tolerance was
very low indeed.
It is no wonder then that the addition of sections 501(h) and 4911 to the
Internal Revenue Code by the Tax Reform Act of 1976 was seen as an
important step in the direction of curing the faults of the pre-1976 substan-
tiality test. The amendments were applauded for providing a liberalized,
116. Id. For detailed discussion of the Sierra Club revocation, see Borod, Lobbying for the
Public Interest: Federal Tax Policy and Administration, 42 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1087 (1967); Caplin,
Limitations on Exempt Organizations: Political and Commercial Activities, in N.Y.U. PRoc.
OF THE EiGHTH BmNmiA CoNp. or CuArrABLE FouND. 265 (H. Sellin ed. 1967); Note, Political
Activity and Tax Exempt Organizations, Before and After the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 38
GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 1114, 1121-25 (1970); Recent Cases, Income Taxes, 80 H~Av. L. REv.
1793 (1967). A less detailed, but even more extreme, illustration of the breadth of discretion
the IRS exercised during this period can be found in the Service's dealings with the Fellowship
of Reconciliation in 1963. See infra note 149.
In 1967, the IRS reiterated its position that neither the community benefit of the legislation
addressed, nor the relationship of an organization's substantial legislative activity to its rec-
ognized charitable purpose will prevent the organization from being classified as an "action
organization." Rev. Rul. 67-293, 1967-2 C.B. 185. And testifying before the House Appro-
priations Committee in 1967, the Commissioner again indicated that the IRS would not apply
a percentage standard, but would measure substantiality of an organization's legislative activity
by considering money spent, staff and volunteer time spent, and the organization's "real
activity." Caplin & Timbie, supra note 108, at 192-93 (citing Hearings on Treasury Dept. and
Related Agencies Appropriations for 1968 Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Appropriations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 536 (1967)).
The IRS's view of its task is further reflected in the Exempt Organizations Handbook, which
sets policy for IRS personnel. The Handbook, too, indicates that the limits of "insubstantial"
legislative activity are set by some shifting sense of how important the activities seem to the
organization's program:
[Tlhere is no simple rule as to what amount of activities is substantial.... Most
cases have tended to avoid any attempt at percentage measurement of activi-
ties.... The central problem is more often one of characterizing the various
attempts to influence legislation. Once this determination is made, substantiality
is frequently self-evident.
Exempt Organizations Handbook, 4 Int. Rev. Man.-Admin. (CCH) § 394.
Further, the Handbook adopts the League of Women Voters and Kuper view of what
constitutes "legislative activity," instructing IRS personnel that while "it is sometimes difficult
to determine what supporting activities should be included with the proscribed attempts to
influence legislation ... [alttempting to influence legislation does not necessarily begin at the
moment the organization first addresses itself to the public or to the legislature." Id.
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quantified "safe harbor" within which organizations could safely address
themselves to public issues and for defining critical terms that, before the
Act, had been open to shifting and extremely limiting interpretation., 7
For organizations which elect its coverage," 8 the central feature of section
501(h) is its expression of the substantiality limitation on lobbying activities
in terms of a percentage of expenditures test. Section 501(h) specifies that
an electing organization's "carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting,
to influence legislation" will not be "substantial" so long as the organization
does not normally exceed amounts established by a formula set out in the
statute. 1 9
The second major impact of the 1976 amendments is the replacement of
the all-or-none loss of exempt status with a scaled system of penalties for
those organizations that choose to be covered by section 501(h) and then
violate its limits. Violations initially result in imposition of an excise tax on
excess lobbying expenditures. Only when the four-year average of the or-
ganization's lobbying expenditures exceed its limits is the organization subject
to revocation of its section 501(c)(3) status.' 20
117. See, e.g., G. MELTON, CHILD ADVOCACY 154 (1983); P. TREIuSCH & N. SuGA mN, TAx
ExmCHr CITABLE ORoANZATONS 195 (2d ed. 1983); Nix, supra note 108, at 414, 420;
Washburn, New Tax Act Defines "Substantial" Lobbying-But Charities Must Elect To Be
Covered, 55 TAxEs 291, 299 (1977); Comment, Tax Subsidies for Political Participation, 31
TAx LAw. 461 (1978).
118. See supra note 102.
119. The basic formula allows electing charities to make, without penalty, annual expenditures
for influencing legislation equal to 20% of the first $500,000 of the organization's "exempt
purpose expenditures," plus 15% of the second $500,000, plus 10% of the third $500,000, plus
5% of any additional expenditures. I.R.C. § 4911(c)(2) (West Supp. 1987). "Exempt purpose
expenditures" include amounts paid or incurred by an exempt organization to carry out the
charitable, educational, or other purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(B) and upon which its
exempt status is based. Id. § 491 1(e)(1)(A). Exempt purpose expenditures include administrative
and lobbying expenses, id. § 4911(e)(1)(B), but do not include expenses for fundraising by a
separate unit or organization; id. § 4911(e)(l)(C). In no case may the "nontaxable lobbying amount"
exceed $1,000,000. Id. § 4911(c)(2). Because the lobbying amount is determined according to
a sliding scale, larger organizations are allowed to spend a smaller amount, proportional to their
total expenditures, than are smaller organizations.
An organization may, without penalty, spend for grass roots lobbying up to 25% of the
amount allowed for lobbying under section 4911(c)(2). Id. § 4911(c)(4). It is interesting to note
that the percentage Congress chose for the lobbying ceiling amount is virtually the same
percentage that the Court of Claims, denying deductibility in Haswell, found to be an indication
that legislative activity was of too much "relative importance ... in NARP's total effort."
Haswell, 500 F.2d at 1146.
120. Violation of the proscription on "substantial" legislative activity so as to justify rev-
ocation of exempt status is defined, for electing organizations, as "normally" making lobbying
expenditures that exceed 150% of the "lobbying nontaxable amount," I.R.C. § 501(h)(1)(A)
(West Supp. 1987), or "normally" making grass roots expenditures that exceed 150% of the
"grass roots nontaxable amount," id. § 501(h)(1)(B). The nontaxable lobbying amount is derived
from the basic formula of section 501(h)-that is, 20% of the organization's first $500,000 of
exempt purpose expenditures, plus a sliding scale of decreasing percentages of additional exempt
purpose expenditures. The grass roots nontaxable amount is equal to 25% of the lobbying
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Finally, sections 501(h) and 4911 supply definitions for key terms in the
new substantiality formula. "Lobbying expenditures" are amounts spent to
"influence legislation." 12 "[I]nfluencing legislation" includes "any attempt
to influence any legislation" either "through an attempt to affect the opinions
of the general public or any segment thereof"' or "through communication
with any member or employee of a legislative body, or with any government
official or employee who may participate in the formulation of the legis-
lation,"''  subject to certain exceptions . 24 Besides defining what is lobbying,
the 1976 provisions specify a number of activities which, by legislative grace,
are not. Activities which are explicitly excluded from the term "influencing
legislation" are "providing of technical advice . .. to a governmental body
or to a committee ... in response to a written request,"'2 "appearances
nontaxable amount.
The revocation sanction is made still less threatening by the meaning that has been given to
the word "normally," as used in this provision. The legislative history of the provision indicates
that "normal" expenditures will be measured by taking a four-year average. H.R. REP. No.
1210, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 9 n.2 (1976); S. REP. No. 938, pt. 2, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at
81 n.3 (1976). See also Exempt Organizations Handbook, 4 Int. Rev. Man.-Admin. (CCH) §
395. Thus, an unusually high level of grass roots or lobbying expenditures in one year, if
balanced by lower levels in the preceding three years, will not lead to revocation of the
organization's tax exempt status. It will, however, subject the organization to the other type
of sanction provided for in the section 501(h) scheme-that is, the imposition of an excise tax
on the excess expenditure.
Section 4911 provides for a first-level sanction on a charitable organization which exceeds
its nontaxable lobbying or grass roots amount in any taxable year. The sanction takes the form
of an excise tax equal to 25% of the overexpenditure. I.R.C. § 4911(a) (West Supp. 1987). If
an organization exceeds both the lobbying and grass roots limiations, the tax is imposed on
the greater of the two excesses. Id. § 4911(b).
Provisions added to the Code by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 impose
an excise tax penalty on any non-electing organization which loses its section 501(c)(3) status
as a result of "substantial" lobbying activity, and an additional penalty on organization
managers who agree to the making of "substantial" lobbying expenditures. Pub. L. No. 100-
203, § 10714 (1987). See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
121. I.R.C. § 4911(c)(1) (West Supp. 1987). For one expert's assessment of what costs should
be included in calculating the expenditures, see 4 S. WErraojR, supra note 4, at 34-61, 34-62.
In Weithorn's judgment, an organization must allocate portions of staff salaries, overhead,
and travel expenses to "lobbying expenditures." Id. The recent proposed regulations, see supra
note 2, support this interpretation.
122. I.R.C. §§ 4911(c)(3), 4911(d)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1987).
123. Id. § 4911(d)(1)(B). Section 4911 defines additional terms. The term "grass roots expen-
ditures" is defined to include only the first half of the lobbying expenditures definition, that
is, expenditures to influence legislation by affecting the opinions of the general public or some
segment thereof. Id. § 4911(c)(3).
"Legislation," according to the scheme of the 1976 Act, "includes action with respect to
Acts, bills, resolutions, or similar items by Congress, any State legislature, any local council
or similar governing body, or by the public in a referendum, initiative, constitutional amend-
ment, or similar procedure." Id. § 4911(e)(2). "Action," in the context of the definition of
legislation, is "limited to the introduction, amendment, enactment, defeat, or repeal" of
legislation. Id. § 4911(e)(3).
124. Id. § 4911(d)(2).
125. Id. § 4911(d)(2)(B).
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before, or communications to, any legislative body with respect to a possible
decision by such body which might affect the existence of the organization,
its powers and duties, tax-exempt status, or the deduction of contribu-
tions,"1 26 and communications with non-legislative government officials, so
long as the communication does not urge the influencing of legislation. 27
Also exempted from the definition of "influencing legislation" are an or-
ganization's communications with bona fide members,' 28 unless such com-
126. Id. § 4911(d)(2)(C).
127. Id. § 4911(d)(2)(E).
128. Id. § 4911(d)(2)(D). The Senate Report on the Tax Reform Act specifies that if less
than 15% of the distribution of an organization's publication is to nonmembers, then the
portion of the publication's cost which is allocable to:
material directly encouraging the members to engage in direct lobbying is to be
treated as an expenditure for direct lobbying .... [T]he fact that some copies
of the publication are distributed to libraries and other bona fide subscribers will
not cause any portion of those expenditures to be treated as expenditures for
grass roots lobbying. On the other hand, if more than 15 percent of the copies
are distributed to nonmembers (including libraries), the portion of the cost of the
publication allocable to the lobbying material is to be allocated between activities
relating to members and the activities relating to nonmembers (grass roots lob-
bying) in proportion to the distribution of the publication.
S. REP. No. 938, pt. 2, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 81 n.4 (1976).
The specification of the 15% standard is one of the few items on which the Senate Report
varied from the House Ways and Means Committee Report on the bill, which supported the
same general approach, but which used the term "insubstantial" in place of the numerical test.
See Hyslop & Ebell, supra note 4, at 288; Washburn, supra note 117, at 294. Washburn points
out that since the legislative provisions were added to the 1976 Tax Reform Act by the Senate,
the Senate Report prevails in areas of disagreement. Id. at 294 n.16.
Thus, if an electing organization publishes an eight-page newsletter, one page of which is a
"legislative alert" urging readers to contact members of the legislature on matters before it,
one-eighth of the cost of preparing and mailing the publication must be charged to direct
lobbying, so long as at least 86% of circulation is directed to bona fide members of the
organization. However, if, for example, 20% of circulation is to nonmembers, the organization
must divide the cost of the "legislative alert" page-that is, one-eighth of the publication cost-
allocating 80% of that amount to direct lobbying and 20% to grass roots lobbying expenditures.
Washburn suggests that the potential complexity of record-keeping and accounting required by
this two-tiered allocation system might be incentive enough for an organization with a large
nonmember circulation of its publication to avoid the section 501(h) election altogether. Wash-
burn, supra note 117, at 298.
Because the allocation requirement turns on the proportion of distribution to "bona fide
members," the definition of that term takes on a special importance. The House Report defines
"bona fide member" to be a person who has "more than a nominal connection with the
organization." In addition to having "affirmatively expressed a desire to be a member," a
"bona fide member" must also pay more than nominal dues, contribute more than a nominal
amount of time to the organization, or be one of a limited number of "honorary" or "life"
members. H.R. REP. No. 1210, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1976).
These standards prevent an organization from unilaterally bestowing "membership" upon
all who are on its mailing list in order to avoid having to allocate publication costs to the
lower grass roots lobbying ceiling. The House Report requirements are designed to ensure that
an organization's membership standards "do not serve as a subterfuge for grass roots lobbying
activities." Id. It is not absolutely necessary that the organization's membership qualifications
coincide with those specified; the report states that an organization may be able to persuade
the IRS that its nonconforming membership requirements are supported by "a good reason."
Id.
[Vol. 63:201
EXEMPT ORGANIZATION ADVOCACY
munications urge the member to contact legislators 29 or to urge others to
contact legislators, 130 and "making available the results of nonpartisan anal-
ysis, study, or research."''
The statute does not define "nonpartisan analysis, study, or research."
Several commentators suggested that, pending IRS elaboration of the 1976
amendments through regulations, guidance could be found in the regulations
amplifying parallel provisions of section 4945. Section 4945 imposes an excise
tax on any amount spent for lobbying by private foundations. 32 The section
4945 regulations explain that "nonpartisan analysis, study, or research"
means "independent and objective exposition of a particular subject matter,
including any activity which is 'educational' within the meaning of Treasury
regulation, section 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3).' ' 33 A study is nonpartisan despite its
advocacy of "a particular position or viewpoint," so long as it presents "a
sufficiently full and fair exposition of the pertinent facts" to permit its
readers to "form an independent opinion or conclusion." A study does not
fall within the exception if it is a "mere presentation of unsupported
opinion. ' ' 34 An organization may disseminate the results of its nonpartisan
research by any reasonable means, but it may not limit or direct its distri-
bution "toward persons who are interested solely in one side of a particular
issue,"' 35 nor time its presentation so as to implicitly favor one side of an
issue and still remain within the bounds of the exception. 136 The recently
proposed regulations, the fate of which is, at this point, quite uncertain,
13 7
indicate that the IRS does indeed intend to give "nonpartisan analysis, study,
or research" the same meaning regardless of context.'38
129. I.R.C. § 4911(d)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1987). If it does so, it is "influencing legislation"
under section 4911(d) and a "lobbying expenditure" under section 4911(c)(1).
130. If it does so, it is a "grass roots expenditure" under section 4911(c)(2). Id. § 4911(d)(3)(B).
131. Id. § 4911(d)(2)(A).
132. See, e.g., 4 S. WErrHoRN, supra note 4, at 34-57 to 34-59; Nix, supra note 108, at 422
n.58; Shrekgast, Political Lobbying of Exempt Organizations, 37 N.Y.U. INsT. ON FED. TAX'N
pt. 2, 26-1, 26-15 (1979); Washburn, supra note 117, at 295.
The suggestion is a logical one. Not only do the two sections contain much identical language,
but the legislative history of the 1976 Act indicates that Congress was conscious of the similarity.
House Report No. 1210 notes that three of the categories of activities excluded from the concept
of "influencing legislation" in section 4911 are also excluded under the private foundation
provisions of section 4945. H.R. REP. No. 1210, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1976).
133. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
134. Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-2(d)(1)(ii) (1972).
135. Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-2(d)(1)(iv) (1972).
136. Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-2(d)(1)(iii) (1972); Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-2(d)(1)(v) Example (7)
(1972).
137. See supra notes 2-9 and accompanying text.
138. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-3(b), 51 Fed. Reg. 40,223 (1986) ("For guidance
in determining whether an amount is paid or incurred for, or in connection with, making
available the results of nonpartisan analysis, study, or research see § 53.4945-2(d)(1).").
The private foundation regulations offer guidance as to the meaning of the other section
4911 exceptions as well. The section 4911 exception for "providing technical advice or assistance
1987]
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The 1976 provisions were applauded for the relative certainty and new
flexibility they offered to electing organizations. 39 Close analysis of the
provisions reveals, however, that although the 1976 Tax Reform Act did
indeed make some changes in the lobbying restrictions for public charities,
the new provisions are not much different from the old and, ultimately, fail
to cure the problems of indefiniteness and inconsistency that were the focus
of criticism in the pre-1976 scheme.
The communications to bona fide members exception aside, most of the
activities designated "non-legislative" by the 1976 Act were actually excluded
from the measure ,of lobbying activities under the old section 501(c)(3)
provisions, either by reference to definitions contained in the more severe
lobbying restrictions imposed on private foundations in 1969, 40 or by virtue
• .. in response to a written request by [a governmental] body for committee]," I.R.C. §
4911(d)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1987), also tracks an identical section 4945(e) provision. To fit within
this exception, according to the section 4945 regulations, the 'request must come from and the
response be addressed to the entire body or committee, rather than an individual member
thereof- Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-2(d)(2)(i) (1972). The material presented need not be balanced,
as it must to qualify for the nonpartisan study exception. The organization's opinions or
recommendations may be presented if specifically requested by the governmental body or if
they "are directly related to the materials so requested." Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-2(d)(2)('i) (1972);
Treas. Reg. § 534945-2(d)(2)(iii) Examples (1)-(3) (1972).
The "self-defense" lobbying exception of section 491(d)(2)(c) tracks the private foundation
provision of section 4945(e), which is amplified by Treasury Regulation section 53.4945-2(d)(3).
This exception does not extend to attempts to influence legislative decisions -which "merely
affect the scope of the [organization's] future activities." Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-2(d)(3)(ii)
Examples (3) & (4) (1972). Thus, while an organization may, under this exception, lobby freely
to revise the tax law which governs deductibility of contributions made to it, it may not urge
continued funding of a government program under which it has a contract, and the exception
would certainly not extend to lobbying on issues that are substantively related to the organi-
zation's charitable purpose, but which have no direct impact on the legal status of the organ-
ization. The proposed section 4911 regulations cross-reference the private foundation provisions
addressing technical assistance and self-defense lobbying. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-3(c), (d),
51 Fed. Reg. 40,223 (1986).
Section 4911's final exception to the definition of "influencing legislation" has no parallel
in the private foundation provisions of section 4945(e). Section 4911(d)(2)(E) permits an or-
ganization to communicate with any non-legislative government official or employee, so long
as the contact is not for the principal purpose of influencing legislation. Since it has no explicit
counterpart in the private foundation portion of the Code, this exception stands without
elaboration. It has been suggested that this exception is designed to clarify the distinction
between the respective effects on exempt status of administrative and legislative advocacy and
to ensure that engaging in the former will not raise an inference of lobbying. 4 S. WITHORN,
supra note 4, at 34-59. Although not explicit, a similar exception for private foundations may
well be implied by the descriptions of "legislation" and "propaganda influencing legislation"
found in Treasury Regulation section 53.4945-2(a)(1), (2). See infra note 140 and accompanying
text.
139. See, e.g., Nix, supra note 108, at 424; Washburn, supra note 117, at 299.
140. To the extent that the 1976 provisions are given content by the section 4945 regulations,
they are deprived of much of their impact as an instrument of change because, although
Congress stated its intent that the new rules apply only to organizations that may and do elect
to be covered by section 501(h), many of the "new" provisions were already applicable to all
section 501(c)(3) organizations. The Joint Committee Explanation which accompanied the 1969
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of IRS interpretations of the section 501(c)(3) lobbying restrictions them-
Tax Reform Act indicates that Congress thought that tne specific provisions of section 4945
would clarify, but not modify (except by removing the "substantiality" threshold insofar as
private foundations were concerned), the section 501(c)(3) lobbying restrictions. STAFF OF THE
JoINT CoMI. ON INT. REv. TAX., 91sT CONG., 2D SEss., GENRA EXPLANATION OF T TAX
REFoRM ACT OF 1969 47, 49 (Comm. Print 1970). See Caplin & Timbie, supra note 108, at
188 (noting in 1975 that the section 4945 regulations "are the best available measure of [the]
Treasury's current position on the meaning of legislative activity for section 501(c)(3) purposes").
The IRS had also acknowledged the relationship of section 4945 and its regulations to the
concept of activities which constitute attempts to influence legislation for purposes of section
501(c)(3). "The legislative history surrounding the enactment of Code § 4945(d) and (e) indicates
that Congress viewed § 4945(e) as a clarification of the phrase 'attempt to influence legislation'
in all contexts in which that phrase is used with respect to exempt organizations." Gen. Couns.
Mem. 36,127 (June 6, 1974). See also Haswell, 500 F.2d at 1141 (applying section 4945 and
its regulations to determine whether NARP was an "action organization" under section 501(c)(3),
noting that section 4945 and its amplifying regulations "provide additional and more precise
definitions of activities that are included within the § 501(c)(3) lobbying restrictions").
Section 4911 specifies two categories of exempt activities which have no direct parallel in the
section 4945 or section 501(c)(3) regulations. The exemption for contact with non-legislative
government officials for purposes other than to influence legislation is one of these and might
thus be thought to apply only to section 501(h) electing organizations. It seems clear, however,
that the exception, although not listed with the others in the section 4945 regulations, is solidly
incorporated into other portions of those regulations. The private foundation regulations define
"attempts to influence legislation" to "include communications with a member or employee
of a legislative body or with an official of the executive department of a government. . . with
respect to legislation being considered by, or to be submitted imminently to, a legislative body."
Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-2(a)(1) (1972). The clear implication of this formulation is that com-
munication with an executive official on a subject other than a current legislative proposal is
not an "attempt to influence legislation" for purposes of section 4945 or (through the appli-
cability of the section 4945 regulations) of section 501(c)(3). At most, it appears that under
the section 4945 regulations, an organization might have to count as legislative activity that
proportion of a multi-purpose contact with an executive official that dealt with pending or
imminent legislation, while an organization which had elected section 501(h) coverage would
not, so long as the "principal purpose" of the communication was not to influence legislation.
I.R.C. § 4911(d)(2)(E) (West Supp. 1987).
The communication with members exception of section 4911 has no counterpart in section
4945, either explicitly or by implication. Thus, it appears to be the only one of the "new"
exception categories that truly creates a distinction between a charity which elects under section
501(h) and one which remains subject to the "old" section 501(c)(3) substantiality test. Most
of the categories of legislative activities that are exempted under section 4911 are equally
exempted under the general section 501(c)(3) provision, and should not enter into an assessment
of the substantiality of lobbying by organizations subject to the old, qualitative test any more
than they do for those which have made the section 501(h) election. Furthermore, the definitions
which fill out the term "influencing legislation" in the various sections, though not identical
in their language, seem indistinguishable in their meaning. What sections 501(h) and 4911 say
it means for an electing organization to "influence legislation" is essentially the same as what
the section 501(c)(3) regulations and, by implication, the section 4945 regulations say it means
for a non-electing organization to "influence legislation."
While the 1976 provisions were the first to incorporate the term "grass roots" into the Code,
the lobbying restriction has long included the kind of activity now given that label. Section
4911(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code defines "grass roots" lobbying to be "any attempt
to influence any legislation through an attempt to affect the opinions of the general public or
any segment thereof." Treasury Regulation section 1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(3)(ii)(a) states that "influ-
encing legislation" includes urging the public to contact legislators; section 53.4945-2(a)(1)
includes in its definition "efforts to affect the opinion of the general public." Thus, the
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selves.' 41 To be sure, an electing organization has the certainty of knowing
restriction on "grass roots" lobbying efforts is neither new nor limited to electing organizations.
All three sections, of course, restrict direct communication with legislators about legislation.
I.R.C. § 4911(d)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1987); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(li)(a) (1959); Treas.
Reg. § 53.4945-2(a)(1) (1972). All three offer equivalent definitions as to what constitutes
legislative action. Section 4911 defines "legislation" to include "action with respect to Acts,
bills, resolutions, or similar items by the Congress, any State legislature, any local council, or
similar governing body, or by the public in a referendum, initiative, constitutional amendment,
or similar procedure." I.R.C. § 4911(e)(2) (West Supp. 1987). The section 501(c)(3) regulations
use virtually identical language. The only difference, that is, deletion of the words "with
respect to Acts, bills, resolutions, or similar items," has no effect on substance. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii) (1959). The section 4945 regulations, which, according to legislative history,
apply to section 501(c)(3), see supra, and which probably bear on section 4911 as well, see supra
note 132 and accompanying text, repeat the same language and then elaborate somewhat: "[s]uch
term does not include actions by executive, judicial, or administrative bodies. For purposes of
the preceding sentence, school boards, housing authorities, sewer and water districts, zoning boards
and other similar federal, state, or local special purpose bodies, whether elective or appointive,
shall be considered administrative bodies." Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-2(a)(2) (1972).
The "action" which electing charities are not supposed to influence, by either direct or
"grass roots" contacts, is defined by section 4911(e)(3) to be "limited to the introduction,
amendment, enactment, defeat, or repeal of Acts, bills, resolutions, or similar items." This
statement differs from that given in the section 4945 regulations only slightly. In that section,
the word "action" "includes the introduction, enactment, defeat, or repeal of legislation." Id.
Thus, the "new" provision of section 4911 inserts "amendment," replaces "legislation" with
a list of components, and "limits" rather than "includes." These appear to be clarifications
rather than significant changes. The section 4945 regulations, in turn, seem designed to clarify
rather than to alter the substance of the section 501(c)(3) definition-that is, "proposing,
supporting, or opposing legislation." Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(iii) (1959).
141. Well before the enactment of the 1976 amendments, the IRS had explicitly held that
nonpartisan research does not constitute an attempt to influence legislation. Rev. Rul. 64-195,
1964-2 C.B. 138. See also 4 S. WErrHoRN, supra note 4, at 34-36 (quoting testimony of Edwin
S. Cohen, then Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, before the House Ways and Means
Committee, May 3, 1972). There is direct reference to the nonpartisan analysis, research or
study exception in the section 501(c)(3) regulations, although since none of the section 501(c)(3)
regulations addresses the issue of substantiality, the discussion arises in another context. The
phrase appears in a section which describes "action organizations." Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-
1(c)(3)(iv) (1959). For a discussion of the interrelationship between the "substantiality" and
"action organization" provisions, see infra notes 145-51 and accompanying text. Invited tes-
timony was also excluded from attempts to influence legislation. Rev. Rul. 70-449, 1970-2 C.B.
111, 112 (for purposes of section 501(c)(3), "attempts to influence legislation ... imply an
affirmative act and require something more than a mere passive response to a Committee
invitation").
While the House Report on the 1976 amendments demonstrates that Congress was aware
that nonpartisan research and invited testimony were excluded from consideration under the
section 501(c)(3) substantiality test, H.R. RP. No. 1210, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 n.5 (1976),
the report makes no reference to an already existing exclusion of self-defense lobbying. The
IRS, however, had taken the position in 1970 that such an exclusion in fact applied. The IRS
based this conclusion on: 1) the notion that the 1969 section 4945 amendments were intended
to restate, but not revise, the existing definition of attempting to influence legislation, and 2)
the idea that since the 1934 addition of the lobbying restrictions was simply a codification of
Slee, which at least implied that charitable organizations could engage in self-defense lobbying,
the exception is inherent in the basic statutory provision. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,289 (May 8,
1970).
The Exempt Organizations Handbook, revised in 1982, continues to describe the restrictions
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that the extent of its legislative activity will be measured in terms of dollars
expended. Much of the certainty fades, however, unless it is possible to
predict with some confidence exactly which expenses will be ascribed to
legislative activity. Largely because their pivotal terms share definitions with
those of the old section 501(c)(3) substantiality test, the 1976 provisions,
despite their apparent detail, do not afford that confidence. For example,
all charitable organizations, whether or not they elect to come under section
501(h), are free to undertake "nonpartisan analysis, study, and research."' 142
Yet the line between "nonpartisan analysis" and "attempting to influence
legislation" is far from clear. 43
A second source of uncertainty is the difficulty of confidently predicting
which supporting activities will be considered to be part of an organization's
on non-electing charitable organizations' attempts to influence legislation in terms that indicate
that the Service has not altered its view. The Handbook specifically states that "appearances
before legislative committees in response to official requests for testimony" and "non-partisan
study [and] research" are not among the proscribed activities. Exempt Organizations Handbook,
4 Int. Rev. Man.-Admin. (CCH) §§ 392(3), 392(5).
A synopsis of the IRS's understanding of the prohibition on excessive legislative activity by
charitable organizations was delivered by Edwin S. Cohen, then Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury, in 1972 (after the 1969 Tax Reform Act, but before the 1976 amendments):
[WMe have interpreted it so as to permit research and study of matters that may
become the subject of legislation, and the publication of those studies. We have
also interpreted it as permitting attempts to influence administrative decisions as
to the application of legislation, and to influence the exercise of administrative
officials of discretion given to them by legislation. We have interpreted it to
permit litigation in the courts to construe legislation that has been enacted or to
construe the provisions of constitutions.
Cohen, Testimony before the House Ways and Means Comm., quoted in 4 S. WErrHoRN,
supra note 4, at 34-36.
142. See supra notes 131-38 and accompanying text.
143. The section 4945 regulations define "nonpartisan analysis, study, or research" to include
any activity which is "educational," that is, any communication that offers a "full and fair
exposition" of the pertinent facts. Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-2(d)(1)(ii) (1972). Several illustrative
examples provided by the regulations suggest that presenting a conclusion which supports one
side of an issue, even an issue that is the subject of pending legislation, may or may not be
"nonpartisan analysis."
Although the regulation at least supports the proposition that communications that are not
"the mere presentation of unsupported opinion" would be "nonpartisan analysis," the dis-
tinction really appears to turn not on whether the conclusion is supported, but whether it is
accompanied by some threshold quantum of information that is counter to the position taken.
The examples, however, provide no real guidance as to what the threshold is, stating in rather
conclusory terms that the situations described either do or do not present a sufficiently "full
and fair exposition." In the last analysis, then, the decision as to whether the costs of a
particular communication would be included or excluded, for purposes of the section 501(h)
calculation, turns on the indeterminate concept of "full and fair exposition," which presumably
defies reliable defimition in this context just as surely as it does in the context of defining
"educational." See Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-2(d)(1)(v) Examples (2), (4) & (5) (1972); Exempt
Organizations Handbook, 4 Int. Rev. Man.-Admin. (CCH) § 395. Furthermore, the questions
raised and left unanswered in that context by Big Mama Rag, 631 F.2d at 1030, and National
Alliance, 710 F.2d at 830, see supra notes 79-100 and accompanying text, would seem to carry
over into this context as well.
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attempts to influence legislation. The IRS continues to take the position that
"[aIttempting to influence legislation does not necessarily begin at the mo-
ment the organization first addresses itself to the public or the legislature"
and that study and research will be considered legislative activity if they
serve "merely as a preparatory stage for the advocacy of legislation."'-
Thus, although the 1976 provisions assure an electing organization that it
is the cost, rather than some vague notion of time and effort spent, that
will be assessed to determine the substantiality of its legislative activities,
they fall short of allowing the organization to be confident that the IRS
will not include in the tally expenditures beyond those which the organization
itself would classify as having been incurred in connection with "attempts
to influence legislation."
Finally, the addition of sections 501(h) and 4911 does not appear to
preclude denial of exempt status on the ground that an organization is an
"action organization" and, therefore, not "operated exclusively" for exempt
purposes. Historically, the basis for restricting the political involvement of
charitable organizations has been found not only in the substantiality pro-
vision, but also in the basic requirement that exempt organizations be "or-
ganized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable .... or educational
purposes.' ' 45 The "action organization" provision is found in the regulations
which delineate when an organization is not "operated exclusively for char-
itable purposes."' 46 The term is given several definitions, 47 the last of which
144. Exempt Organizations Handbook, 4 Int. Rev. Man.-Admin. (CCH) §§ 392(3), (5),
394(3) (citing League of Women Voters, 180 F. Supp. at 379; Kuper, 332 F.2d at 562).
145. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
The legislative history of the Act announces that sections 501(h) and 4911 are not intended
to have any effect on "whether an expenditure might cause the organization to lose its charitable
status because the expenditure violates the requirement that the organization be ... operated
'exclusively' for charitable . . .purposes." H.R. REP. No. 1210, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 n.6
(1976); STAFF OF THE JOINT CoM. ON INT. REV. TAX., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TIM TAX
REFoRM AcT OF 1976 411 n.7, reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. Vol. 2, 1, 423. It has been suggested
that the significance of this statement is to establish that an amount of lobbying activity that
is acceptable under section 501(h) could still be unacceptable under the "operated exclusively"
requirement if the lobbying concerns non-charitable subject matter, See Shrekgast, supra note
132, at 26-32. Thus, the extent to which an organization might be vulnerable under the "operated
exclusively" requirement could potentially impose significant constraints on its advocacy activ-
ities quite separate from those which inhere in the "no substantial part" requirement.
146. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3) (1959).
147. One of the definitions states that "[a]n organization is an 'action' organization if a
substantial part of its activities is attempting to influence legislation by propaganda or other-
wise." Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii) (1959) (emphasis added). If the section 501(h) and
section 4911 approach truly has no effect on the "operated exclusively" requirement, it would
appear that an organization which elects to be covered by section 501(h) is subject to both the
new and the old "substantiality" tests, and could be penalized for activity that is well within
the section 4911 limits but is found to exceed the indeterminate, "facts and circumstances"
substantiality threshold. Of course, this result is logically insupportable; a much more reasonable
interpretation is that, for an electing organization, the measure of "substantial" legislative
involvement will always follow the section 4911 formula. The proposed regulations, see supra
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focuses on whether the accomplishment of the organization's primary ob-
jectives is likely to require legislative action and whether the organization
"advocates" for the attainment of those objectives. 4 1 While this regulation
appears to focus on both means and ends, it is not clear exactly what kind
of activity-will constitute "advocacy" that may trigger the action organization
characterization. The uncertainty is introduced by several IRS pronounce-
ments which suggest that the threshold of "advocacy" in this context does
not necessarily require that the organization address itself to specific, pending
legislative proposals.149 This last definition of "action organization" has long
note 2 and accompanying text, support this interpretation, specifying that an electing organi-
zation "will not be considered an 'action' organization by reason of this subdivision (ii)" if it
exceeds the section 501(h) limits. Prop. Treas- Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-I(c)(3)(fi), 51 Fed. Reg. 40,213
(1987).
148. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(3)(iv) (1959).
149. The Revenue Ruling cited by the Exempt Organizations Handbook as an example of
an "action organization" under this last definition disqualified an organization because it was
"primarily engaged in teaching and advocating the adoption of a particular doctrine or theory
... [which could] be attained only by legislative action." Exempt Organizations Handbook,
4 Int. Rev. Man.-Admin. § 392(2) (1982) (citing Rev. Rul. 62-71, 1962-1 C.B 85). There is no
indication in the Ruling that the organization was addressing actual pending or imminent
legislative proposals.
Other IRS statements also suggest, although not consistently, that general "advocacy" ob-
jectives that would ultimately require legislation for their attainment may be an independent
basis for denial of exempt status. In General Counsel Memorandum 37,247 (Sept. 8, 1977),
the IRS took the position that an organization's ultimate goal of freeing the individual from
governmental and social control could be achieved only illegally or by legislation. Advocacy
of illegal action would preclude "charitable" classification; advocacy of legislation would
disqualify the group as an action organization under the final definition. Some concern was
expressed that the organization might be engaging in legislative activity; it is not clear that the
general political focus of the organization would have been enough to cause the IRS to disqualify
it.
Perhaps the most dramatic example of the application of this provision was the IRS's
revocation of the exempt status of the Fellowship of Reconciliation in f963. Although the 40-
year-old organization was involved in no legislative activity, the IRS concluded that the or-
ganization's stated goal of attaining international peace could be achieved ultimately only
through legislation. See 4 S. Warraoxr, supra note 4, at 34-13; Caplin & Timbie, supra note
108, at 187; Comment, The Revenue Code and a Charity's Politics; 73 YaE L.J. 661 (1964).
In the section which deals with private foundations, the Exempt Organizations Handbook
notes that "activities which appear by themselves to be educational in nature may, in fact, be
part of a broader purpose to influence specific legislative action" and cites Robert's Dairy
Company v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 948, 950 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 865
(1952), which held that since the organization's ultimate object was the revision of the tax
laws, it was attempting to influence legislation. But see Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,741 (Nov. 9,
1978) (section 501(c)(3) status was granted because the organization's primary objectives were
not dependent on adoption or rejection of legislation and because the organization did not
contact legislators or its members to urge action on pending legislation; it is unclear whether
the first factor would have defeated exemption absent the second, but it seems unlikely, in this
case, given the generally approving tone of the memorandum); Rev. Rul. 70-79, 1970-1 C.B.
127 (section 501(c)(3) status granted because "[a]lthough some of the plans and policies for-
mulated by the organization can be carried out only through legislative enactments, the or-
ganization does not direct its efforts or expend funds in making any legislative recommendations,
preparing prospective legislation, or contacting legislators"); Rev. Rul. 68-656, 1968-2 C.B. 216
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been criticized for the virtually unlimited discretion it gives the IRS to focus
on an organization's ultimate goals instead of the nature of its activities. 50
Nothing suggests that the complaint is any less apt today. In fact, it has
been suggested that insofar as a liberalized and clarified substantiality test
diminishes the Service's ability to deny exemption on the basis of clear
legislative activity, it might be encouraged to rely on the separate application
of the action organization regulations.' 5'
A section 501(c)(3) organization which finds the limits on legislative ad-
vocacy to be too constraining might consider establishing a sister organization
under section 501(c)(4).152 Section 501(c)(4) extends exempt status, but not
eligibility to receive deductible contributions, to "social welfare" organi-
zations.5 3 Section 501(c)(4) organizations must be "primarily engaged in
promoting in some way the common good and general welfare of the people
of the community,"' 54 but need not limit their legislative advocacy efforts
to "insubstantial" amounts. 5 In addressing questions about the constitu-
tionality of the section 501(c)(3) lobbying restrictions which had been raised
by commentators for years,' 56 the Supreme Court's 1983 opinion in Regan
(organization could not qualify for section 501(c)(3) status because achievement of the
organization's cause would require change in law and because the organization drafts and
circulates petitions to have legislation introduced; there is no indication as to whether the first
factor alone would have been sufficient to disqualify the organization).
150. Shortly after the regulations were adopted, Professor Clark observed that they are
"sufficiently broad to permit either a relaxed or a strict administration depending upon which-
ever way the Treasury wishes to throw the switch." Clark, supra note 38, at 452.
151. Comment, supra note 117, at 477-78. See also Garrett, supra note 108, at 577 (suggesting
that organizations that engage in no lobbying, but do take firm positions on controversial
issues, are at risk of disqualification under the action organization regulations). In fact, the
recently proposed section 4911 regulations, see supra notes 2-9 and accompanying text, indicate
that the IRS intends to reserve this option. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(h)-I, 51 Fed. Reg. 40,213
(1987) ("An organization that elects the expenditure test may nevertheless be determined to be
an action organization under § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(iii) [election campaign participation] or (iv)
[primary objective may be attained only by legislation and organization advocates, as distin-
guished from engaging in nonpartisan analysis, study, or research].").
152. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (West Supp. 1987).
153. Id.
154. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2) (1959).
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., Caplin & Timbie, supra note 108, at 184; Graetz & Jeffries, Limitations on
Lobbying by Charitable Organizations, in 5 COMMSSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBuc
NEEDS, RESEARCH PAPERS 2945 (1977); Levy & Nielsen, An Agenda for the Future, in 2
COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLC NEEDS, RESEARCH PAPERS 1029, 1037 (1977);
Mavity & Ylvisaker, Private Philanthropy & Public Affairs, in 2 COMISSION ON PRIVATE
PHI.ANnRopy AND PUBLIC NEDs, RESEARCH PAPERs 795, 835 (1977) (quoting Sen. Vance Hartke,
Speech to the Council on Foundations New England Regional Conference, Hartford, Conn.
(Feb. 27, 1975)); Troyer, supra note 108. Mavity and Ylvisaker, noting that the challenges
were to be found in the literature, rather than in litigation by organizations subject to the
restrictions, observed that "it is commentary enough on the timidity of philanthropy's leadership,
and on the dominance of tax considerations, that what is a logical imperative and presumptively
a constitutional tight has been surrendered without the semblance of heroic struggle." Mavity
& Ylvisaker, supra, at 835.
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v. Taxation With Representation of Washington 57 seems to clear the way
for close affiliation between a section 501(c)(3) organization and a lobbying
section 501(c)(4) entity.
Taxation With Representation of Washington (TWR) was the product of
the merger of a section 501(c)(3) organization, which sought to promote the
public interest in federal taxation issues through litigation and publication
of a journal, and a section 501(c)(4) organization, which pursued the same
goal through legislative advocacy." 8 When TWR was denied section 501(c)(3)
status, it challenged the section 501(c)(3) lobbying restrictions on two grounds:
first, that the restrictions imposed an unconstitutional condition on the
organization's exercise of its first amendment rights, and second, that they
violated the equal protection guarantees of the fifth amendment by subsi-
dizing lobbying activities of veterans' groups-which may receive deductible
contributions, but which are not subject to limits on legislative activities-
while failing to subsidize similar lobbying by charitable organizations. 59
On its way to holding that the differential treatment of veterans' and
charitable organizations does not violate guarantees of equal protection, 16
the Supreme Court rejected the first amendment argument that the lobbying
constraints force a section 501(c)(3) organization to forego constitutionally
protected speech in order to receive a government benefit to which it is
otherwise entitled (here, the deductibility of contributions). 16' The Court held
that the lobbying restrictions simply implement a Congressional judgment
that legislative activity is worthy of exemption but should not be extended
the second level of favorable tax treatment represented by deductibility.
Since it was already settled that a Congressional decision not to "subsidize"
lobbying with a tax deduction for its cost does not, in and of itself, infringe
first amendment rights, 62 the lobbying restrictions are not constitutionally
infirm unless they somehow impose a penalty beyond nondeductibility of
the funds used for lobbying. The Court concluded that no such penalty is
imposed by the lobbying restrictions, because a section 501(c)(3) organization
157. 461 U.S. 540 (1983). Although the case involved a challenge to the pre-1976 provision,
its principles apply equally to organizations which elect section 501(h) coverage.
158. Id. at 543; Taxation With Representation of Washington v. Regan, 676 F.2d 715, 717
n.l (D.C. Cir. 1982).
159. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. at 542.
160. Id. at 549. The Court overturned the D.C. Circuit on this point, disagreeing with that
court's conclusions, first, that it was appropriate to apply a heightened standard of review to
the evaluation of the difference in treatment, Taxation With Representation, 676 F.2d at 724,
and second, that the differences could not be justified even under a rational basis standard,
id. at 739.
161. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. at 545.
162. Id. at 546 (citing Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959)). This principle,
taken from Cammarano, is the starting place for first amendment analysis of tax deduction
issues that implicate protected speech. Even the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, in reaching
the opposite result in Taxation With Representation, took no issue with this basic first amend-
ment analysis. 676 F.2d at 717.
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that wishes to lobby can simply organize itself into a dual structure, isolating
the lobbying activities into an affiliated section 501(c)(4) entity which would
be tax exempt, but not eligible to receive deductible contributions.' 63 In this
way, the section 501(c)(3) organization can continue to receive and expend
deductible funds for all but its legislative activities. The Court appeared to
characterize this affiliation arrangement as nothing more than a procedural
formality, designed to keep the finances of the two organizations separate-
a simple matter of bookkeeping.'6
Although exempt organizations were on the losing side in TWR, the effect
of the decision may be to ease the constraints on the degree to which they
can engage in legislative advocacy. If, in fact, the decision authorizes the
close affiliation of a section 501(c)(3) organization with a lobbying section
501(c)(4) entity, it would seem to override IRS pronouncements suggesting
that a substantially greater degree of independence between the two organ-
izations is required than simply separate incorporation and funding 65
It has been suggested that the TWR decision does, in fact, have a liber-
alizing effect. Because the opinion ties the constitutionality of the limitations
to the unfettered ability of a section 501(c)(3) organization to affiliate with
a lobbying section 501(c)(4) group, the IRS cannot constitutionally continue
(or reinstate) its prior practice of insisting upon separate directors, staff,
163. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. at 544.
164. Id. Concurring in the opinion, Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall insisted that
the constitutionality of the lobbying restrictions in fact depend on this characterization; if the
IRS were to limit the section 501(c)(3)-501(c)(4) connection beyond insisting upon a clear fiscal
separation, the lobbying constraints would indeed impose a penalty upon the section 501(c)(3)
organization, rather than simply declining to subsidize its legislative activity. Id. at 552-54.
165. A striking example was the Service's response to the Center on Corporate Responsibility's
second-round application for section 501(c)(3) status. In response to the IRS's position that
proxy contests are inherently non-charitable activities, the Center split off the proxy activities
into a separate, non-exempt organization and assured the IRS that it had ceased all involvement
in the proxy contests, but expected to act as counsel for the non-exempt affiliate in connection
with the affiliate's proxy fight activities. Center on Corporate Responsibility v. Schultz, 368
F. Supp. 863, 867 (D.D.C. 1973). Acknowledging that "the mere fact that an otherwise charitable
organization is in some way affiliated with a noncharitable organization is not necessarily fatal
to charitable qualification," id. at 876, the IRS nevertheless contended that, given the "common
control and interrelation of the two programs," Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,341 (May 16, 1963),
to grant section 501(c)(3) status to the Center would be equivalent to allowing the organization
"to indirectly devote its resources to ends which we previously concluded have not been shown
to be charitable," id. The ostensible basis for the IRS position was the well-established principle
that charitable resources must not be expended for the noncharitable activity of a noncharitable
affiliate, and the "common control and overlapping personnel" of the two organizations raised
doubts about whether the required separation of resources could be effectively monitored.
Center on Corporate Responsibility, 368 F. Supp. at 863. The Center successfully challenged
the denial, see supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text, but the IRS continued to exhibit
concern in other cases over common control, shared staff, and coordinated agenda of affiliated
section 501(c)(3) and section 501(c)(4) organizations, even when there was clear assurance of
separation of funds and bookkeeping. Troyer & Lauber, Supreme Court's TWR Decision
Provides Guidance in 501(c)(3) Lobbying, 59 J. TAx'N 66, 68 n.9 (1983).
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facilities, or agenda-it can require nothing more than separate funds.16 6
Thus, a section 501(c)(3) organization should be able to safely pursue a
legislative agenda, so long as it does so through the mechanism of a section
501(c)(4) sister organization. However, the dual structure arrangement may
be of limited utility. First, funding the efforts of the section 501(c)(4) affiliate
may be a significant obstacle to the organization's ability to pursue its
objectives in this form. Contributions to a section 501(c)(4) organization are
not deductible to the donor, 67 private foundations are seriously constrained
in their ability to provide grant support, 6 and support from the affiliated
section 501(c)(3) organization' 69 for lobbying would be limited to the amount
the section 501(c)(3) organization could itself spend for lobbying activities.
Second, the dual structure arrangement may be a less reliable option than
it appears at first (post-TWR) glance, for such an arrangement is beset with
the same ambiguity and inconsistency that are woven throughout the con-
straints on legislative activity. Exactly which activities must be carried out
by the section 501(c)(4) affiliate? While it is plain that direct contacts with
legislators and clear grass roots lobbying should be undertaken by the section
501(c)(4) affiliate, the difficulty of confidently predicting which preparatory
activities might be classified as "attempts to influence legislation" carries
over to this context as well. If the section 501(c)(3) organization produces
a report that would qualify as "discussion of broad social issues" because,
although arguably one-sided, it is dispassionate and unconnected to specific
legislation, and its section 501(c)(4) affiliate then uses the report as support
for what is plainly legislative activity, it is not at all clear that the report
166. See Troyer & Lauber, supra note 165, at 68-69.
167. "In a practical sense, the income tax exemption is of relatively minor importance since
most organizations operate on a balanced budget. However, the tax advantages of 501(c)(3)
rather than 501(c)(4) status can amount to a 15 percent subsidy on costs." Downing & Brady,
The Role of Citizen Interest Groups in Environmental Policy Formation, in NowPRonrr Fniss
n A THREE SECTOR EcoNomy 61, 82 (M. White ed. 1981).
168. Foundations may not direct support specifically to lobbying activity without incurring
a heavy excise tax liability and cannot provide general operating support for a section 501(c)(4)
organization which lobbies, since grants made to noncharitable organizations must be limited
to use for charitable purposes. I.R.C. § 4945(d) (West Supp. 1987).
169. See Washburn, supra note 117, at 297. One possible approach for an organization with
income-generating program activities would be to locate those activities within the section
501(c)(4) affiliate and transfer funds in excess of support needed for the section 501(c)(4)
organization to the section 501(c)(3) organization, since transfer of funds from the section
501(c)(4) organization to the section 501(c)(3) organization is not limited as are transfers in the
other direction. This approach may not be a practical solution, however, as the organization
may want or need charitable status to carry on its major program activities. "[Charitable
status has come to symbolize stability and credibility. The defrocked organization frequently
finds itself at a disadvantage in recruiting members. and in obtaining the cooperation of other
community agencies, including the press, radio, and television." Clark, supra note 38, at 455.
Further, the section 501(c)(3) organization would have to be alert to the possibility that sub-
stantial funding from its section 501(c)(4) affiliate might undermine its ability to demonstrate
the broad public support necessary to maintain public charity status. See infra notes 358-63
and accompanying text.
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would not be characterized at that point as legislative activity, having been
"merely preparatory" for the legislative effort.1 70
Finally, and perhaps most troubling, there is the danger that the section
501(c)(3) organization might be vulnerable to being characterized as non-
charitable because it is within the Treasury's vague definition of "action
organization." '7 Its close affiliation and shared agenda with a section 501(c)(4)
organization which was created expressly for the purpose of lobbying could
be seen as evidence that the section 501(c)(3) organization's primary purpose
can be achieved only through legislation. Since it is still not clear what
constitutes "advocating" the attainment of the.primary objectives for pur-
poses of this definition,172 the section 501(c)(3) organization's expression of
a clear position in its public education endeavors might conceivably suffice.
This is particularly true if some of the related activities of the section 501(c)(3)
organization are capable of being characterized as legislative activity because
of their connection with clear legislative involvement by the section 501(c)(4)
affiliate.
Since the evaluation of whether an organization is organized and operated
exclusively for charitable or educational purposes is purportedly separate
and apart from the question of whether a "substantial part" of its activities
constitute attempts to influence legislation, and since the former inquiry
purportedly focuses on objectives, it is entirely conceivable that a close section
501(c)(4) affiliation could lead to a denial of section 501(c)(3) status couched
in terms of the "operated exclusively" requirement. So long as the denial
rests on the indefinite and ambiguous content that has been given to the
terms "operated exclusively," "charitable," and "educational," it would
appear to turn on a conclusion that the inherent nature of the organization
places it outside the long-recognized categories granted favored tax treatment,
rather than on a judgment that attempts to influence legislation form a
170. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. Of course, if the report could qualify as
"nonpartisan analysis, research, or study," it would not be classified as legislative activity even
if its subsequent use by the section 501(c)(4) organization connected it to a specific legislative
proposal. Predicting whether a publication is sufficiently dispassionate and presents a sufficiently
"full and fair exposition of the pertinent facts" to qualify as "nonpartisan analysis" causes
its own difficulties. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text. See also Gen. Couns. Mem.
35,734 (Mar. 19, 1974) (IRS approved section 501(c)(3) status for organization which had a
section 501(c)(4) 1o-bbying affiliate but cautioned that the section 501(c)(3) organization "would
not be free to conduct research and prepare educational materials as a means of giving
preferential assistance to ongoing projects of [the section 501(c)(4) organization] which serve
non-charitable purposes or otherwise as a means of providing the latter with material for use
in any non-501(c)(3) activity"). The author of a student Note has suggested that because there
is no assurance that volunteer lobbying activities of individuals who are members of both affiliates
would not be attributed to the section 501(c)(3) organization, the charitable organization is vulnerable
to a finding that a "substantial part" of its activities constitute lobbying. Note, Charitable Lobby-
ing Restraints and Tax Exempt Organizations: Old Problems, New Directions?, 1984 UTAH L. Rv.
337, 355-56. Of course, if the section 501 (c)(3) organization makes the section 501 (h) election, "substan-
tiality" is a function of money spent, so the volunteer activity would be of no consequence.
171. See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
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"substantial part" of the organization's activities. Depending on how the
denial is justified, the constitutional protection afforded by Taxation With
Representation may be illusory.
Ultimately, then, although the enactment of the 1976 Tax Reform Act
and the holding in Taxation With Representation may have somewhat eased
the degree to which charitable organizations are constrained in their selection
of legislative advocacy as a strategy for accomplishing their exempt purposes,
they do not entirely resolve the difficulties posed by the ambiguity and
inconsistency of the restrictions as they stood before the two developments.
Nor do they alter the fact that, so far as federal tax law is concerned,
legislative advocacy remains subject to a very complicated and highly re-
strictive set of limitations.
E. Effect of the Limitations
Taken together, the explicit restrictions on advocacy and the further con-
straints that are inherent in their uncertain limits seriously curtail the par-
ticipation of section 501(c)(3) organizations in the formulation of public
policy. Although some strategies are subject to more extensive constraints
than others under the present tax law, all varieties of system-focused advocacy
are disfavored as compared to direct service activities. Not only the readily
apparent constraints, but also nervousness about their possible reach, un-
derstandable in light of the unresolved issues concerning the scope and
application of the constraints, lead organizations to limit their social activism,
even where they believe system-focused activity is the most effective means
of achieving their exempt ends. No comparable constraints limit an organ-
ization's direct service activities in pursuit of identical purposes. 7 1
Besides steering section 501(c)(3) organizations away from system-focused
advocacy in general, the constraints have the additional effect of influencing
those organizations which do engage in system-focused advocacy in their
choice of strategy and even in their choice of issues. In their extensive study
of public interest law firms, Weisbrod, Handier, and Komesar noted that
the tax law restrictions on lobbying have caused public interest law activities
to be directed overwhelmingly toward litigation, with a secondary emphasis
on administrative advocacy, even in cases where legislative advocacy was
173. For example, the IRS had no difficulty in granting exempt status to an organization
which provided a residence facility and therapeutic program for individuals recently releas ed
from mental institutions because "promotion of mental health is ... charitable." Rev. Rul.
72-16, 1972-1 C.B. 144. Yet the Maryland Division of the National Mental Health Association
was threatened with loss of its exempt status because of its dealings with the state legislature,
also presumably in the interest of promotion of mental health. G. MELTON, supra note 117,
at 153.
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perceived to be a more direct and effective means of achieving the charitable
goal. 174 Other commentators have echoed this observation. 175
Exempt organizations are frustrated by their inability to pursue their
legitimate concerns in the most effective way, if the most effective way in
a particular instance is through system-focused advocacy, especially legislative
action. Furthermore, there are certain areas of philanthropic concern which
will necessarily be more affected by the limitations than others, "on the
basis of fortuities quite beyond the control of the parties.' 1 76 Some social
welfare areas have been more preempted by government than others, and
advocacy in the preempted areas will necessarily be more hampered by the
constraints. Thus, a mental health association, operating largely in the public
arena because the responsibility for providing mental health services is pri-
marily the province of the state, will find that its work is confounded by
the restrictions far more than are the efforts of the heart and cancer asso-
ciations, although their goals are largely parallel. 177
An organization's effectiveness may be compromised by its inability to
carry its cause into an arena to which its opposition has full access. For
example, the successes of public interest organizations in litigation over the
Trans-Alaska pipeline were met with Congressional action declaring the
pipeline in compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
and exempting the pipeline from further litigation. Specific statutory ex-
emptions effectively eliminated the grounds upon which public interest suits
could be brought to force compliance with National Environmental Protec-
tion Act procedures and Clean Air Act performance standards by dozens
of oil-to-coal plant conversions. 17s The section-501(c)(3) lobbying limitations
barred environmental organizations from resisting legislative action to fore-
close their other avenues of challenge.
174. B. WEISBROD, J. HANDLER & N. KOMESAR, PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: AN EcoNoMIc AND
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 556-57 (1978) [hereinafter PUBLIC INTEREST LAW].
175. Tax-exempt groups are permitted to pursue their program objectives through
advocacy before courts and administrative agencies; yet such advocacy is prohibited
if the same matter is considered by a legislature .... There is no justification for
this distinction, and the public interest is disserved by excluding tax-exempt groups
from the legislative process.
Donee Group, supra note 29, at 82. See also, e.g., Downing & Brady, supra note 167, at 92-
93; Note, A Setback for Environmental and Other Public Interest Plaintiffs, 55 NEB. L. REv.
283, 292 n.58 (1976). But see R. KRAmER, VOLUNTARY AGENCIES IN THEE WELFARE STATE 228-
29 (1981) (suggesting that fear of losing tax exemption is not as important a constraint on
legislative advocacy as other factors, such as organizational self-image, time and energy required
for program management, fundraising demands, and leadership's commitment to advocacy).
See also Frank, supra note 57, at 19 (noting that the relative unavailability of legislative activity
as a strategy choice interferes with the public interest attorney's ability to fulfill his ethical
obligation to represent the client zealously).
176. Clark, supra note 38, at 454.
177. Id.
178. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., THE WASHINGTON LOBBY 111, 113-15 (2d ed. 1974);
Downing & Brady, supra note 167, at 91.
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Organizations which see reform of public systems to be a major part of
their mission are necessarily more hampered by the limitations on legislative
involvement than are organizations whose lobbying activity is adjunct to a
program of direct service delivery. They are hampered not only because a
greater prorortion of their resources is devoted to lobbying, but also, and
less justifiably, because much more of their activity is likely to implicate the
most ambiguous and uncertain aspects of the constraints, such as where
background work and "nonpartisan analysis" stop and lobbying begins. 179
Much of the activity of an organization which hopes to affect systems
necessarily involves study and analysis of the existing systems, as well as
research into theoretical and actual model systems which suggest directions
for change. It is inevitable that any proposals for legislative action which
such an organization ultimately generates will draw upon the background
studies. If the Internal Revenue Service chooses, as it appears inclined, 80 to
define broadly which support activities are part of the attempt to influence
legislation, the organization could find itself seriously penalized for what it
reasonably thought to be "'safe" activity. In .contrast, a direct service or-
ganization is likely to get involved in legislative activity, if at all, at a later
stage; the direct service agency may endorse and campaign for the passage
of a piece of legislation, but is likely to do so based on the background
work of the system-focused advocacy organization, and perhaps at its behest.
Further, the organization which concentrates on policies and systems, rather
than individual clients, is particularly susceptible to characterization as an
"action organization" and, through that categorization, failure of the op-
erational test."" While a direct service agency's primary goal might be to
provide counseling services to mentally ill clients, another organization with
the same charitable purpose-that is, promotion of mental health-might
believe that goal can best be accomplished by restructuring the state mental
health care delivery system. The former group's lobbying activity, if any, is
likely to be perceived as incidental to its primary purpose; the latter group's
activities with respect to the same piece of legislation will be seen as part
and parcel of the organization's overall aims. Given the potential for dis-
qualification as an "action organization" based on objectives which require
legislative action for their accomplishment,' 2 the system-focused organization
is, again, especially vulnerable.
The present collection of explicit and implicit constraints on system-focused
advocacy by section 501(c)(3) organizations confers overly broad adminis-
179. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 145-51 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text. Even public education efforts which are
not linked to specific legislative proposals can lead to "action organization" classification for
an organization whose goals cannot be attained without legislative action.
1987]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
trative discretion on the IRS over the affairs and even the survival of exempt
organizations. The ambiguity and inconsistency of the existing regulatory
scheme gives the Internal Revenue Service nearly unlimited power to "pull
the plug" on any organization that is politically active.
There is some indication that the IRS has, in fact, taken advantage of
the definitional leeway in the tax provisions to suppress unpopular ideology.
The Service's earliest demarcations between "propaganda" and "education"
have been characterized as protective of the status quo.'8 3 Even now,
the controversiality of an organization's cause or position may draw the
attention of the IRS.'" The effectiveness of an organization's advocacy
efforts, theoretically irrelevant to a determination of whether the organization
is "operated exclusively" for exempt purposes or whether it has engaged in
"substantial" legislative action, appears to increase the likelihood of a neg-
ative IRS response to the organization.'85
Since controversiality and visibility appear to be important factors in the
actual application of the statutory/regulatory scheme of restrictions on ad-
vocacy by exempt organizations, organizations which concentrate on policies
and systems are in a precarious position. Because their very existence is
typically premised on a desire to change the status quo, the positions they
take are likely to be controversial. 8 6 Because they cannot accomplish their
purposes without having their position heard and understood by the public
183. Lehrfeld, supra note 75, at 52.
184. See Levy & Nielsen, supra note 156, at 1032 ("At one point many leaders of the
movement were convinced that organizations concerned with social change rather than with
more traditional forms of charitable and educational activity were being subjected to harassment
by the I.R.S."). A similar theme ran through the hearings on the 1976 amendments to the
lobbying restrictions. "Witnesses testifying on behalf of the charitable organizations charged
that the law gave District Directors, revenue agents, and other I.R.S. officials broad discretion,
which at times was abused in order to challenge the actions and to suppress the views of
organizations with which they disagreed." Hearings on H.R. 13720 Before the House Ways
and Means Comm., 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 222 (1972) (statement of Stuart Johnson).
This perception is not limited to representatives of exempt organizations. Mortimer Caplin,
former Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, has stated: "In close cases, I.R.S.
officials may be swayed instinctively to be more or less lenient in taxing political activities
depending upon their view of the merit of an organization's political activities." Caplin, supra
note 116, at 277.
185. See Nix, supra note 108, at 412 n.13. Richard Harwood, a writer for the Washington
Post, described the reaction of the IRS to the Sierra Club's advertisement urging the public
to contact Congress to oppose construction of dams in the Grand Canyon:
[On the day the advertisement appeared] an excited young assistant bounded into
the office of ... Commissioner Sheldon Cohen . .. [and] dropped on Cohen's
desk a fresh copy of the Washington Post .... [I]t took Cohen only a couple
of minutes to get the message from the ad and before the day was out he had
ordered his agents ... to audit the Sierra Club's books.
Harwood, Inquiry into Sierra Club Could Affect Tax Exempt Giants, Washington Post, Aug.
14, 1966, at 1, col. 2, quoted in Note, supra note 116, at 1122 n.66.
186. See supra notes 75-100 and accompanying text (describing how controversiality of an
organization's views enters into the determination of whether the organization's efforts are
"educational" or "charitable").
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at large and by legislators, their effectiveness depends on the very visibility
that makes them vulnerable. The selection of exempt organization returns
for audit is based largely on receipt of complaints by the IRS.187 It only
makes sense that organizations which are most effective in making their
positions heard are those which will be least appreciated by those who run
the systems they monitor, and will likely be those about whom the IRS is
most likely to receive complaints.
From time to time, the breadth of the IRS's power over exempt organi-
zations has been used as a blatant political tool. During the cold war years,
forty-two organizations had their exempt status summarily revoked because
of their appearance on the Attorney General's list of "subversive" organi-
zations.'88 There have been other instances of less than neutral enforcement
of the political activities restrictions. During the 1960's, the White House
directed the IRS to investigate far-right hate groups that were tax-exempt. 8 9
Efforts to politicize the IRS and to use the exemption provisions as a tool
for ideological suppression escalated during the Nixon years. In 1969, Nixon
established the Special Services Staff "to gather information on the finances
and activities of extremist organizations ... and to make this information,
along with recommendations on what to do with it, available to the appro-
priate division of the I.R.S."' 19 By June of 1972, the Special Services Staff
had information files on over 2,500 organizations. This action and other
attempts by the Nixon administration to politicize the IRS apparently had
little direct effect; some have suggested that the IRS is simply too massive
and self-contained a bureaucracy to distort for political ends.' 91
187. See Ginsburg, Marks & Wertheim, supra note 52, at 2606 (citing Internal Revenue
Manual 4(1 1)(43)). See also Lehrfeld & Webster, Administration by the I.R.S. of Non-Profit
Organization Tax Matters, 21 TAx LAW. 591, 599-600 (1968) (describing the order of processing
cases; inquiries from the House Ways and Means Committee, Joint Committee on Internal
Revenue Taxation, Treasury Department, and White House receive first priority over all other
matters).
188. Lehrfeld, supra note 75, at 67, 72-73. Ginsburg, Marks and Wertheim maintain that
while this was an abuse of power, the IRS was no more unfair than any other part of the
government during that era. Furthermore, they propose, the IRS was taking its cue from
Congress, which had recently demonstrated quite an interest in the political activities and
perspectives of tax-exempt organizations. "Understandably, there [was] no desire to provoke
the sleeping lion once again." Ginsburg, Marks & Wertheim, supra note 52, at 2615 (quoting
Clark, supra note 38, at 460).
189. Ginsburg, Marks & Wertheim, supra note 52, at 2615-16. The challenge to Christian
Echoes, see supra note 113 and accompanying text, apparently arose this way. Although the
revocation was ultimately upheld by the Court of Appeals on the grounds that Christian Echoes
had not been prejudiced by the Service's "deviation from normal procedures," the district
court initially found that the decision to revoke had been made arbitrarily and without sufficient
evidence. Id. (citing Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, 470 F.2d at 849; Christian Echoes Nat'l
Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 28 A.F.T.R. 2d 71-5260 (D. Okla. 1971)).
190. Ginsburg, Marks & Wertheim, supra note 52, at 2615-16.
191. See Caplin & Timbie, supra note 108, at 194-95 ("Whether or not these allegations [of
uneven application] are well-founded, such discretion and the resulting potential for actual or
apparent abuse are undesirable as a matter of sound tax administration.").
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Exempt organizations should not have to rely on the unwieldiness of the
bureaucracy, nor on the reassurance that the IRS has only infrequently
abused its discretion. The discretion is there, and carries with it the potential
for abuse. While instances of blatant political manipulation may be few,
there are simply too many situations in which the IRS cannot avoid making
a judgment and simply too much room for interpretation. Unable to draw
clear conclusions as to what activities are permitted, organizations tend to
be overly cautious.
Finally, as they are presently structured and administered, the limitations
on system-focused advocacy tend to be more restrictive of non-religious than
of religious organizations. Churches cannot elect the supposedly relaxed
standards of section 501(h). 92 Nonetheless, they are able to maintain a
significant presence in the legislative process. 93 The IRS is understandably
reluctant to challenge church involvement in politics. With the notable ex-
ception of the Christian Echoes case, 94 the pursuit of which was apparently
politically motivated, political activity by religious organizations (at least,
mainstream religious organizations) has often been looked upon with a
relatively tolerant eye. A cataloguing of the early propaganda cases 95 reveals
that strong positions taken on one side of an issue were more easily tolerated
when they were rooted in religious belief. 96 The IRS has noted the virtual
unthinkability of applying the supposedly absolute proscription on election
campaign involvement against religiously-affiliated organizations which pub-
lished articles and made statements opposing the election of a Roman Cath-
olic as President. 97 The pending controversy in Abortion Rights Mobilization'"8
involves plaintiffs who are contesting the failure of the IRS to enforce the
election participation constraints against the Catholic Church, despite its
overt support of anti-abortion candidates. The government is extremely
reluctant to see the case pursued. In fact, the government went so far as to
petition the United States Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing
the district court to dismiss the case.' 99 The petition was unsuccessful, and
the case is still pending. The Supreme Court has recently agreed to consider
standing issues which could prevent reaching the merits of the underlying
case.
20o
192. I.R.C. § 501(h)(5) (West Supp. 1987). See also supra note 102.
193. See, e.g., Note, Church Lobbying. The Legitimacy of the Controls, 16 Hous. L. REv.
480, 501-03 (1979).
194. Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, 470 F.2d at 849. For a discussion of the case, see
supra note 113.
195. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
196. See, e.g., Lord's Day Alliance, 65 F. Supp. at 62; Girard Trust, 122 F.2d at 108.
197. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,071 (Mar. 11, 1969).
198. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Regan, 603 F. Supp. 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
199. In re Baker, 107 S. Ct. 256 (1986).
200. 108 S. Ct. 284 (1987). The basic standing issue, whether the plaintiffs have standing to
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F. Arguments in Favor of the Limitations
Not everyone agrees that discouraging exempt organizations from at-
tempting to influence systems and policies is a bad idea. A number of
arguments have been offered to support the contention that exempt status
and activist stance are inconsistent, and that any organization desiring to
assume one of the two should forego the other.20' The argument cannot rest
on charitable trust principles, since neither traditional nor contemporary
perceptions of the appropriate functions of charitable organizations demand
restraints on system-focused advocacy. The common law of charitable trusts
in this country "does not reveal a tradition of reasoned or even intentional
opposition to charitable involvement in public policy formulation.
202
Of course, tax law need not follow the common law of trusts. Certainly,
Congress could conclude that tax exemption and deduction should hinge on
conditions that do not apply in the charitable trust context. Such a decision
might logically be based on the conclusion that charitable trust law reflects
a bad policy choice, or on a determination that what is good for charitable
trust law doeg not fit the distinct purposes and rationales of tax law. While
it is unlikely that Congress originally based its imposition of restrictions on
sue the IRS and the Treasury for failing to revoke the tax-exempt status of the Catholic Church
despite the Church's active participation in election campaign activity in violation of section
501(c)(3), is the same as that raised by the government when it sought a writ of mandamus
ordering dismissal. See supra note 199 and accompanying text. The government had based an
earlier petition for summary dismissal on the same argument and lost. Baker v. Abortion Rights
Mobilization, Inc., 788 F.2d 3 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 184 (1986). See also Abortion
Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Baker, No. 80 Civ. 5590 (RLC) (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (denying certi-
fication of an interlocutory appeal of the district court's holding that the plaintiffs do have
standing).
The standing issue is now being raised by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops
(NCBB) and the United States Catholic Conference (USCC). These groups were dismissed as
defendants in the early stages of the proceedings, Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Regan,
544 F. Supp. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), but were ordered to comply with discovery orders and were
held in civil contempt for refusal to do so, Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Baker, 110
F.R.D. 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). The challenge to the plaintiffs' standing in the underlying action
is raised now in the context of an appeal of the contempt order. In re United States Catholic
Conference and Nat'l Council of Catholic Bishops, 824 F.2d 156 (2d Cir.) (upholding contempt
order), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 484 (1987).
For a concise summary of the chronology of the dispute, see Evans, Challenge to IRS
Enforcement of Ban on Political Activities by Churches Poses Difficult Questions for High
Court, 37 TAx Nom-s 1194 (1987).
201. See infra notes 203-12 and accompanying text.
202. Simon, Foundations and Public Controversy: An Affirmative View, in Tim FUTURE OF
FoUNDATONS 58, 68 (F. Heimann ed. 1973). See 4 A. ScoTT, Tim LAW OF TRusTs § 374.4 (3d
ed. 1967) ("Many reforms can be accomplished only by a change in the law, and there seems
to be no good reason why the mere fact that they can be accomplished only through legislation
should prevent them from being valid charitable purposes."); Lehrfeld, supra note 75, at 53-
54 (describing history of political reform activity by charitable trusts, as approved by various
states); Thompson, supra note 76, at 513 n.56 (comparing American approach with English
common law, which is less accepting of activism by charitable organizations).
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either conclusion, it is probably accurate to conclude that Congress has, by
now, acquiesced in the application in the tax context of restrictions that are
not mirrored in the law of charitable trusts. Nonetheless, it is appropriate
to question now whether there are policy justifications to support the result,
even if the justifications were not articulated as the law was formed.
Some have questioned the wisdom of encouraging charitable organizations
to engage in social activism, either because there is no need for such in-
volvement or because engaging in system change advocacy distorts and
demeans the charitable mission. 2 3 For each such statement several others
applaud the charitable sector for assuming an activist role. 204 And the di-
versity of opinion within the nonprofit sector is seen to argue for, rather
than against, the value of charitable groups bringing their views into the
debate on public issues. 20 5
Other arguments against political activism by charitable organizations are
specific to the tax context, and rest on perceptions about the nature of
taxation and tax exemption. It is understandable that the Treasury would
favor a somewhat restrictive approach to acknowledging the compatibility
of advocacy activities with charitable principles, because each exemption and
deduction represents a revenue loss. 2o0 Some commentators have argued that
203. One commentator has proposed that foundations should reserve their support for that
portion of the charitable sector which is concerned with "knowledge" (i.e., scientific research)
and "beauty" (i.e., the arts). "The creation of beauty, after all, is a function of status and
luxury.... And, after all, things like the Ford Foundation, and the others, are creatures of
status and luxury." Hart, Foundations and Social Activism: A Critical View, in ThM FUTrrE
OF FoUNDATIONs 43, 56 (F. Heimann ed. 1973). Hart goes on to say, "It is also true that to
bring about the creation of beauty a great deal of money may have to be wasted.... But the
foundations would seem to be in an ideal position to do this." Id.
While Hart's argument is directed at private foundation involvement, foundation funding is
very important to the system change functions of charitable organizations, and Hart's preference
for total noninvolvement of foundations in public affairs would also seriously compromise
charitable organization involvement. The same author suggests that nothing would be lost
should the charitable sector avoid social activism completely, because "those who evangelize
for social activism . . . exaggerate the seriousness of our various social difficulties. They falsely
suggest, and may even believe, that the activities they propose and sponsor will ameliorate
those difficulties-though the reverse is more often the case." Id. at 54.
Other commentators have suggested that "the public has the right to ask of charitable
organizations that they meet higher standards of debate than the standards prevailing in the
commercial and campaign marketplaces." Graetz & Jeffries, supra note 156, at 2962. They
also suggest that the higher standard is compromised by advocacy activities because they "[serve]
pecuniary self-interests or [serve] only to inflate the reputations of the principals of the charitable
organizations," and because they only diminish public confidence in the charitable sector,
particularly when the public may see different charitable organizations taking different positions
on an issue. Id. at 2462-63.
204. "They exist to experiment, to innovate, to critique, to aid the powerless, and thus
necessarily to involve themselves in social tension." FiELD FOUNDATION REPORT, 1968-69, quoted
in Carey, supra note 27, at 1109. See also supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
205. See Simon, supra note 202, at 71 ("Indeed, the very absence of a universal consensus
... undermines the argument [that foundation involvement in public affairs is unnecessary].").
206. See Clark, supra note 38.
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the tax base should be protected from the erosion that would result from
expanded permission to charitable organizations to engage in advocacy ac--
tivity. Particularly in the case of legislative advocacy, it has been argued,
the restrictions limit activity that is likely to be directed toward promoting
the expenditure of public funds. As a result, allowing section 501(c)(3)
organizations to lobby would run counter to the rationale for extending tax
exemption-that is, that government is compensated for its loss of revenue
by relief from the financial burden of services provided by the charities
which would otherwise have to be met from the public fisc.207 This tax-base
erosion argument is weak. First, any direct revenue loss which results from
extending exemption and deductibility to politically active organizations is
probably not significant, and would not be, even if the limitations were
liberalized. 208 Second, the notion that political activism must necessarily lead
to increased government expenditures is simply insupportable. There is just
no way to estimate the significance of the revenue consequences of limiting
advocacy activities by charities.m
The principal tax policy objection to extending exemption and deductibility
to politically active charitable organizations is that government should avoid
207. Pepper, Hamilton & Sheetz, Legislative Activities of Charitable Organizations Other
Than Private Foundations, in 5 ComnSSION ON PUVArE PHMA.NTHRoPY AND PUBLIc Nanos,
RESEARciH PAPES 2917, 2937 (1977). The authors protest that "while this sort of activity may
help the legislators better realize the needs of the country, it does not provide any of the funds
that are vital to satisfy the need to which the charity has drawn attention." Id. at 2923. See
also Graetz & Jeffries, supra note 156, at 2963.
208. See Garrett, supra note 108, at 581; Note, supra note 170, at 360.
The restrictions are more likely to influence donors in their choices among organizations,
rather than having much effect on the overall level of contributions and, thus, deductions. See
Garrett, supra note 108, at 581-82; Note, Political Speech of Charitable Organizations Under
the Internal Revenue Code, 41 U. Cm. L. REv. 352, 374 (1974); Note, supra note 170, at 360.
209. See, e.g., Mavity & Ylvisaker, supra note 156, at 828, stating:
To sum it up, there is no way of giving a totally objective or defintitive answer
to the questions of private philanthropy's overall worth or efficiency, either when
measured by its own aspirations or when compared with government's present or
future capacity to do the same things with the same money. Activities sponsored
by private philanthropy and government are so randomly scattered over the entire
range of "efficiency," and judgments of effectiveness and worth are so varying
and subjective, that any conclusion is almost meaningless .... Merely citing
examples of how many philanthropic endeavors turned out to be "good or bad,"
or more or less "efficient" than government's actual or hypothetical record in
similar endeavors sooner or later becomes an exercise in the interminable.
... Especially in its role as critic, competitor, judge, and adversary ... the
value of private philanthropy lies not in its relative efficiency, but simply in the
fact that it exists and is available to a public that chronically needs something
more than government always and alone can provide.
Id.
Some advocacy is clearly directed toward money-saving objectives. For example, successfully
urging a state to establish a program of adoption subsidies for hard-to-place children would
reduce expenditures for long-term foster care. That net savings probably would, in fact, "lessen
the burdens of government." See also Karel, Foundations and Public Policy: Coming of Age
in the 1980"s, FouND. NEws, Mar.-Apr. 1985, at 58-59.
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underwriting participation in political debate. 210 If the restrictions on ad-
vocacy activities are lifted, it is argued, government neutrality would be
undermined. Some charitable organization viewpoints would be heard more
than others,2 1 1 and the charitable sector would have an unfair advantage
over the for-profit sector. 212
Neutrality arguments often cite Cammarano v. United States.2 3 In Cam-
marano, the Supreme Court upheld the nondeductibility of business-related
lobbying, stating that the regulations barring deduction "simply ... required
[the plaintiffs] to pay for [lobbying] activities entirely out of their own
pockets, as everyone else engaging in similar activities is required to do
... 214 Some counter that neutrality with respect to political activities was
overturned by the passage of section 162(e) of the Internal Revenue Code,
which allowed deduction of expenditures for lobbying on issues of direct
interest to the taxpayer's business. 25 Proponents of the restrictions on char-
itable organizations reply that neutrality demands the distinction notwith-
standing section 162(e), because business-related lobbying expenses must be
deducted to reach an accurate measurement of net income, while a deduction
for a contribution to a politically active charitable organization is a subsidy
for personal choice advocacy.2 6 The same distinction can be made between
business-related and charitable organization litigation.
Even conceding that deductibility of business lobbying and litigation is
necessary to arrive at a net income figure, while deductibility of contributions
to activist charitable organizations constitutes a subsidy, the present system
is not really neutral at all. Businesses can deduct expenditures for lobbying
beyond those which are "of direct interest" and therefore necessary to deduct
210. Statements of this position typically point to Learned Hand's announcement in Slee v.
Commissioner that "political agitation as such is outside the statute." 42 F.2d 184, 185 (2d
Cir. 1930). See also supra note 109.
211. See, e.g., Note, supra noie 208, at 370, 372 (describing and rejecting the argument that
tax-exempt political activity enhances the voice of organizations favored by the wealthy).
212. See, e.g., Pepper, Hamilton & Sheetz, supra note 207, at 2924 (expressing concern that
a large "slush fund" of tax-free dollars would be available for lobbying by charitable organ-
izations should the restrictions be relaxed); Public Charities Lobbying, supra note 107, at 486-
87 ("many members of Congress 'are afraid [the 1976 revisions of section 501(c)(3) lobbying
constraints] will unleash a torrent of zealous lobbyists upon Congress' ") (quoting Rep. Barber
Conable).
213. 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
214. Id. at 513.
215. See, e.g., Borod, supra note 116, at 1113; Fogel, supra note 109, at 964; Garrett, supra
note 108, at 585; Lehrfeld, supra note 75, at 65 n.88.
216. See, e.g., Haswell, 500 F.2d at 1141; Graetz & Jeffries, supra note 156, at 2948. See
also Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy, 83 HARv. L.
REv. 705, 724 (1970) (noting "the importance of distinguishing tax expenditures and tax
incentives from those provisions considered a proper and necessary part of the structure of an
income tax," i.e., "expenses and costs incurred in the process of producing or earning the
gross income received by the taxpayer"). This conclusion requires the rejection of the "net
income theory" of the charitable deduction. See infra note 226.
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to reach an accurate measure of net income. Tax regulations permit businesses
to deduct as a business expense trade association dues used for lobbying
directed toward legislation which, though not of "direct interest" to the
taxpayer, "is of direct interest to the organization, as such, or is of direct
interest to one or more members of the organization. ' 217 Thus, an organi-
zation with a broad membership may pursue a broad legislative agenda, and
the deduction to its members will exceed that which leads to an accurate
measurement of taxable income. 218 The principle of neutrality is also violated
by the absence of any restrictions on political activity by section 501(c)(19)
veterans' organizations. These organizations may lobby freely with deductible
dollars, although such activity is undertaken not to generate income but in
pursuit of "personal choice" political agendas .219
A related objection to permitting exempt organizations to engage in ad-
vocacy activity contends that taxpayers have economic and political liberty
interests in not subsidizing the expression of political views with which they
disagree. 220 Successful lobbying activity yields law which binds supporters
and non-supporters alike. Thus, the argument goes, the general "charitable
social contract"-that people are generally willing to "spend" through tax-
ation in support of charitable activity which they would not support directly,
because other taxpayers "spend" reciprocally-does not comfortably extend
to the advocacy of legal change. 21
217. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-20(c)(3), as amended by T.D. 6996, 34 Fed. Reg. 835 (1969).
218. See Comment, Tax Subsidies for Political Participation, 31 TAx LAW. 461, 473 (1978).
219. The Supreme Court's observations in Taxation With Representation about the possible
Congressional rationales for extending different treatment to veterans' organizations than to
charitable organizations implicitly acknowledge that, as it now stands, the law with respect to
deductibility of lobbying expenditures is not neutral. 461 U.S. at 548.
It is not at all clear from the legislative history that Congress intended any such distinction
between charitable and veterans' organizations. See Taxation With Representation, 676 F.2d
at 732-33 ("[T]here is no indication in the legislative history .... that Congress intended to
grant any tax-exempt organization a lobbying advantage over any others. In fact, the scant
legislative history that exists .. . suggests that Congress meant to treat the lobbying of all
§ 501(c) organizations equally."). Furthermore, Treasury Regulation section 1.170A-1(h)(5), with
language that parallels section 501(c)(3), prohibits any deduction for contributions to any
organization that lobbies or participates in an election campaign. This rule should apply to
contributions to veterans' organizations as well as to charitable organizations, but the IRS does
not enforce it with respect to the former. Surrey, supra note 216, at 721. Thus, it seems that
this departure from neutrality originates with the Treasury and the courts, rather than with
Congress.
220. This argument has been made in connection with a proposal that local Legal Aid
organizations which receive Legal Services Corporation funding should be severely restricted
in their ability to lobby. Comment, Pulling the Rein on Legal Services Lobbying, 9 HARv. J.
L. & Pus. POL'Y 203, 204-05 (1986). The author cites a number of cases which held uncon-
stitutional compulsory individual financial support for expression of views with which the
individual disagreed. All of the cases cited involved direct expenditures by the individual (license
plate fees, union dues) or by the government (government campaign to defeat a proposed
constitutional amendment).
221. See Note, supra note 170, at 362. See also Thompson, supra note 76, at 537.
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This objection is also undermined by the imperfections in neutrality of
the present system. Taxpayers involuntarily support the deductible advocacy
activity of businesses, trade associations, and veterans' organizations which
is not undertaken to generate income.mn Further, the costs of nondeductible
advocacy are reflected in the price of a business's products and services;
consumers of those products or services involuntarily support the expression
of political viewpoints with which they may not agree. Purchase of the
product may be fully voluntary, but it is unlikely that the consumer knows
that the price paid includes the cost of such expression. It is even less likely
that the consumer is aware of the issues addressed or the position espoused
by the producer.
Even if the present system could be accurately characterized as neutral,
maintaining that neutrality would be misguided. Neutrality is neither con-
stitutionally required,2 nor necessarily supportable as a matter of good
policy. Rules which have the effect of either limiting or encouraging advocacy
activity should aim to protect the integrity of the processes to which the
advocacy is directed. Where technical neutrality contributes to unequal access
to governmental institutions and processes, reinforces rather than relieves
the chronic voicelessness of some segments of society,2 and leads to social
policy built upon incomplete information,2 it no longer provides an ac-
ceptable foundation upon which to rest a system of controls and incentives.
II. POLICY BASES FOR A CONSISTENT APPROACH TO ADVOCACY BY
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS
Clearly, the present tax law is far from neutral with respect to a section
501(c)(3) organization's choice of means by which to pursue its ends. As a
rule, strategies which seek to change systems rather than to deliver direct
services are disfavored. Furthermore, some system change strategies entail
greater costs and stricter controls than others. These results are defensible
only if they are consistent with the policies underlying the section 501(c)(3)
exemption or if there are other important reasons for restricting the use of
system-change strategies. Where there are countervailing concerns which
argue against permitting unfettered use of a particular strategy, the limits
imposed should be constructed to strike a careful accommodation between
the policy arguments for limiting the means and those for promoting the
ends.
222. See supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text.
223. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90-91, 93 n.127 (1976) (subsidy of political
speech is not constitutionally prohibited; there is no "establishment clause" component to first
amendment's guarantee of free speech).
224. See infra notes 312-18 and accompanying text.
225. See infra note 311 and accompanying text.
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There are important justifications for basing the regulation of advocacy
activity by exempt organizations on a deliberate and principled analysis of
the implicated values. The resolution of the issue has significant fiscal im-
plications for organizations which see system change as a desirable or essential
part of their charitable mission. These groups need the sort of reliable
statement of rules that can be generated only by a clear approach to the
question. More importantly, because the fiscal implications have incentive
and disincentive effects that tend to steer organizational behavior, ad hoc
responses deserve broader societal interests as well.
Exemption and deductibility operate as an incentive system with the power
to promote or retard the pursuit of particular objectives and the undertaking
of particular activities by nonprofit organizations. 226 When qualification for
226. The proper characterization of exemption and deduction is the subject of some debate.
See, e.g., ComMIssioN ON PRIVATE P mIANTnRoPY AND PUBuc NEEDS, GIVING IN AMERICA 107-
11 (1975); B. HopKiNs, supra note 49, at 48-50; McNulty, Public Policy and Private Charity:
A Tax Policy Perspective, 3 VA. TAx L. REV. 229 (1984); Hansmann, Why Are Nonprofit
Organizations Exempted from Corporate Income Taxation?, in NoNPRoFr FiRxs IN A TmE
SECTOR ECONOMY 115 (M. White ed. 1981). Exemption and deductibility are often characterized
as two levels of governmental subsidy in the form of "tax expenditures." That is, the tax revenues
foregone as a result of the exemption or deduction are, in some sense, the equivalent of a govern-
mental outlay. See, e.g., S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 223 (1973); Hochman & Rodgers,
The Optimal Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions, 30 NAT'L TAx J. 1, 2 (1977). This view is not
universally shared. An opposing view maintains that the exemption and deduction provisions
simply contribute to an accurate measure of income. See, e.g., Bittker, Charitable Contributions:
Tax Deductions or Matching Grants, 28 TAx L. REv. 37 (1972); Bittker & Kaufman, Taxes
and Civil Rights: "Constitutionalizing" the Internal Revenue Code, 82 YALE L.J. 51 (1972);
Bittker & Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income Taxation,
85 YALE L.J. 299 (1976).
This "income definition" theory proposes that to treat charitable organizations as taxable
entities would be conceptually difficult and ill-fitted to legal and accounting principles that
have been devised to compute net taxable income and set the tax rates of for-profit corporations.
Bittker & Rahdert, supra, at 307-16. Further, the theory posits, money spent by individuals
for charitable contributions is not a proper subject of taxation. The deduction appropriately
relieves from taxation amounts donated to charitable organizations because those expenditures
are in some sense nonvoluntary. Either the donor is compelled by a "moral conviction that
charitable functions have a high priority claim on one's resources" or the contribution is, in
reality, a necessary business expense. Bittker, supra, at 57-58; McNulty, supra, at 238. Fur-
thermore, because the income so spent is deflected for the benefit of others, the donor should
not be taxed on it, since he has neither consumed nor saved for future consumption as a result
of the expenditure, id. at 241, and only income in the sense of consumption or savings is
properly taxable, see Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARv. L.
REV. 309 (1972).
Hansmann rejects both the "subsidy" and "net income" characterizations and offers an
efficiency model, proposing that the exemption can be explained and justified as a means of
compensating nonprofit organizations for the constraints they face in raising capital for ex-
pansion to a long-run competitive equilibrium with their for-profit competitors. Hansmann,
supra, at 124-28. Congress signaled its acceptance of the tax expenditure concept with the
enactment, as part of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, of a requirement that the budget
include a "Special Analysis" of "Tax Expenditures," which includes information about the
"cost" of the deduction provisions. See U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDor, SPECIAL
ANALYSIS: TAx ExPENDITUREs, SPECIAL ANALYSES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
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exemption or deductibility hinges on foregoing a particular kind of activity,
the decision to engage in the activity imposes a cost on the organization. 27
Consideration of this cost can be expected to influence the organization's
choice of strategy in pursuit of its objectives, and even its choice of objectives.
The rules which shape the incentives and disincentives ought to be carefully
tailored to maximize desired responses and to minimize undesirable effects.
Otherwise, the rules may work at cross-purposes to the underlying values
and thus impede, rather than promote, the desired ends.
What are the underlying values and the desired ends? The first inquiry
must focus on identifying the range of endeavors that merit the institution-
alized incentives of tax exemption and deductibility. 228 Incentives ought to
be directed toward encouraging activities which, without encouragement, are
likely to be undertaken in insufficient quantity or, perhaps, not at all. What
distinguishes the sort of activities that ought to be encouraged? Speaking
generally, the normal operation of the private, for-profit sector market tends
to result in an undersupply of "public" or "collective" goods-that is,
commodities which are desired at least a little by a large number of people
and which, if supplied to anyone, will necessarily benefit many others. 9
(1984); B. HoPKn~s, supra note 49, at 48-49; Thompson, supra note 76, at 493 n.14. No
figure for the "cost" of the section 501(c)(3) exemption appears in the tax expenditure budgets.
Hansmann suggests that its absence may signal uncertainty as to whether the exemption is
really a "subsidy" or implicit acknowledgment of the difficulty of computing the tax liability
of a nonprofit organization. Hansmann, supra, at 120 n.8.
The courts, too, have accepted the tax expenditure characterization. Regan v. Taxation With
Representation of Washington provides perhaps the most straightforward expression of the
position:
Both tax exemption and tax-deductibility are a form of subsidy that is administered
through the tax system. A tax exemption has much the same effect as a cash
grant to the organization of the amount of tax it would have to pay on its income.
Deductible contributions are similar to cash grants of the amount of a portion
of the individual's contributions.
461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983).
If qualification for exempt status and receipt of deductible contributions are characterized
as subsidies to qualifying organizations, it is easy to see the incentive effect of those mechanisms.
Furthermore, if exemption and deductibility are, in effect, equivalent to expenditures of public
funds, decisions about when they are appropriate should be made with the care and deliberation
that should accompany any decision about governmental expenditures. See generally Schroeher,
Congressional Oversight of Tax Expenditures, 7 TAx NoTEs 323 (1978). Even those who view
exemption and deductibility as necessary to reach an accurate measure of income recognize the
disincentive effect of the taxation which results from failure to qualify. See, e.g., B. HoPriNs,
supra note 49, at 13-14; Bittker, supra, at 53.
227. Even though deductibility of contributions is directed to individual donors, it is generally
agreed that qualification to receive deductible contributions is often far more valuable to an
organization than is its own exemption. See, e.g., C. CLOTFELTER, FEDERAL TAx PoLIcY AND
CHARITABLE GIVING 11 (1985).
228. Under the view that rejects the "tax expenditure" characterization, the focus of this
inquiry might more properly be characterized as seeking to identify the range of endeavors
which merit careful avoidance of the disincentives of taxation.
229. While "public good" is probably the more frequently used terminology, Weisbrod chose
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The market is an inefficient reflector of demand for collective goods because
of the distorting effect of high transaction costs-that is, the costs of iden-
tifying, informing, and collecting from all who stand to benefit-and because
of the "free-rider" problem-that is, the natural reluctance of many to bear
a share of the cost when they stand to benefit, whether or not they pay. In
addition, the market is incapable of responding to many of society's equity
concerns. 20 Even perfectly efficient operation of the private market may
lead to results that are dissonant with widely shared social and moral val-
ues?. 1 The disadvantaged status of some "consumer" classes chronically
weakens their bargaining position. Basically, these classes are unable to
command the attention of the market. Here, market forces fail not because
the normal operation of the market is inefficient, but because it is inequitable.
Much of the function of correcting market failure is assumed by the public
sector. 2 In large measure, governmental activity involves the provision of
collective goods, either directly233 or by regulating aspects of private pro-
duction.2 4 The second major category of government activity is the redis-
tribution of income and opportunity to adjust for disparities between private
market outcomes and widely shared conceptions of basic fairness.23 Gov-
ernment has a wide array of mechanisms by which it can intervene to alleviate
both efficiency-based and equity-based market failures. One choice, putting
aside for the moment whether and when it is the best choice, is the system
to use the term "collective good" in his seminal exploration of the economic role of the
nonprofit sector. Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Nonprofit Sector in a Three-
Sector Economy, in THE EcoNo)icS OF NoNPRoIT IN STITUTIONS 21 (S. Rose-Ackerman ed.
1986), reprinted from ATratns , MoRu-nry, AND ECONOMIc TEORY 171 (E. Phelps ed. 1975) [herein-
after Weisbrod, Theory]. That convention will be followed in this Article because "collec-
tive goods" identifies the concept without risking the implication that the supplier must be public
(governmental). See also Weisbrod, Private Goods, Collective Goods: The Role of the Nonprofit
Sector, in THE EcoNoMIcS OF NoNpRoPUETARY OROANIzAzioNs 139 (K. Clarkson & D. Martin eds.
1980) [hereinafter Weisbrod, Private Goods]. It should also be noted that "goods" in this context
may be goods or services.
"Undersupply" is used in this context to refer only to allocative inefficiency. "Resources
are allocated 'efficiently' when every consumer gets the goods and services he wants, so long
as he is willing and able to pay enough to compensate workers and other resource owners for
their voluntary supply of those resources required in production of those goods and services."
PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 174, at 9.
230. See PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 174, at 9-15.
231. See id. at 5-6, 18-19. "[P]rivate market responses [yield an unacceptable result] when
'low' income is the source of lack of economic demand, but where social consensus supports
provision of some commodity or service to some group nonetheless." Id. at 26.
While a broadly shared desire for redistribution of income and opportunity might itself be
identified as a "collective good," it will be useful for purposes of this Article to maintain the
distinction between efficiency-based and equity-based market failures.
232. See id. at 17.
233. "Direct" provision can involve either government production or government purchase
from private producers. National defense is the classic example.
234. Government's provision of the collective good, clean air, is largely undertaken through
this mechanism.
235. Food stamps and anti-discrimination regulations are examples.
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of laws and regulations governing section 501(c)(3) exemption and deduct-
ibility, which funnels the intervention through the private, nonprofit sector. 236
It should come as no surprise that, again speaking generally, the section
501(c)(3) classifications encompass a range of activities which have collective
goods or redistributive characteristics.
A. The "Charitable" Exemption
The basic description of the class of endeavors to which the incentives of
exempt status and deductibility are extended has changed little since 1894,
when nonprofit corporations, companies, and associations organized and
operated solely for "charitable, religious, or educational purposes" were
exempted from the first imposition of a corporate income tax.237 The pro-
vision for deduction of charitable contributions by individuals originated in
1917 and paralleled the exemption provision.238 Neither Congress's reason
for enacting the exemption and deduction provisions nor its early conception
of the boundaries of these provisions is clear. The original exemption pro-
visions may reflect merely the longstanding tradition of non-taxation of
charitable and religious organizations, rather than a carefully considered
policy choice. 2 9
The virtually complete absence of relevant legislative history has led to
some debate about the proper scope of the terms "charitable," "educa-
tional," and "religious." Much of the discussion has focused on the term
236. Weisbrod offers an explanation of why the private, nonprofit sector has arisen as an
alternative mechanism for the correction of private market failure. Weisbrod, Theory, supra
note 229. See also Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980).
237. Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556. The 1894 Act was held unconsti-
tutional in Pollock v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, on reh'g, 158 U.S. 601(1895). The exemption was reenacted in the Corporate Excise Act of 1909, ch. 6, 36 Stat. 11.
After the passage of the sixteenth amendment, the Revenue Act of 1913 adopted the list and
added "scientific" organizations to it. Ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114. The Revenue Acts of 1918 and
1921 added, respectively, "the prevention of cruelty to children or animals," ch. 18, § 231(6),
40 Stat. 1057, and "literary" classifications, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509. "Testing for public
safety" was added to the list by the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Ch. 736, 68A Stat. 1.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 added organizations which "foster international sports compe-
tition." For a detailed description of the evolution of the charitable exemption and deduction
provisions through 1975, see Liles & Blum, Development of the Federal Tax Treatment of
Charities, 39 LAw & CoNTEmp. PROB. 6 (1975).
238. Ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300. Deductibility of corporate contributions was initiated
by the Revenue Act of 1935. Ch. 829, 49 Stat. 1014. Except for its omission of "testing for
public safety," the deductibility list echoes the list of organizations which may be exempt from
taxation under section 501(c)(3). However, the two provisions are not cross-referenced. Liles
& Blum, supra note 237, at 24-26.
239. See McGovern, The Exemption Provisions of Subchapter F, 29 TAx LAW. 523, 526
(1976). The enactment of the deduction provision appears to have been spurred by a fear that
colleges would likely be strapped for funds as a result of the effect of heavy wartime taxes on
the revenues of their wealthy supporters and losing students to the military. Liles & Blum,
supra note 237, at 25.
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"charitable," quite likely because it is equally feasible that Congress intended
the term to encompass either of two well-established meanings. One argument
asserts that Congress intended the "charitable" exemption to extend only
to organizations "charitable" in what is often referred to as the narrow,
"popular" sense of the word-that is, organizations whose purpose is the
relief of the poor, distressed, and disadvantaged.m° An alternative view holds
that Congress had in mind the broader, common law definition of charitable
purposes, which extends beyond relief of the poor and distressed to encom-
pass the promotion of health; the advancement of education, science, or
religion; the erection and maintenance of public buildings, performance of
government functions or otherwise lessening the burdens of government; and
the promotion of social welfare for the benefit of the community.-' The
argument that Congress did, indeed, intend for "charitable" in the exemption
and deduction provisions to stand for the broad common law concept was
advanced in 1958 by Herman T. Reiling, who was at the time Assistant
Chief Counsel of the IRS. 2 It is not surprising, given the vantage point
240. This argument is founded largely on principles of statutory construction and grammatical
logic. First, it is posed, section 501(c)(3)'s reference to "religious, charitable, or educational
purposes" (emphasis added) demands that the categories be read as alternatives. Further, only
if "charitable" is read in the narrow sense can it logically parallel the other terms on the list;
a broader reading of the term would subsume "educational" and "religious" and render their
inclusion redundant. See B. HopruNs, supra note 49, at 61-62. Early Treasury interpretations
of the term followed this narrow view. From at least as early as 1923, Treasury Regulations
and IRS interpretive documents consistently held that organizations "organized and operated
exclusively for charitable purposes comprise, in general, organizations for the relief of the
poor." See id. at 63 (quoting Treas. Reg. 65, Art. 517 and subsequent regulations promulgated
under the Revenue Acts of 1924, 1926, 1928, 1932, 1934, 1936 and the Internal Revenue Code
of 1939).
241. See G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, LAW OF TRusTs 200 (5th ed. 1973); B. HopKINs, supra
note 49, at 71-73; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 368 (1959). The list "includes everything
that is within the letter and spirit of the Statute of Elizabeth, considering such spirit to be
broad enough to include whatever will promote, in a legitimate way, the comfort, happiness,
and improvement of an indefinite number of persons." Harrington v. Pier, 105 Wis. 485, 520,
82 N.W. 345, 357 (1900). The Preamble to the Statute of Charitable Uses, 1601, 43 Eliz. 1,
ch. 4, defined "charitable" purposes to include:
Relief of aged, impotent and poor people, some for maintenance of sick and
maimed soldiers and mariners, schools of learning, free schools, and scholars in
universities, some for repair of bridges, ports, havens, causeways, churches, sea-
banks and highways, some for education and preferment of orphans, some for
or towards relief, stock or maintenance for houses of correction, some for mar-
riages of poor maids, some for supportation, aid and help of young tradesmen,
handicraftsmen and persons decayed, and others for relief or redemption of
prisoners and captives, and for aid or ease of any poor inhabitants concerning
payment of fifteens, setting out of soldiers and other taxes.
7 PICKsEImGo'S ENGu SH STATUTES 43.
242. Reiling, Federal Taxation: What Is a Charitable Organization?, 44 A.B.A. J. 525 (1958).
Reiling took the position that given the absence of any indication that Congress intended the
narrower meaning, the content of "charitable" as used in the tax law must be that which has
been so long accepted in areas of law other than tax. Id. at 526-27. The separate enumeration
of "educational" and "religious" purposes, as well as the later addition of "scientific" and
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from which he wrote, that Reiling's view was reflected in the definition of
"charitable" which was included in Treasury Regulations promulgated in
1959.3 Some commentators dispute the legitimacy of the broad approach,
because of the structure of the statute and its legislative history, 244 or because
the breadth of the provision is seen to create problems in administering the
exemption.2 5 Even those who disapprove, however, agree that the regula-
tion's broad definition, as administratively and judicially amplified and as
tacitly accepted by Congress since 1959, must be taken as defining the present
scope of the term "charitable" for purposes of exemption and deductibil-
ity. 6
Even in its narrow, "popular" sense, the term "charitable" is amenable
to evolution and expansion beyond direct aid to the impoverished. "Distress
and disadvantage" need not be financial; ministering to the special, non-
financial needs of the terminally ill,247 the handicapped, 24 8 and the elderlyu 9
constitutes "relief of the distressed" justifying classification as a charity,
although this was not always So.250 If it, in fact, follows common law
charitable trust principles, the term "charitable" in the tax context should
reach "to almost any thing that tends to promote the well-doing and well-
being of social man,"'' so long as the benefit of the activity flows to a
large, indefinite classy.2 2 Further, the bounds should not be fixed, but rather,
"literary" purposes to the list, explained Reiling, simply provides additional description of
what the term "charitable" encompasses beyond relief of the poor, to guard against the
possibility that taxpayers unfamiliar with the broad legal definition might mistakenly read
"charitable" in its popular, narrow sense of relief of the poor and distressed. Id. at 527. In
other words, the list, taken as a whole, is meant to reach to the outer hounds of the common
law legal definition of "charity."
243. Charitable defined.-The term "charitable" is used in section 501(c)(3) in its
generally accepted legal sense and is, therefore, not to be constrained and limited
by the separate enumeration in 501(c)(3) of other tax-exempt purposes which may
fall within the broad outlines of "charity" as developed by judicial decisions.
Such term includes: Relief of the poor and distressed or underprivileged; ad-
vancement of religion; advancement of education or science; erection or main-
tenance of public buildings, monuments, or works; lessening of the burdens of
Government; and promotion of social welfare by organizations designed to ac-
complish any of the above purposes, or (i) to lessen neighborhood tensions; (ii)
to eliminate prejudice and discrimination; (iii) to defend human and civil rights
secured by law; or (iv) to combat community deterioration and juvenile delin-
quency.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(2) (1959).
244. E.g., B. HOPKINS, supra note 49, at 61-62.
245. E.g., Thompson, The Unadministrability of the Federal Charitable Tax Exemption:
Causes, Effects and Remedies, 5 VA. TAx Rav. 1, 54 (1985).
246. See, e.g., B. HOPKINS, supra note 49, at 64; Thompson, supra note 245, at 13-14.
247. Rev. Rul. 79-17, 1979-1 C.B. 193.
248. Rev. Rul. 79-19, 1979-1 C.B. 195.
249. Rev. Rul. 77-246, 1977-2 C.B. 190; Rev. Rul. 72-124, 1972-1 C.B. 145.
250. Rev. Rul. 68-422, 1968-2 C.B. 207; Rev. Rul. 56-138, 1956-1 C.B. 202.
251. Ould v. Washington Hosp. for Foundlings, 95 U.S. 303, 311 (1877).
252. See G. BOGERT & 0. BOGERT, TRUsTs AND TRusmTEs § 369 (rev. 2d ed. 1977).
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should evolve with changing ideas about what constitutes community ben-
efit.253 And, in fact, as it has been applied in the context of tax law, the
term "charitable" is broad in scope and subject to flexible construction that
will "recognize the changing economic, social, and technological precepts
and values of contemporary society."25 4
Within the reaches of the broader sense of "charitable" are several causes
which the regulation offers as examples of "promotion of social welfare,"
such as lessening neighborhood tensions, eliminating prejudice and discrim-
ination, defending human and civil rights, and combatting community de-
terioration and juvenile delinquency.255 As broad as it is, "promotion of
social welfare" apparently does not exhaust the content of the term "char-
itable." In addition, section 501(c)(3)'s "charitable" designation has been
extended to activities such as environmental preservation efforts and legal
representation "on behalf of the public at large on matters of public in-
terest," the rationale being that these activities benefit the community as a
whole.25 6
253. See id. § 368.
254. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
vacated on other grounds, 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
255. The grant of section 501(c)(3) exempt status on the grounds that the applicant organ-
ization "promotes social welfare" has generally rested on a fairly direct tie between the proposed
activity and one or more of the explicit examples of social welfare activities which appear in
the regulation: (I) lessening neighborhood tensions-Rev. Rul. 75-386, 1975-2 C.B. 211 (security
patrols, distribution of free newspapers, and basketball league); (2) eliminating discrimination-
Rev. Ru!. 75-285, 1975-2 C.B. 203; Rev. Ru!. 72-228, 1972-1 C.B. 148 (gender discrimination);
Rev. Ru!. 68-655, 1968-2 C.B. 213 (racial discrimination in housing); Rev. Ru!. 68-438, 1968-
2 C.B. 209 (racial and religious discrimination in housing and public accommodations); Rev.
Rut. 68-70, 1968-1 C.B. 248 (racial discrimination in employment); (3) defense of rights secured
by law-Rev. Ru!. 75-283, 1975-2 C.B. 201 (rights of public housing tenants); Rev. Ru!. 73-
285, 1973-2 C.B. 174 (religious rights); (4) combatting community deterioration-Rev. Ru!. 76-
419, 1976-2 C.B. 146; Rev. Ru!. 76-147, 1976-1 C.B. 151 (industrial parks in depressed areas);
Rev. Rul. 74-587, 1974-2 C.B. 162 (financial assistance for businesses in economically depressed
areas); Rev. Ru!. 70-585, 1970-2 C.B. 115 (nonprofit housing corporations); and, (5) combatting
juvenile delinquency-Rev. Ru!. 80-215, 1980-2 C.B. 174 (sports activities program); Rev. Ru!.
68-15, 1968-1 C.B. 244 (discrimination, community tension, and juvenile delinquency).
However, the notion that broad social benefit is an essential component of "charitable"
"social welfare" has been a determinant of charitable status even in the context of organizations
which seem to operate for an enumerated "social welfare" purpose. Rev. Ru!. 76-147, 1976-
1 C.B. 151 (combatting community deterioration in a nonblighted area promotes social welfare
because benefit accrues to community at large); cf. Rev. Rul. 67-6, 1967-1 C.B. 135 (preserving
and maintaining historic area for education of general public is charitable but preserving
architecture and traditions of a community for benefit of community residents, while "pro-
motion of social welfare," is not charitable).
In addition, a few groups have been held to "promote social welfare" and, thus, be charitable,
by providing general community benefits that do not fit within one of the regulation's enu-
merated categories of "social welfare." Rev. Rul. 70-79, 1970-1 C.B. 127 (organization to study
regional problems of urban areas); Rev. Ru!. 66-146, 1966-I C.B. 136 (organization presenting
citizen awards).
256. Efforts to "preserve and protect the environment" have qualified as charitable because
the benefit of the activities accrues to the public at large. E.g., Rev. Ru!. 80-279, 1980-2 C.B.
1987]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
A strong case can be made for the proposition that activity on behalf of
the classes and causes that fit within section 501(c)(3)'s "charitable" clas-
sification indeed merits the incentives of tax exemption and deductibility.
Each justification for designating a class or a cause to be an appropriate
focus of "charitable" activity implicates some variety of market failure.
Endeavors which are "charitable" because of the broad public benefit they
generate, or because they lessen neighborhood tensions or combat community
deterioration, implicate collective goods. Endeavors which are "charitable"
because they relieve poor, distressed, and disadvantaged classes, or because
they promote social welfare by defending human and civil rights or by
eliminating discrimination, are fundamentally redistributive. Both of these
varieties of section 501(c)(3) "charitability" are exactly the sort of enterprise
that is ill-served by the usual operation of the marketplace.
Various explanations from Congress, the courts, the IRS, and commen-
tators for the existence of the charitable exemption and deduction, while
not cast in terms of defective market forces, do seem to reflect an appre-
ciation of the collective goods or redistributive characteristics of charitable
endeavors and do point, at least implicitly, to these characteristics as jus-
tification for the special support that the exemption and deduction provide.
The often-repeated notion that the government is compensated for the loss
of revenue that results from exemption because the benefits that result from
the promotion of the general welfare relieve a financial burden that would
otherwise be borne by government 2 7 seems an inherent acknowledgement of
176; Rev. Rul. 80-278, 1980-2 C.B. 175. Likewise, the rationale for extending section 501(c)(3)
exemption to law firms which "present positions on behalf of the public at large on matters
of public interest," Rev. Proc. 71-39, 1971-2 C.B. 575 (also released as T.I.R.-1348, dated
Feb. 19, 1975), has been that those organizations "provide a service which is of benefit to the
community as a whole," Rev. Rul. 75-74, 1975-1 C.B. 152. An organization formed to provide
a color guard for public functions and dedications of newly-installed flagpoles qualified for
exemption because charitable trust precedent recognized the promotion of patriotism as an
appropriate charitable objective. Rev. Rul. 78-84, 1978-1 C.B. 150.
257. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1938), reprinted in 1939-1
C.B. (Part 2) 728, 742. The House Report states:
The exemption from taxation of money or property devoted to charitable ...
purposes is based upon the theory that the Government is compensated for the
loss of revenue by its relief from financial burden which would otherwise have
to be met by appropriations from public funds, and by the benefits resulting
from the promotion of the general welfare.
Id. See also, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983) ("Charitable
exemptions are justified on the basis that the exempt [charity] confers a public benefit-a
benefit which ... [a] community may not itself choose or be able to provide, or which
supplements and advances the work of public institutions already supported by tax revenues.");
Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1139-40 (Ct. Cl. 1974) ("The exemption, and the
corresponding deduction, recognize the benefits resulting from promotion of the general welfare
and are based on the theory that the Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by
its relief from financial burden which would otherwise have to be met by appropriations from
public funds."). See also Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden, 263 U.S. 578, 581 (1924); McGlotten v.
Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 456 (D.D.C. 1972); Reiling, supra note 242, at 595.
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this view. Commentators have noted that it would be "illogical and mean"
to tax organizations that "subserve the highest public ends," 8 and have
posited that the tax treatment of charitable organizations reflects an implicit
"recognition that some sectors have greater needs than others, that our
society nurtures and perpetuates pockets of poverty and misery, and that
the rational organization of voluntary services should compensate for socie-
ty's wrongs by concentrating disproportionate resources to where the need
is disproportionately large."2' 9
Some actual decisions about qualification for section 501(c)(3) exempt
status seem at first blush to be inconsistent with this construct. For example,
the IRS and the courts have seriously curtailed any requirement that health
care organizations be redistributive-that is, provide free care to the poor-
in order to qualify as "charitable. '"26 This shift, however, does not neces-
sarily clash with the notion that redistribution and provision of collective
goods provide the rationale for exemption. For example, in moving away
from the requirement that health care providers must care for indigent
patients in order to be eligible for exemption, the Tax Court shifted at least
implicitly to a collective goods rationale for the exemption, indicating that
charitability should be determined by a "community benefit" approach which
focuses on the size of the class served.26 In support of its conclusion that
promotion of health care is per se charitable, the court relied on language
from Scott's treatise on trusts which indicates that health-related charitable
trusts are not limited to providing medical assistance to the poor, but may
also be established for purposes such as medical research or to remove the
causes of the spread of disease. 262 Of course, these examples describe col-
lective goods, and might well be distinguished from health care delivery that
neither redistributes wealth nor provides collective goods. Indeed, the notion
that the provision of health care services without a redistributive or collective
goods component is nonetheless "charitable" and thus an appropriate focus
of exemption and deduction has engendered much debate.263
258. Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 226, at 332 (quoting Harvard President Charles Eliot).
259. Jordan, supra note 27, at 402.
260. See, e.g., Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 506 F.2d at 1287; Sound Health Ass'n v.
Commissioner, 71 T.C. 158, 178 (1978); Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94; Rev. Rul. 69-545,
1969-2 C.B. 117.
261. Sound Health, 71 T.C. at 190.
262. Id. at 178; 4 A. Scott, supra note 202, § 372. The court's quotation of Scott included,
with emphasis added, Scott's assertion that "[a] trust for the promotion of health... is...
charitable although the benefits are not limited to the poor. Thus a trust to establish a hospital
for all persons whether rich or poor is charitable." 71 T.C. at 178. While the court offered
this quotation to support the conclusion that a health care organization need not provide free
services to indigents in order to qualify as "charitable," a fairer reading of the statement seems
to be that a hospital need not serve only the poor in order to be "charitable." Thus, the
paragraph on which the court relied is not inconsistent with the notion that "charitability"
reflects some combination of redistributive activity and collective goods.
263. See, e.g., Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 725 P.2d 1357 (Utah 1986).
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B. The "Educational" Exemption
A collective goods justification exists for the exemption of "educational"
organizations as well. The tax provisions extend "education" well beyond
formal schooling. 26 While the outer boundary of the category is far from
clear, 265 it appears that the common characteristic of organizations which
have been ruled to be exempt because of their "educational" nature is
that they engage in the dissemination of information and ideas.266 The
Hansmann has observed that extending the exemption to "virtually all nonprofit hospitals,
whether or not they provide free care for indigents or engage in other activities which might
be thought to involve positive externalties," tends to undermine the argument that the tax
exemption is a means of subsidizing the provision of collective goods. It might be argued,
however, that although present practice is inconsistent with the underlying rationale, it is the
practice, and not the rationale, that requires adjustment. In fact, Hansmann notes that his
efficiency model would also argue against continuing the exemption of nonprofit hospitals
which provide no research, teaching, or subsidized care for indigents. Hansmann, supra note
226, at 132.
264. "Educational" organizations have qualified for exemption since the beginning of the
tax law and for deductibility for as long as that concept has been incorporated in the Code.
See supra notes 237-39 and accompanying text. In exempting educational organizations, the
tax law follows the pattern of the common law of charitable trusts. The "advancement of
education" is a long recognized subcategory of "charitable" activity. The Statute of Charitable
Uses included among its enumeration of charitable purposes support for "schools of learning,"
"free schools," and '!scholars in universities." Statute of Charitable Uses, 1601, 43 Eliz. 1,
ch. 4.
The law of charitable trusts recognizes the charitability of other sorts of educational insti-
tutions, such as museums, zoos, and libraries, see 4 A. Scotr, supra note 202, § 370, as well
as trusts for the dissemination of knowledge and beliefs through methods other than formal
schooling, such as publication and distribution of books and presentation of lectures, id.
§ 370.4.
For tax purposes the term "educational" was first explicitly defined in the 1959 regulations,
which specify that-the term encompasses activities "relating to the instruction or training of
the individual for the purpose of improving or developing his capabilities" and the "instruction
of the public on-subjects useful to the individual and beneficial to the community." Treas.
Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(i) (1959). Treasury Regulation section 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) lists "ad-
vancement of education" as one type of "charitable" activity. This classification is generally
applied to activities which are collateral to more clearly "educational" endeavors. Examples
of such activities include: (1) operation of a college bookstore-Squire v. Students Book Corp.,
191 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1951); Rev. Rul. 69-538, 1969-2 C.B. 116; (2) operation of college
housing and food services-Rev. Rul. 76-336, 1976-2 C.B. 143; Rev. Rul. 67-217, 1967-2 C.B.
181; Rev. Rul. 58-194, 1958-1 C.B. 240; (3) provision of student aid-Rev. Rul. 69-257, 1969-
1 C.B. 151 (scholarships); Rev. Rul. 64-274, 1964-2 C.B. 141 (free housing, books, or supplies);
Rev. Rul. 63-220, 1963-2 C.B. 208 (low-interest loans); and, (4) provision of supporting services
to educational organizations-Rev. Rul. 74-614, 1974-2 C.B. 164, clarified by Rev. Rul. 81-
29, 1981-1 C.B. 329 (computer services); Rev. Rul. 71-529, 1971-2 C.B. 234 (financial and
investment services). For a more extensive catalogue of activities which are "charitable" because
they "advance education,' see B. HoPKiNs, supra note 49, at 98-101.
265. For an excellent analysis of the difficulties of defining the scope of "educational"
activity and the problems occasioned by IRS attempts to locate the limits in various contexts,
see Thompson, supra note 76, at 487.
266. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 66-147, 1966-1 C.B. 137 (publication of abstracts of scientific and
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seriousness267 or general acceptability26 1 of the subject matter with which they
are concerned is not a consideration in determining qualification for exempt
status; exemption seems to have less to do with the substance with which the
organization is concerned than with the process it undertakes. And, indeed, to
the extent that the process relieves the burdens of government (as in the
case of private schools) or adds to the quantity and variety of information
and ideas available to society at large (as in the case of educational organ-
izations which "[instruct] the public on subjects useful to the individual and
beneficial to the community"), 269 it is a kind of collective good, and the
incentives of exemption and deductibility are justified.270
medical articles contributes to the advancement of education and science by providing an
effective means for increased dissemination and application of such knowledge).
267. See, e.g., Lions Associated Drag Strip v. United States, 64-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 9283
(S.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 1963) (instruction in drag racing); Rev. Rul. 65-270, 1965-2 C.B. 160
(instruction in dancing); Rev. Rul. 64-275, 1964-2 C.B. 142 (instruction in sailboat racing).
268. See Rev. Rul. 67-342, 1967-2 C.B. 187 (presenting programs on the need for international
social and economic cooperation); Rev. Proc. 86-43 § 3.01, 1986-2 C.B. 729 ("advocacy of
particular viewpoints or positions may serve an educational purpose even if the viewpoints or
positions being advocated are unpopular or are not generally accepted"). This approach is
consistent with charitable trust law. See 4 A. ScoTT, supra note 202, § 370.4. Scott states:
The mere fact, however, that the beliefs or doctrines to be disseminated are those
of a minority group does not preclude the trust from being a valid charitable
trust. The difficult task is imposed upon the courts to determine whether a belief
or doctrine is of such a character that its dissemination is illegal, or at least that
its dissemination cannot be of benefit to the community because of its absurdity,
or whether it is merely one which is displeasing to the majority.
Id. But see supra note 76 and accompanying text (describing early cases which held that
organizations which disseminated information on "controversial" topics were not "educa-
tional").
269. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(3)(i)(b) (1959).
270. "[I]nformation itself is a commodity that is produced, and it frequently has the char-
acteristics of a collective-type good; once produced, it can be used by persons who did not
contribute to its financing." PuBic INTEREsT LAW, supra note 174, at 17 (explaining why
government action can alleviate allocative inefficiency when the cause of the market failure is
lack of information). See also McKean, Producing Knowledge in Nonproprietury Organizations,
in THE EcoNoMics op NoNPopRRiETARY OR;ANzrAsoNs 209 (K. Clarkson & D. Martin eds.
1980) (agreeing that information production, collection, and dissemination is a collective good,
but questioning the capacity of the nonprofit sector to provide it effectively).
It is more difficult to fit this rationale to organizations which "[instruct] the individual for
the purpose of improving or developing his capabilities." Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(a)
(1959). Whereas operation of training centers for the rehabilitation of prisoners, Rev. Rul. 67-
150, 1967-1 C.B. 133, and providing a program for the rehabilitation of individuals recently
released from mental institutions, Rev. Rul. 72-16, 1972-1 C.B. 143, and alcoholic treatment
centers, Rev. Rul. 75-472, 1975-2 C.B. 208, exhibit the kind of redistributional effect which is
frequently implicated in the classifications of tax exemption, instruction of individuals in the
skills of sailboat racing, Rev. Rul. 64-275, 1964-2 C.B. 142, and conducting seminars on banking
for bank employees, Rev. Rul. 68-504, 1968-2 C.B. 211, would seem neither to, redistribute
wealth to society's least fortunate nor to generate significant external benefits. These endeavors
might better be left to the normal operation of the marketplace.
The only possible justifications for granting the "educational" exemption in these circum-
stances are that (1) it is too difficult to draw the line between instructional activities which
constitute the kind of "formal instruction" that government would otherwise provide and those
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Distinctions made in determining exempt status that are otherwise difficult
to explain are consistent with this characterization. For example, the line
that is drawn in practice between publishing activities that are deemed "too
commercial" to be "educational" for purposes of tax exemption and those
which qualify seems to reflect a recognition that information which is pub-
lished and distributed by ordinary commercial practices is more properly
characterized as a "private" good than a "collective" one. 27' A similar
distinction may account for the denial of exemption to professional organ-
izations which collected and disseminated information solely for the use of
the group's members, 27 even where the members' professional affiliations
were in the "charitable" sphere of public health and welfare.273 In contrast,
the "educational" classification was granted to a society of heating and air
which are purely private goods, or (2) the general public derives some benefit from the
enhancement of its individual members' knowledge and skills. The first of these appears to be
the implicit rationale in some of the individual instruction cases. For example, attendees of the
banking seminars could earn university credit, and a program in securities management which
was granted "educational" status was closely affiliated with a school of management. Rev.
Rul. 68-16, 1968-1 C.B. 246.
The grant of the educational exemption to the sailboat racing school also seems to implicate
this rationale. The school was chartered by the State Board of Regents and was organized to
prepare individuals for .Olympic and other international competition. Revenue Ruling 64-275
relied upon the notion that physical education is part of "education" and upon the assertion
that the sailing program is analogous to a trade school (which is explicitly included in the
Treasury Regulation section 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(ii) definition of "education"). A rationale more
consistent with the principles underlying exemption and deductibility is that the development
and training of athletes to represent the nation in international competition is a collective good.
"[Fostering] national or international amateur sports competition" was added as an independent
basis for section 501(c)(3) exemption by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455 §
1313(a), 90 Stat. 1525, 1730. Section 501(j), added by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act of 1982, Pub.: L. No. 97-248 § 286, 96 Stat. 324, 569-70, to clarify the 1976 amendment,
specifies that the-new category includes organizations which "support and develop amateur
athletes for national or international competition in sports." I.R.C. § 501(j)(2) (West Supp.
1987). 1
At least one IRS pronouncement seems to implicate the second rationale. See Gen. Couns.
Mem. 38,459 (Jflly 31, 1980) (reduced price distribution of scholarly journals to organization's
scientist-members "results in the education of a class of individuals whose increased knowledge
and capabilities will serve the public interest").
271. Compare Rev. Rul. 77-4, 1977-1 C.B. 141 (publication of ethnic newspaper undertaken
in manner indistinguishable from ordinary commercial publishing practices not exempt) with
Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 494 F. Supp. 473, 476-77 (D.D.C. 1979), rev'd on other
grounds, 631 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (feminist newspaper which is published by volunteer
staff, distributed free, and does not make a profit is distinguishable from ordinary commercial
publishing practices and, therefore, not ineligible for section 501(c)(3) on that basis). See also Rev.
Rul. 79-369; 1979-2 C.B. 226 (exemption granted for recording and sale of musical compositions
not generally produced by the commercial recording industry because the process results in
presenting new works of unrecognized composers and neglected works of known composers);
Rev. Ru. 67-4, 1967-1 C.B. 121 (non-commercial manner of preparing and distributing journal
of abstracts from world's medical and scientific publications qualifies organization for exemp-
tion).
272. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 69-632, 1969-2 C.B. 120.
273. Rev. Rul. 70-641, 1970-2 C.B. 119.
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conditioning engineers which collected, generated, and broadly disseminated
(beyond its membership) information although the information itself did not
relate to "charitable" topics.274
C. The "Religious" Exemption
Providing the incentives of exemption and deductibility for "religious"
organizations 2 5 cannot rest on the justification that it encourages private
undertaking of functions government would otherwise be obliged to carry,
because government is, of course, constitutionally barred from engaging in
or directly supporting religious activity. 2 6 And, despite some opinion that
advancement of religion is worthy of the exemption and deductibility in-
274. Rev. Rul. 71-506, 1971-2 C.B. 233. Compare The Incorporated Trustees of the Gospel
Worker Soc'y v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 374 (D.D.C. 1981), aff'd without opinion, 672
F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 944 (1982) (profitable publishing activities
of missionary organization resembled publishing and sales practices -of nonexempt commercial
publishers and therefore disqualified organization for "educational" exemption) with Presby-
terian and Reformed Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 743 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1984) (exemption
upheld despite fact that religious publishing house with publishing and sales practices otherwise
unlike commercial practices accumulated profits to expand exempt operations).
275. "Religious" organizations, too, have been exempted from tax as long as there has been
a tax, see supra note 237 and accompanying text, and contributions to them have been deductible
as long as there has been a charitable deduction, see supra note 238 and accompanying text.
Like education, religion is both separately enumerated in section 501(c)(3) and included, by
regulation, as a subcomponent of "charitable," Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (1959), where
tax law, reflecting the common law of charitable trusts, recognizes the promotion of religion
as charitable.
While the Statute of Charitable Uses, 1601, 43 Eliz. I, ch. 4, deliberately omitted religious
purposes except the repair of churches in order to avoid difficulties 'which might arise in
connection with shifts in the official religion, see 4 A. ScoTT, supra note 202, § 371, the
common law soon included the promotion of the established religion, and later, other religions
as well in the category of charitable trusts. Id. Under the tax law, the "advancement of religion"
component of "charitable" is applied, for the most part, to activities which support the functions
of one or more churches or sects. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 75-282, 1975-2 C.B. 201 (making below
market mortgage loans for construction of church buildings); Rev. Rul. 74-575, 1974-2 C.B.
161 (supervising food products to ensure compliance with religious dietary rules); Rev. Rul.
68-26, 1968-1 C.B. 272 (providing materials for parochial school system); Re'M Rul. 68-306,
1968-1 C.B. 257 (publishing church newspaper).
The "religious" designation is applied more broadly, and has qualified not only mainstream
sects, but also groups espousing nearly any sincerely held belief. See B. HoPINs, supra note
49, at 184-87. Where tax exemption has been denied to purportedly "religious" organizations,
denial has almost always rested on other requirements of section 501(c)(3), such as theprohibition
on private inurement or the limitations on political activity, rather than on a conclusion that
the organization is not within the bounds of the term "religious." Id. at 189-92. See also
Thompson, supra note 245, at 10.
276. Government could provide or finance operas, hospitals, historical societies, and
all the rest because they represent social welfare programs within the reach of the
police power. In contrast, government may not provide or finance worship because
of the Establishment Clause any more than it may single out "atheistic" or
"agnostic" centers or groups and create or finance them. 1.
Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 708-09 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting)..
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centives because of its contribution to the general well-being of society, 277
the better-accepted view is that tax exemption for religious organizations is
not supported, or supportable, by reference to the desirability of providing
incentives. Rather, exemption is the less obnoxious of two troublesome
alternatives.
While exemption raises the spectre of subsidy, non-exemption offends the
principle that "organized religion is not expected to support the state.''278
The classic treatment of the issue is found in Walz v. Tax Commission of
New York.279 In Walz, the United States Supreme Court concluded that it
is appropriate for government to go out of its way to avoid interfering with
the private practice of religion, 280 and that, while "[e]ither course, taxation
of churches or exemption, occasions some degree of involvement with re-
ligion, ' 28 1 the involvement between church and state occasioned by the
exemption is far less than that which would necessarily accompany taxa-
tion.282 Exemption "restricts the fiscal relationship between church and state,
and tends to complement and reinforce the desired separation insulating each
from the other. 283
D. Advocacy as Charity
Thus, while the religious exemption must be explained in other terms, the
endeavors which qualify for exemption and deduction under the tax law
generally do tend to be those which either supply collective goods or which
are redistributive in that they serve the needs and interests of society's
1
277. See, e.g., Reiling, supra note 242, at 595. Reiling states:
Nonetheless, there is a presumption that the exemption of [religious organizations]
serves a public interest. It is a presumption which springs from the fact that the
advancement of religion is generally recognized as fundamental to our way of
life, for we are a people who do not agree with the agnostic views of Robert G.
Ingersoll or with the teaching of Karl Marx that religion "is the opium of the
people." Instead, we believe in a government that guarantees the right to religion
and to religious freedom. These religious objectives are accomplished only by
public i~stitutions that are established and maintained otherwise than by govern-
ment. These institutions, when recognized by law as religious, are of a public
character and therefore serve a public interest.
Id. For an excellent discussion of the various justifications that have been proposed for the
exemption of religious organizations, see Schwarz, Limiting Religious Tax Exemptions: When
Should the Church Render Unto Caesar?, 29 U. FLA. L. Rav. 50 (1976). See also Consedine
& WhelanrChurch Tax Exemptions, 15 CATH. LAw. 93, 95 (1969); Hageman, An Examination
of Religious Tax Exemption Policy Under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, 17
VAL. U.L. REv. 405 (1983).
278. Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1680, 1687 n.16 (1969).
279. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). While Walz concerned state property tax exemption, the analysis
and conclusions apply equally in the federal income tax exemption context.
280. Id. at 672-74.
281. Id. at 674.
282. Id. at 675.
283.-tId. at 676.
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distressed and disadvantaged. In the case of "educational" organizations,
the collective good is the process-the dissemination of information and
ideas. In the case of "charitable" organizations, on the other hand, the
collective good or redistributive aspect that supports the designation is found
in the substantive content of the organization's aims. The charitable organ-
ization's purpose is to aid a group or a cause that has been recognized to
be an appropriate focus of special support. The organization's "charitability"
flows from the ends it pursues.
Left free to choose, the charitable organization would likely be guided in
its selection of means by considerations such as the pool of skills and expertise
available within the organization, the perceived effectiveness of a particular
strategy relative to others which might be chosen, and its membership's and
management's views of the organization's appropriate role and style. External
factors will also influence the choice. One important concern will be the
relative direct and indirect costs of various activities. Another is the desir-
ability or necessity of carrying the organization's activity into an arena chosen
by others, either to join in collective action with those who share the or-
ganization's purposes or to respond to those whose interests are counter to
the organization's charitable ends. So long as its activities are in pursuit of
the "charitable" ends determined to be deserving of the incentives of ex-
emption and deductibility, the organization's choice of means should not be
distorted by special regulatory constraints. Nor should the choice of some
particular means carry the extra costs that attend the withholding or re-
traction of the incentive unless there are reasons for the restriction or control
of that means that are at least equal in strength to the policy behind
encouraging the pursuit of the organization's charitable ends. That is, without
some convincing justification to the contrary, the tax law should be neutral
with respect to a charitable organization's choice of strategy, and should
not penalize the organization's decisions to supplement or supplant direct
service activities with system-focused advocacy.
In fact, there are important reasons, at least in some circumstances, to
be not just neutral, but especially solicitous of charitable advocacy activity.
In some circumstances, advocacy activities are not simply means to an
otherwise charitable end. Rather, they are worthy in their own right of the
incentives of exemption and deductibility. This special deference is due where
the advocacy activity tends to promote fair participation in the arenas of
public decisionmaking-where it operates to correct chronic underrepresen-
tation in the processes of government. Careful characterization of the kinds
of interests represented by "charitable" organizations and critical exami-
nation of the workings of the policymaking processes toward which system-
change advocacy is directed reveal that much advocacy by "charitable"
organizations should in fact be the object of special encouragement.
Equal protection analysis, although not directly applicable to the question,
offers a starting point. Equal protection jurisprudence is rooted in the idea
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that majoritarian outcomes of the political process lose their presumed le-
gitimacy when the public decisionmaking processes from which they flow
are fundamentally flawed. The systematic and pervasive disadvantage under
which some groups labor in the political arena justifies a close and skeptical
evaluation of policy formulations that adversely affect their interests. Of
course, these are the "discrete and insular minorities" of Carolene Products'
famous footnote 42 4-groups with respect to which majoritarian prejudice
"tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily
to be relied upon to protect minorities. ' 28 5
While only racial and ancestral group characteristics have qualified une-
quivocally as "suspect" classifications which demand strict scrutiny,2 6 mem-
bers of other groups operate to some significant degree under the same
chronic political disadvantage that underlies our solicitude for the recognized
"suspect classes." Children, for example, may be such a group. Although
children are not the objects of class prejudice of the type that merits height-
ened protection under equal protection analysis, 2 7 as a class they have no
direct access to the political process. Some subgroups of children-foster
children, very poor children, and children of children-lack even indirect
representation through their parents. These same children have the most to
lose from decisionmaking that does not factor in their perspectives, because
284. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). The language of
the footnote itself indicates that it is their condition of disadvantage in the political arena that
justifies the special protection of strict judicial scrutiny of legislation adverse to the interests
of "discrete and insular minorities." The notion that equal protection analysis is concerned
with the correction of process defects has its distinguished supporters, see, e.g., J. ELY,
DEMocRAcY Am DSsRUST (1980), and its distinguished critics, see, e.g., Brilmayer, Carolene,
Conflicts, and the Fate of the "Inside-Outsider," 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1291 (1986); Parker,
The Past of Constitutional Theory-And Its Future, 42 Omo ST. L.J. 223 (1981); Powell,
Carolene Products Revisited, 82 CoLIJm. L. Rav. 1087 (1982); Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence
of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980). Parker argues that Ely's
process-based view of equal protection doctrine is fundamentally flawed because its premise
that "our political process works well enough as it is, and ... is given (only) to rather discrete
sorts of malfunction," Parker, supra at 240-41, ignores a more pervasive falling: "the routine
political ineffectiveness and quiescence-rooted in social and economic inequality-of masses
of ordinary citizens," id. at 249.
285. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.
286. See, e.g., L. TRmE, Am:EaicAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1012 (1978). Justice Powell has
suggested that in writing footnote 4, Justice Stone intended to limit the universe of "discrete
and insular minorities" to those racial, religious, and ethnic groups which are treated unfairly
and unequally in the political process. Powell, supra note 284, at 1091.
The Court has sometimes held that classification on the basis of noncitizen status calls for
strict scrutiny. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365 (1971). It has not done so consistently, and the alienage cases, taken together, seem to
reflect an intermediate standard of review. See J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. Yotmo, CoN-
sTrITTioNAL LAW 630-44 (3d ed. 1986); L. TRIE, supra, at 1052-56.
287. See J. ELY, supra note 284, at 153 (discussing the centrality of prejudice in the iden-
tification of suspect classes); Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HtAv. L. Rav. 713,
740 (1985) (suggesting that the "prejudice" aspect of Carolene in fact argues against a purely
process-based reading of footnote 4).
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their lives are much more affected by public programs and policies than are
those of children who have the buffer of a reasonably well-functioning
family.H8 A number of other groups, such as the very poor, the mentally
ill, and the mentally retarded, share this characteristic of special vulnerability,
because their dependence on public systems2s coincides with a lack of ef-
fective direct access to decisionmaking processes. Furthermore, it is likely
that their interests will not routinely be of much importance to those who
do have access.290
Scholars have suggested that the principle of political fairness which un-
derlies footnote 4, and not its specific words, should shape judicial review.
For instance, Ackerman proposes that "anonymous and diffuse" groups-
even majorities-are subject to systematic disadvantages in the political mar-
ketplace that are similar to, and perhaps worse than, those which justify
special protection for "discrete and insular" groups.29' Because of the relative
invisibility of the members of "anonymous and diffuse" groups to one
another, the barriers to effective organization may be greater than those
faced by at least some "discrete and insular" groups. 292 Thus, the interests
of groups which are discrete and diffuse (like women 293 and handicapped
persons), or anonymous and somewhat insular (like homosexuals), 294 or both
288. See R. MNOOKN, IN THE INTEREST OF CIRLDREN 37, 41, 514 (1985); Knitzer, Child
Advocacy: A Perspective, 46 AM. J. ORTnopsYcmATrRY 200, 205 (1976). Tribe suggests that,
for purposes of equal protection analysis, it would be appropriate to treat children as a "semi-
discrete minority" and childhood as a "semi-suspect classification." L. TamE, supra note 286,
at 1077-80.
In its treatment of illegitimacy as a classification, the Court has come close to recognizing
a need to extend special equal protection review on behalf of children, particularly in circum-
stances where they are disadvantaged by their parents' actions, see, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon,
430 U.S. 762 (1977) (invalidating Illinois law excluding illegitimate child from inheritance from
father through intestate succession unless legitimated through intermarriage of natural parents
and father's acknowledgement of paternity), but appears to have retreated somewhat from that
position, see Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
289. Glasser describes these groups in terms of their intrinsic dependency resulting from
"natural causes that cannot be remedied," such as severe physical or mental handicap, or
extrinsic dependency, caused by "economic insufficiency." Glasser, supra note 24, at 126.
Welfare recipients, foster children, and many of the elderly and mentally ill fall into the latter
category. Id.
290. See infra notes 312-14 and accompanying text.
291. Ackerman, supra note 287, at 723-24.
292. Id. See generally M. OLsoN, THE LOGIC OF CoLLEcvE ACTION (1965). This conclusion
is consistent with predictions suggested by the economic model of political organization, see
infra notes 317-18 and accompanying text, and with empirical observations, see infra note 319
and accompanying text.
293. See also J. ELY, supra note 284, at 164 (although women are neither "insular," nor a
minority, "there remains something that seems right in the claim that women have been operating
at an unfair disadvantage in the political process, although it's tricky pinning down just what
gives rise to that intuition"). Ely concludes that political "access was blocked in the past but
can't responsibly be said to be so any longer" and proposes that "old" gender-discriminatory
laws be reviewed more stringently than "new" ones. Id. at 169.
294. See also id. at 163-64.
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diffuse and anonymous (like poor people) are chronically underrepresented
in the processes which set public policy and should be extended the same
sort of protection through careful judicial review which is extended to foot-
note 4's "discrete and insular minorities. ' '295
Taken together, the "discrete and insular minorities" of Carolene Prod-
ucts' footnote 4 and Professor Ackerman's "diffuse" and "anonymous"
groups describe a universe that is very nearly coextensive with the universe
described by the term "charitable." They encompass the "distressed and
disadvantaged" groups that are the appropriate focus of "charity" in its
narrow, "popular" sense; the groups served by the anti-discrimination com-
ponent of "charitable" "promotion of social welfare;" and the "sufficiently
large and indefinite" classes, the service of whose collective interests is
"charitable" under the broad, common law reach of the term that has been
incorporated into the tax law since at least 1959.296 The same concern about
chronic underrepresentation of these groups that justifies a willingness to
overturn majoritarian outcomes in the equal protection context should inform
our approach to advocacy by charitable organizations. For although neither
established equal protection doctrine nor the exploratory extensions of its
underlying principles dictate special incentives for participation, they may
help to identify groups whose participation is chronically compromised.
Furthermore, recognizing how heavily our perception of the legitimacy of
governmental action depends on an underlying assumption of fair oppor-
tunity for participation in the design of that action should lead us to consider
other adjustments that might be made to correct the chronic underrepresen-
tation of some interests.
The very nature of the policymaking process, as well as the public policy
which results, is distorted when some views are chronically underrepresented.
The classic pluralist model of democratic government 297 describes a legislative
process wherein the articulated preferences of groups of individuals who
share attitudes and claims upon other groups in society298 compete with the
articulated preferences of other interest groups for attention and accom-
modation. The function of the legislative process is to hear and balance
these articulated preferences, arriving at some optimal aggregation which is,
295. Ackerman, supra note 287, at 742.
296. See supra notes 241-56 and accompanying text.
297. See generally D. TaRmAN, TBE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: PoIrMcAL INTERESTS AND
PUBLIC OPIMON (2d ed. 1971). For an excellent survey of the literature describing various
models of the legislative process and examining empirical studies of the legislative process for
fit with the theoretical models, see Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65
TEx. L. REv. 873 (1987). See also Eskridge & Frickey, Legislation, Scholarship and Pedagogy
in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. PiT. L. Rav. 691 (1987).
298. D. TRUMAN, supra note 297, at 37 ("[An interest group is a shared attitude group that
makes certain claims upon other groups in the society. If and when it makes its claims through
or upon any of the institutions of government, it becomes a political interest group.").
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by definition, the embodiment of the "public interest." The process of
adjustment and compromise takes account of both the size of the group
sharing any given preference and the intensity with which that preference is
held; thus, an intensely felt minority preference can counter a less intense
majority interest. 29 Although some have expressed concern that proliferation
of identified interest groups may ultimately immobilize, rather than perfect,
the democratic process,3a3 or that the accommodation reached will represent
a division of policy "turf" among coalitions of minority factions, 0 1 classic
pluralist theory holds that the existence of unorganized potential interest
groups, overlapping membership among identified interest groups, and widely
shared but unorganized interests set stabilizing limits on the interest group
struggle. 02 The process and its outcomes are democratic to the extent that
all articulated preferences are heard at a meaningful stage in the decision-
making process. 303
A version of the pluralist view of the legislative process has been embraced
by law and economics scholars, who have proposed that legislative outcomes
result from the operation of a specialized marketplace. Within this market-
place, coalitions of individuals in pursuit of economic gain seek laws that
will promote that goal from legislators who seek to ensure their own ree-
lection. Groups seek to "outbid" competing interests for legislation favorable
to them, with the currency of exchange being the group's value to the
legislator's chances of reelection (through ability to deliver votes, to provide
favorable publicity or withhold unfavorable attention, and to make campaign
contributions).3°4
The pluralist model has been criticized as being neither descriptively ac-
curate nor normatively sound. 03 First, its critics argue, "[tihe idea that the
political process operates as a well-functioning market is highly romantic." 3°6
Second, and more important, they take issue with the notion that government
in its policymaking function is nothing more than a "cash register, ringing
up the additions and withdrawals of strength, a mindless balance pointing
299. See Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29, 33 (1985).
See also Weisbrod, Theory, supra note 229, at 35 (describing how legislative outcomes are
affected by the vote trading that results from the variation in intensity of individual preferences
with respect to different issues).
300. Cigler & Loomis, Introduction: The Changing Nature of Interest Group Politics, in
INTEREST GRou PoLrIcs 1, 27-28 (A. Cigler & B. Loomis eds. 1983).
301. See McFarland, supra note 28, at 324, 335.
302. See D. TRumAN, supra note 297, at 513-16.
303. See R. Dm.m, DmnEaAs oF PLuRALIsT DEMocRAcY 6 (1982).
304. See, e.g., Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political
Influence, 98 Q.J. EcoN. 371 (1983); Landes & Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an
Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J. L. & EcoN. 875 (1975).
305. See, e.g., A. MAAss, CONGRESS AND TE CommON GOOD 3-4 (1983); Sunstein, Madison
and Constitutional Equality, 9 HA.v. J.L. & PrB. PoL'Y 11 (1986).
306. Sunstein, supra note 305, at 18.
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and marking the weight and distribution of power among the contending
groups. 3a 7 An alternative model proposed by these critics argues that gov-
ernment's function is not just to tally expressed interest group preferences,
but to reflect critically on them, to provide an effective forum for deliberation
and discussion and thus to arrive at expressions of public policy which
embody a "public interest" that is separate from, and loftier than, a simple
aggregation of competing private interests. 301
Under either the classic pluralist theory or the deliberative model, the
legitimacy of the process and of the product it generates depends on wide
and effective access to the decisionmaking machinery.2 9 If the political
marketplace is not open to all articulated preferences, it can hardly lead to
an accurate aggregation of those preferences' l0 If the legislative function is
to reach a well-considered embodiment of some higher notion of the public
interest, the function can only be compromised by the diminution of infor-
mation and perspective available to policymakers which necessarily results
when some groups are consistently denied full access.3 '
Distribution of effective access is clearly skewed, to the detriment of both
the "distressed and disadvantaged" groups and the "large and indefinite
classes" that have been identified as the appropriate focus of "charity."
These are the interests that habitually lose in the policy process either because
they lack the power to get their concerns on the public agenda 12 or because
307. E. LATHAM, THE GROUP BASIS OF PoLITIcs 37 (1952), quoted in Friedmann, The Changing
Content of Public Interest: Some Comments on Harold D. Lasswell, in NoMos V: TBE PuBaIC
INTEREST 80, 84 (C. Friedrich ed. 1962).
308. See A. MAASS, supra note 305, at 5, 19; Friedmann, supra note 307, at 84-85; Sunstein,
supra note 305, at 18.
309. Unlike the classic pluralists, the law and economics theorists do not consider participation
in the debate by all interests to be a postulate of a properly functioning system. Rather, the
factors which result in differential levels of political participation among interests are themselves
the result of the operation of economic principles. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 297, at
704-05.
310. See T. Lows, THE END OF LIBERALISM 51 (2d ed. 1979) (noting that one of the fun-
damental assumptions upon which the classic pluralist view rests is that virtually all sectors of
society are adequately represented by effective organization of their interests). See also Asher,
supra note 28, at 1069, 1080 ("[I]f we are to trust the political marketplace to mediate between
private claims and define public needs equitably and democratically, the marketplace must be
open to all on fair and equal terms.").
311. See HousE SELECT COMM. ON LOBBYING ACTrvrrTEs, GENERAL INTERIM REPORT, H.R.
REP. No. 3138, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1950) ("where a full hearing is available for all
interested groups, we can rely on competitive watchfulness and public scrutiny as partial
safeguards against misrepresentation of the facts by any one group"); remarks of Sen. Edmund
Muskie, 117 CoNG. Rac. 8518 (1971) ("if we are to maintain a democratic form of government
in practice, and if the Congress is to reach reasoned judgments on the important issues before
it, we must assure that every segment of society is able to communicate with Congress"); Caplin
& Timbie, supra note 108, at 198 (legislators dealing with social problems should have advantage
of information and expertise of organizations which have practical experience with the problems).
312. A. DOBELSTEIN, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC WELFARE 166-67 (1980); E.
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they are without the resources needed to obtain their desired outcomes once
the issues are raised in the public arena. The degree to which a group obtains
effective access to governmental decisionmaking processes depends, among
other things, on the group's prestige and the extent to which the decision-
makers belong to or identify with the group. 1 3 Groups that are appropriate
beneficiaries of "charitable" activity rarely enjoy much prestige. Further,
government officials are unlikely to consider themselves to have much in
common with members of these groups, particularly the "distressed and
disadvantaged" classes. To the extent that the concerns of these groups make
it onto the public agenda, legislators are more likely to identify with, and
therefore give access and credence to, the professional service providers who
are concerned with the same policy issues as their client populations but
who are likely to represent an entirely different, though not necessarily
unsympathetic, perspective. 314
Sca-rscmmmR, THE SEI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE 71 (1960) ("Some issues are organized into
politics while others are organized out."), quoted in Bachrach, Interest, Participation, and
Democratic Theory, in Nomos XVI: PARTIcIPATiON IN PoLrrcs 39, 54 n.10 (J. Pennock & J.
Chapman eds. 1975); Bachrach, supra, at 45; Parker, supra note 284, at 250 (criticizing Ely's
process-oriented conception of politics for "[ignoring] the probability that a condition of
weakness might impair a group's capacity even to get its interests on the 'agenda' of the political
process" and for being "oblivious to a dimension of power involving 'nondecisions;' that is,
inaction").
313. D. TRuMAN, supra note 297, at 506-07.
314. See id. at 336; Cigler & Loomis, supra note 300, at 13-14 (noting also that service-
provider interest groups face fewer obstacles to organization than client groups, particularly
when clients are poor, mentally ill, or otherwise disadvantaged).
Parallel problems of effective access confront the target populations of "charity" in the
second major locus of public policy decisionmaking, that is, administrative agencies. The
importance of wide access to bureaucratic policy setting is clearly essential to fair and balanced
outcomes. See Sunstein, supra note 305, at 18; DiMento, Citizen Environmental Litigation and
the Administrative Process: Empirical Findings, Remaining Issues and a Direction for Future
Research, 1977 Duan L.J. 409, 441 (1977). DiMento states:
If that portion of the public which has previously been unrepresented in agency
decision-making can be included in the [administrative] decision-making process,
many will agree that the decisions will be closer to the public interest than was
the case prior to their inclusion .... [C]ontributions from a greater variety of
perspectives may improve the quality of analysis.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Interest group influence in this context, too, is likely to be skewed by disparity in availability
of resources and, probably even more than in the legislative context, by the identification of
the decisionmakers with the professional, rather than client or consumer, interest groups. See
A. DOBEaasmIN, supra note 312, at 168-69 ("professional groups have access to the bureaucracy,
largely because the staff of administrative agencies themselves are likely to be members of
professional groups and often seek the advice of their colleagues in exchange for political
support"); E. LAxm. , THrE GRoUP BAsIs OF PouTics 37 (1952), quoted in Friedmann, supra
note 307, at 84-85; McLachlan, Democratizing the Administrative Process Toward Increased
Responsiveness, 13 AmIZ. L. REV. 835, 836 (1972). See, e.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation
Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
941 (1966). See also Keim, Participating in Contemporary Democratic Theories, in NoMos XVI:
PARTICIPATION IN PoLTIs 1, 16 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1975).
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The economic theory of the legislative process3 5 also predicts that section
501(c)(3)'s "distressed and disadvantaged" groups and "large and indefinite
classes" are likely to be at a chronic disadvantage in the political marketplace.
First, the "distressed and disadvantaged" groups have, almost by definition,
less of the currency needed to "buy" favorable legislation. Second, the
formation and successful mobilization of interest groups as "buyers" is
affected by the incidence of transaction costs and the extent to which the
group must overcome a free-rider problem. 1 6 Where the perceived costs or
benefits of legislation fall to a relatively narrow, well-defined group, that
group will tend to organize and participate because the net stake to each
member is significant and the transaction costs of organizing are manageable.
Where the perceived costs or benefits are widely distributed, however, the
net stake of each potentially affected individual is small, and therefore less
likely to seem to justify the cost and effort of organization and active
participation. Furthermore, as the size of the affected group increases, so
does the cost of organization. As a result, economic theory predicts that
interest group activity will be skewed in favor of narrow, well-defined groups,
rather than large, indefinite classes. 317
Finally, since legislators "supply" legislation in exchange for increased
likelihood of reelection, they are reluctant to pass measures which call forth
organized opposition, which is likely to be the case when the costs of the
proposed measure would fall on a relatively small, well-defined group. At
the same time, they are willing to grant concentrated benefits when the cost
is widely dispersed and, therefore, the opposition unlikely to be organized.
Economic theory predicts that the operation of the forces of political supply
and demand will result in a large number of statutes favorable to the interests
of well-organized, powerful interest groups and far fewer "public interest"
laws-that is, laws which correct market failure by supplying collective goods
or by implementing broadly held notions of distributive justice, such as civil
rights laws. 31 8
Empirical studies of interest group and legislative behavior indicate that
neither pluralist theory, in either its "classic" form or as modified by law
and economics scholars, nor the deliberative model provides an accurate
description of our political reality. What the studies do confirm is that while
the legislative product is driven by a shifting mix of response to organized
pressure and independent exercise of legislators' ideology, the pressure is
315. See supra note 304 and accompanying text.
316. See supra note 230 and accompanying text; McFarland, supra note 28, at 327-28.
317. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 297, at 704-05 (summarizing the views of Posner
and others).
318. Id. at 705-06. "[Where] the legislator cannot ... avoid conflictual demand patterns,
either because an issue is politically salient or organized groups are on both sides ... [he] has
every incentive to work out some compromise ... that satisfies as many interest groups as
possible, or even to delegate the sensitive decisions to agencies." Id.
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exerted by groups that disproportionately represent upper-class and upper-
middle-class interests. 31 9
As long as the political demands of some segments of society remain
unarticulated, the legitimacy of the policies which emerge from the skewed
decision processes is suspect. An additional reason to promote opportunities
for involvement in the processes of public policy generation is offered by
those who suggest that the importance of political participation is not only
in its capacity to affect outcomes, but also in its value as a mechanism for
self-realization. 320 Developing awareness of one's latent political interests is
a creative process that can take place only if opportunities exist to reflect
and act upon one's opinions. A political system that forecloses such op-
portunities for some groups is fundamentally flawed. 32'
Finally, one of the claims that individuals have upon others in society is
to be recognized and respected as bearers of interests and demands that
command consideration in the democratic processes of interest accommo-
dation.322 Failure to share decisionmaking power connotes a basic disrespect
for the excluded,323 and seems to postulate a natural right of the political
elite "to determine where the shoe pinches as well as how the pinch should
be eased. ' 324 This message runs directly counter to one of the most basic
premises of our system: while one may not win in the struggle of competing
interests, one's arguments will be given conscientious consideration. One's
claims and one's right to present them will be respected. 325
The principles that support special solicitude for "charitable" groups in
the processes of legislative and administrative policymaking argue equally in
favor of incentives for litigation in pursuit of charitable ends. Diffuse ma-
jority interests are susceptible to underrepresentation in the courtroom, as
well as in the halls of the legislature. Because of the inherent difficulty of
effectively mobilizing diffuse interests that implicate no substantial and im-
mediate individual pecuniary stake, issues that pit substantial private interests
319. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 297, at 886-87, 906-08 (describing a number of empirical
studies). See especially K. ScinozuAN & J. TimERY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AmERICAN
DEMOCRACY 66-87, 107-19 (1986).
320. See Bachrach, supra note 312, at 47-49 (proposing that continuing face-to-face involve-
ment in close-to-home policymaking environments-primarily the workplace-would be an
appropriate mechanism to facilitate political self-realization among those unaccustomed to
participation in the larger political arena); Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-
Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HAv. L. Rav. 4, 26 (1986).
321. See Braybrooke, The Meaning of Participation and of Demands for It: A Preliminary
Survey of the Conceptual Issues, in NoMos XVI: PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS 82 (J. Pennock &
J. Chapman eds. 1975).
322. See A. MA~ss, supra note 305, at 5-6.
323. Ackerman, supra note 287, at 738; Bachrach, supra note 312, at 43.
324. R. DwommN, TAKING RIGHTs SERIOUSLY 272-73 (1977); Sunstein, Naked Preferences
and the Constitution, 84 CoLaus. L. REv. 1689, 1689-98 (1984).
325. Letter from Sen. Sam J. Ervin, Jr., to Commissioner Randolph Thrower (Oct. 14,
1970), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 60, at 47.
19871
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
against widely distributed but far less intensely held interests tend not to be
brought into the courts as often as their overall importance would merit.
The diffuse nature of the interest of the general public in issues such as
environmental preservation and consumer protection undercuts the ability
of the marketplace to provide legal representation commensurate with the
real value of such public interests. 326 The IRS itself has acknowledged that,
under these circumstances, the availability of representation, in and of itself,
is a charitable object.327
There are additional reasons for increasing access to the courts for those
who pursue the interests of the beneficiaries of "charity" in its narrow sense.
Not only do the "distressed and disadvantaged" lack the resources to vin-
dicate their rights, but, by virtue of their particular circumstances, their
most basic rights are especially vulnerable. Precisely because these are the
"distressed" and "disadvantaged," they are often dependent for their most
basic needs on public programs. These programs, reflecting their roots in
the Progressive era, 328 have historically conditioned assistance upon forfeiture
of a significant degree of personal 'autonomy. The agencies and individuals
who provide services under these programs tend sometimes to overlook the
fact that even benevolent governmental intervention is subject to fundamental
constitutional limitations. This tendency creates a strong potential for in-
ordinate agency power over client lives and for arbitrary exercise of that
power.3 29 The only reliable safeguard against abuse is effective access to the
institutions and processes designed to protect private right from public power.
Furthermore, the courts are the primary forum for challenging the legitimacy
of policies generated by unacceptably distorted representative processes. 330
If the very groups that are the most likely victims of these distortions33' are
unable to seek relief from the courts, then the basic premise supporting the
legitimacy of majoritarian outcomes is violated.
Finally, those who represent both broad and narrow "charitable" interests
are uniquely placed to insist that the final arbiters of society's rules do not
overlook basic questions of distributive justice. By definition, they are con-
cerned with collective goods and with the interests of the least powerful.
326. Hearings, supra note 60, at 246, 253 (statement of David Sive, of the law firm Winer,
Newberger & Sive); PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 174, at 28-29; Junger, A Recipe for
Bad Water: Welfare Economics and Nuisance Law Mix Well, 27 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 3,
224-27 (1976).
327. Hearings, supra note 60, at 60-61 (testimony of Commissioner Randolph Thrower);
Rev. Rul. 75-74, 1975-1 C.B. 152.
328. See generally Rothman, The State as Parent: Social Policy in the Progressive Era, in
W. GAYLIN, I. GLASSER, S. MARCUS & D. ROTHMAN, DOING GOOD: THE Lnmrrs oF BENEVOLENCE
69 (1978).
329. See Glasser, supra note 24, at 114-17 (1978).
330. See Denvir, Towards a Political Theory of Public Interest Litigation, 54 N.C.L. REv.
1133 (1976); Sunstein, supra note 305, at 19.
331. See supra notes 284-96 and accompanying text.
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Their presence in the judicial forum helps to guard against the danger that
courts will not only weigh these interests too lightly, but will fail altogether
to recognize that fundamental value judgments are implicated332 in the issues
they are deciding.3 3
III. RESTRUCTURING THE LAW TO REFLECT THE UNDERLYING
RATIONALES
There are good reasons, then, not only to tolerate, but to encourage,
advocacy which tends to correct either general market failures or the par-
ticular failures of the "political marketplace." In general, system-focused
advocacy efforts of charitable organizations have this effect, and the ar-
guments in favor of limiting them are not strong enough to override the
reasons for encouraging them.334 However, even if the arguments against
charitable advocacy are insufficiently persuasive that the incentives of ex-
emption and deductibility should be withheld from advocacy organizations,
the incentives cannot be justified except in cases where the underlying policies
favoring the incentives will, in fact, be furthered.
All advocacy by all varieties of nonprofit organizations is not alike. Under
which circumstances are the justifications for the incentives present? Which
situations do not implicate market failure or do not compensate for that
failure in ways that justify the incentive?
Exemption and deductibility for organizations pursuing "charitable" pur-
poses are justified by the organization's substantive focus. Almost by def-
inition, the "charitable" organization exists to provide public goods or to
332. Tribe argues that the courts do, in fact, demonstrate this propensity. He contends, for
example, that basing decisions on a cost-benefit calculus simply obscures the fact that basic
value judgments are implicated in defining what counts as a "cost" or a "benefit." Further,
the value perspective the courts have tended to adopt is one that discounts, or even ignores,
basic distributive justice issues. Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic
Efficiency?, 98 HAv. L. REv. 592, 597-98 (1985).
333. Section 501(c)(3) imposes substantial constraints on participation in election campaigns.
These limitations are beyond the scope of this article because elections are not really a part of
the policy formulation process; rather, they are the process by which the major policymaking
bodies are constituted. It is true that the chronic underrepresentation of some sectors of society
in this process can be expected to result in a skewing of the policies which emerge from the
resulting policymaking bodies. However, the fair participation issues raised by election cam-
paigns differ from those that arise in the context of legislative, administrative, or litigative
advocacy. The primary value which underlies regulation of elections and participation in cam-
paigns is the principle of ensuring the individual a full and fair opportunity to participate. The
value of associating to participate is, for these purposes, a subordinate one. There is less reason,
therefore, for society to "expend" to encourage aggregation of voices (even chronically un-
derrepresented voices) in this context. Conversely, there is good reason to "expend" to facilitate
full and effective individual opportunity to participate. Incentives in this context, then, should
be directed toward activities which are aimed at engaging the individual in the election process,
such as neutral voter education activities and voter registration drives.
334. See supra notes 203-25 and accompanying text.
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redistribute wealth. The articulation of the organization's purpose identifies
the disadvantaged group or the broad public concern whose interests it seeks
to promote. In principie, the process by which those interests are pursued
is irrelevant; the collective good or redistributive aspect of the endeavor
arises from the nature of the group or cause by which the organization
defines its mission.3 35 In fact, the process of providing representation in the
arenas of public decisionmaking for interests which suffer chronic under-
representation can be, in and of itself, a collective good or redistributional
activity which merits incentive. 36 The justification is absent, however, where
an organization describes its mission in terms of a recognized charitable
purpose, but actually provides a private good-that is, representation that
the private market is perfectly capable of supplying. When an organization
simply amplifies voices already well-represented in policymaking arenas, the
special justification for providing incentives for advocacy is lacking. When
the organization's position merely restates individual interests which are of
sufficient magnitude to ensure their representation without special incentive,
there is no market failure, and providing a special incentive for such advocacy
is more likely to contribute to, rather than correct, imbalance of represen-
tation.
The distinction cannot be drawn on the basis of the position taken. Two
"charitable" organizations may well reach different conclusions about the
desirability of certain public policies. For example, one organization might
oppose the proliferation of nuclear power plants on health and environmental
protection grounds. The policies favored by this organization might also be
preferred by coal producers, who stand to derive a private benefit from the
limitation of alternative energy sources. Another "charitable" organization
might take the position that the expansion of nuclear energy generation
facilities would serve environmental protection and consumer interests. This
organization's policy preferences might be consistent with those of the power
companies which stand to gain from the promotion of nuclear power facil-
ities. Each organization believes its viewpoint to represent the "public in-
terest." It is impossible to identify which vision is correct, and there are
clear reasons to avoid basing decisions about the grant or denial of the
section 501(c)(3) incentives upon an administrative assessment of which vision
is correct.33 7 But if the incentives are to be tailored to reflect their underlying
justifications, some way must be identified to distinguish between those
organizations which merit the incentives and those which do not. Clearly,
that basis must be something more than the organization's own claim that
its efforts are in the service of "environmental preservation" or "consumer
protection."
335. See supra notes 237-63 and accompanying text.
336. See supra notes 284-333 and accompanying text.
337. See supra notes 183-91 and accompanying text.
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Representation of the private interest on either side of the issue does not
implicate market failure and does not merit special incentive, even if the
representatives are organized into nonprofit firms and their goals given the
label of "environmental preservation" or "consumer protection." But rep-
resentation of a widely shared, hard-to-organize sentiment does fit the ra-
tionales for the incentive, no matter which side of the issue is espoused.
Representation of a diffuse interest is no less a collective good because there
exists an opposing diffuse interest or because it is aligned with private
interests. The mechanism for deciding which organizations qualify for the
exemption and deductibility incentives must be designed, therefore, to draw
the line, not between the "pro" and the "anti," but rather, between the
representation of viewpoints which are "collective" and those which are
''private. 33
There is another situation in which the incentives are not warranted. Even
where the inefficiencies or inequities of the marketplace do lead to chronic
underrepresentation, no cure is supplied, and, therefore, no incentive should
be provided, where an organization which purports to give voice to the
slighted viewpoint cannot fairly claim to speak for those whose interests
have been overlooked.
The criticism has been advanced that many organizations which claim to
represent underrepresented interests in fact do not. Very often, there exists
no mechanism by which the organization is formally accountable to those
in whose interests it claims to be acting. As a practical matter, even a
membership organization which is technically accountable to its members is
unlikely to involve them actively in selecting positions on issues or in choosing
strategies by which to pursue them 39 The staff of "public interest" organ-
338. The discussion describes representation of diffuse interests. The same principle applies
to representation of "distressed and disadvantaged" interests, which has redistributive rather
than collective good characteristics and which responds to equity-based rather than efficiency-
based market failure. For example, the fact that developers who stand to gain support a housing
subsidy program does not make the advocacy efforts of an organization formed to promote
the interests of the poor any less "charitable." Nor does the fact that the program would serve
the interests of the poor necessarily make the developers' advocacy "charitable." See K.
ScHLozmAN & J. TiERNEY, supra note 319, at 26-35 (defining public interest group as "one
seeking a benefit, the achievement of which will not benefit selectively either the membership
or the activists of the organization" and noting that there may be both public and private
interests on each side of a question).
339. Further, many membership organizations do not vest even technical, ultimate control
in members. Even an organization with members may vest total voting power, including the
power to elect directors, in its board of directors. See, e.g., ALI-ABA MODEL NoN-PRoFIT
CoRPoR.axoN ACT §§ 15, 18 (1964). Hayes describes a 1977 study which assessed the oppor-
tunities to influence organizational policy provided by public interest lobbies to their members.
Hayes, Interest Groups: Pluralism or Mass Society, in INrERasT GROUP Pouncs 110 (A. Cigler
& B. Loomis eds. 1983). "[Flew of these groups communicated with their memberships in any
ongoing way beyond the publication of newsletters or occasional legislative alerts. Fifty-seven
percent provided no means whatever for members to influence group decision making....
Not surprisingly, the professional staff dominated the decision-making process for most (69
percent) of these groups." Id. at 113-14.
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izations tends to be white, middle class, more highly educated and more
politically liberal than the public at large. 34 0 Even in what might be called
"middle class causes," such as environmental and consumer issues, 4 an
organization's members are likely to hold views that do not accurately reflect
general public opinion, and the organization's staff and board are likely to
subscribe to positions more extreme than those held by many of the members.142
If organizations dealing in middle class causes fail to mirror the characteristics
and policy preferences of their "constituencies," one might expect to find
even more acute disparities between the supposedly represented group and
the leaders of organizations which focus on the distressed and disadvantaged,
or on victims of discrimination.
Despite these criticisms, charitable organizations may indeed be able to
help diminish the imbalance of representation suffered by "charitable" target
groups and causes. Effective action often requires the skills and resources
of relatively well-educated, well-heeled individuals, who can take an entre-
preneurial role in organizing, funding, and directing an organized response
to the problems of chronic underrepresentation.3 43 Social movements have
often begun with advocacy by:
people close to the sociological norm of the country (the white middle
class), many of whom had the communications skills and political talents
to influence other members of the middle class to lobby political elites.
... At certain times in American history, middle-class social movements
have appeared suddenly and have had an immediate impact on public
340. See Hayes, supra note 339, at 110; McFarland, supra note 28, at 340. A poll of public
interest lawyers indicated that 4% of them voted for Ford in 1976, 2% voted for Reagan in
1980, and Bella Abzug and Ralph Nader headed their collective list of most admired individuals.
Lichter & Rothman, What Interests the Public, and What Interests the Public Interests, PUBLIc
OPINION, April-May 1983, cited in Rabkin, Public Interest Law: Is It Law in the "Public
Interest"?, 8 HAgv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 341, 343 n.3 (1985).
341. See PuBUc INTEREST LAW, supra note 174, at 555.
342. See Downing & Brady, supra note 167, at 67, 91-93. Downing and Brady propose that
as a public interest group successfully moves public policy toward its preferred position,
membership will drop, because members with less extreme preferred positions will be satisfied
and will perceive marginally less to be gained by continued participation. It seems possible,
however, that success might invigorate rather than satiate; given evidence of the organization's
effectiveness, a member might rethink his stance. Downing and Brady acknowledge that members
of multiple-issue groups are likely to stay interested longer, since new issues "ripen" as others
approach resolution. Id.
343. See Hayes, supra note 339, at 123. Schlozman and Tierney point out that individuals
with high levels of education, income, and employment are much more likely to engage in all
forms of political activity, including membership in organizations. K. ScHILozM" & J. TiERNEY,
supra note 319, at 60-61. "Individuals vary in terms of the political resources-time, money,
skills, contacts and so on-that make it easier for some individuals to be joiners and more
difficult for others." Id. at 65. The material demands of group membership and participation
("from paying dues to paying a babysitter") "might pose a particular barrier to lower status
citizens." Id. at 62-63.
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policy, partly because existing social institutions provided a means of
communicating the ideas of the new movement.
3
"
The impact has not been limited to "middle-class causes;" largely middle-
class organizations have provided an avenue for reform on behalf of the
"discrete and insular" target groups of charitable purpose as well.345
Although some organizations have made efforts to involve members of
the "distressed and disadvantaged" groups whose interests they seek to
further,34 the limited nature of these efforts has been criticized.3 47 And while
it may be possible and desirable to involve members of some underrepresented
classes (for example, the poor and racial minorities) in the direction of the
organizations which purport to represent their interests, the members of
other chronically underrepresented groups are inherently powerless to identify
and pursue their own interests, even to the extent of joining in decisionmaking
with respect to the organizations which claim to represent them. For example:
[C]hildren need advocates because, in most circumstances, children can-
not speak for and defend their own interests. Whether policy is made
in the legislature or the courthouse, the interests of children need and
deserve representation. And yet, because children cannot speak for their
own interests, how can the advocate know for certain what those interests
are?34s
Generally, it is the groups whose status or condition makes them the least
capable of direct participation in policymaking processes on their own behalf
that have the greatest need for advocates, but also have the least power to
control those who purport to speak for them. These groups would appear
to present the greatest risk of divergence between actual "constituent" in-
terests and the organization's perception of constituent needs. The dilemma
is real, and perhaps incapable of resolution. Experience demonstrates, how-
344. McFarland, supra note 28, at 341. See also D. TRumAN, supra note 297, at 517
("Research evidence indicates that individuals who hold a broad [unorganized] interest ...
may or may not see a given set of events as bearing upon that interest .... The quality and
character of [communication] ... are of fundamental importance in assuring the influence of
unorganized interests.").
345. See, e.g., Cigler & Loomis, supra note 300, at 23. To some extent, this is a necessary
consequence of the fact that some advocacy strategies require the skills of lawyers and other
professionals. But see Cahn & Cahn, Power to the People or the Profession-The Public
Interest in Public Interest Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1005, 1042-45 (1970) (expressing concern that
focus on "middle class" public interest issues, such as consumerism and environmentalism,
will divert the attention of public interest lawyers from the causes of society's least fortunate.
"For the law has traditionally provided the only avenue of redress for the disenfranchised.
... [Tihe only profession specially protected in an advocacy role cannot justify its dereliction
by regrouping under the righteous banner of essentially majoritarian concerns.").
346. See, e.g., K. ScHnozKAN & J. TmiRNEY, supra note 319, at 60-65; Houseman, Community
Group Action: Legal Services, Poor People and Community Groups, 19 CiEAIUGHOUsE REv.
392, 397 (1985).
347. See, e.g., Note, In Defense of an Embattled Mode of Advocacy: An Analysis and
Justification of Public Interest Practice, 90 YALE L.J. 1436 (1981).
348. R. MNooKiN, supra note 288, at 12.
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ever, that even groups which do not mirror the characteristics of their
"constituents" can be capable of valuing and promoting the interests of
those who are not like them. 49 Given the alternative, which is either no
voice at all or "representation" by others whose interests are at odds with
those of the underrepresented group, 3 0 perhaps the best we can do is to
structure the incentives for advocacy activity to avoid enhancement of already
well-represented viewpoints and to promote accountability of ostensibly rep-
resentative organizations, to their "constituent" groups if possible, and, if
not, at least to someone or something other than narrow, otherwise well-
represented interests.
The existing section 501(c)(3) prohibition on private inurement35 ' and the
requirement that to be "operated exclusively" for exempt purposes an or-
ganization must serve "a public rather than a private interest"352 provide
some protection against the most blatant distortions of charitable form for
349. Schlozman and Tierney found (based on their own survey and journalistic accounts)
that "[t]hose who work for public interest groups seem to labor for love not money: they work
long hours in surroundings that are not plush and do so at lower pay than they could command
in the private sector. Moreover, they seem, almost universally, to care deeply about the causes
to which they devote their efforts." K. ScimozmA_ & J. TIErNEY, supra note 319, at 33-34.
Mnookin notes that, despite the inherently compromised accountability of public interest
advocacy groups to the children for whom they purport to advocate, examination of several
major test cases addressing children's issues reveals no evidence that the interests of individual
children were sacrificed to the "cause." R. MNOOxUN, supra note 288, at 515. See also Caplin
& Timbie, supra note 108, at 198-99 (describing legislative advocacy activities of the National
Association for Mental Health on behalf of the mentally ill).
In some situations, interested advocates who are somewhat removed from their "constituency"
may be best able to represent their interests. For instance, "It]he burden on a retarded person's
family is not a primary concern of [independent advocates] committed to the right of the
retarded to lead normal lives. Thus, legal activists may push for more home-based care than
[advocacy organizations led by parents of retarded children]." Rose-Ackerman, Mental Retar-
dation and Society: The Ethics and Politics of Normalization, 93 ETMcs 81, 91 (1982).
350. See, e.g., K. ScHLozmAN & J. TIERNEY, supra note 319, at 21-22 (teachers' viewpoint
with respect to bilingual education is not necessarily consistent with children's interests, because
although teachers are "informed outside observers," their jobs may be implicated in the outcome
and their own values with respect to the relative worth of cultural pluralism and material
success may be different); Knitzer, Advocacy and the Children's Crisis, 41 AM. J. or ORn o-
PsYcI-ATRY 799 (1971) (describing "representation" of children's interests by established in-
stitutional service providers, thus ensuring resistance to any reversal of existing priorities); Rose-
Ackerman, supra note 349, at 92-93 (noting that relatively unskilled ward staff of institutions
for retarded have opposed deinstitutionalization movement because of fear of losing their jobs,
and groups of professionals who work with mentally retarded have supported deinstitutional-
ization accompanied by increase in services provided by their professions); supra notes 314,
319 and accompanying text.
351. Section 501(c)(3) extends exempt status only to otherwise qualifying organizations "no
part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual."
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) (1959). An organization cannot be exempt if it is organized
or operated for the benefit of designated individuals, the organization's creator or his family,
shareholders, persons controlled by the creator, or anyone having a personal and private interest
in the activities of the organization. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(1)(ii) (1959).
352. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(1)(ii) (1959). See Goldsboro Art League v. Commissioner,
75 T.C. 337, 346 (1980).
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private gain, and provide some safeguard against the use of exempt organ-
ization political advocacy to further private interests that are not otherwise
underrepresented. These provisions are designed to inhibit distribution of
the organization's assets to insiders, directly or indirectly. 53 They would
prevent, for instance, the use of the section 501(c)(3) form to provide free
legal representation for the direct, clearly identifiable private interests of
those who control the organization.3 54 To the extent that the "public rather
than private interest" component of the operational test requires that the
benefits of the organization's works accrue to a broad public, rather than
a narrowly defined class, 355 it bars the use of a section 501(c)(3) organization
to pursue the self-serving agenda of, for instance, the members of a particular
profession.3 56 These provisions, however, do not necessarily preclude the use
of a section 501(c)(3) organization to pursue public policy positions which
are perfectly capable of being heard without special incentive, if the organ-
ization's positions deal generally with "charitable" subject matter, nor do
they offer any assurance that the views espoused are those of anyone but
the organization's leadership.
Current tax law offers a model for a mechanism to locate the line between
section 501(c)(3) organizations which should be permitted to engage freely
in system-change advocacy activities and those which should not. Section
509(a) of the Internal Revenue Code describes criteria that a section 501(c)(3)
organization must meet in order to avoid being classified as a private foun-
dation. Private foundations are essentially barred from engaging in legislative
activity.357 Treasury Regulation section 1.509(a) excludes from the definition
of private foundation organizations "which either have broad public support
or actively function in a supporting relationship to such organization. ' 351
In a rough way, this distinction is consistent with the idea that the advantages
of section 501(c)(3) status ought not to be extended to advocacy, even on
"charitable" subjects, on behalf of narrowly held views. In particular, the
353. Distribution or disguised distribution in this context can take the form of excess salary
or benefits, loan arrangements, or proceeds of self-dealing transactions. See, e.g., Founding
Church of Scientology v. United States, 412 F.2d 1197, 1199-1201 (Ct. CI. 1969).
354. Coincidental private benefits, even to those who control the organization, will not
violate the prohibition against private inurement. See B. HoPKINs, supra note 49, at 247.
355. See Sound Health Ass'n v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 158, 190 (1978) ("When possible
membership is so broad, benefit to the membership is benefit to the community." (emphasis
in original)).
356. See, e.g., Krohn v. United States, 246 F. Supp. 341 (D. Colo. 1965); Hammerstein v.
Kelley, 235 F. Supp. 60 (E.D. Mo. 1964).
357. While section 4945 of the Internal Revenue Code does not expressly prohibit private
foundations from engaging in legislative activity, its imposition of an excise tax on lobbying
expenditures has that effect. A tax equal to 10% of the expenditure is assessed initially; if,
however, the expenditure is not recovered promptly, the tax assessed is equal to 100% of the
expenditure. In addition, section 4945 imposes a tax on foundation managers who are responsible
for the expenditure. I.R.C. § 4945 (West Supp. 1987).
358. Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-I (1972).
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public support formulas of Internal Revenue Code sections 170(b)(1)(A)(vi) 3' 9
and 509(a)(2)360 are indicators of whether an organization is responsive to a
broad or a narrow constituency. Generally speaking, an organization can
satisfy either of the formulas only if it receives at least one-third of its
support in the form of relatively small amounts (donations, dues and/or
fees) from a relatively broad "public." ' 36' In the "public charity" formula,
large contributions are included in full in the denominator of the support
fraction, but are included in the numerator only to the extent that the
contribution of any one donor (or group of donors standing in certain
specified relationships to one another) does not exceed two percent of the
organization's total support, averaged over a four-year period.36 The "broadly-
publicly supported" formula screens for concentrated influence by excluding
from the public support numerator any amount received from "disqualified
persons," including individuals whose aggregate contributions have exceeded
a $5,000 or two percent of total contributions threshold.3 63 Because the receipt
of relatively large amounts from any one source works against satisfaction
of the public support formulas, the fact that an organization meets either
of the support tests should provide at least some assurance that the organ-
ization is not controlled by narrow private interests.
Tying eligibility to pursue system-focused advocacy activities with exempt
and deductible dollars to the public support formulas is one way to avoid
providing special incentives for the repetition and amplification of viewpoints
that are not chronically disadvantaged in the political marketplace. In ad-
dition, the fact that its support is drawn from a "diffuse" base gives some
credence to an organization's claim to give voice to "diffuse" interests. A
broad base of financial support provides a direct indicator that the organ-
359. Section 170(b)(1)(A)(vi) establishes the formula for "public charities." I.R.C.
§ 170(b)(1)(A)(vi) (West Supp. 1987). Treasury Regulation section 1.170A-9(e) provides the details
of the formula. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e) (1972).
360. I.R.C. § 509(a)(2) (West Supp. 1987) establishes the formula for "broadly publicly
supported organizations." Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-3 (1972) provides additional detail.
361. For a detailed explanation of the application of these provisions, see B. HoPKiNs, supra
note 49, at 442-58.
Weisbrod suggests that the form in which a nonprofit organization receives its revenue is a
useful proxy measure of the "degree of collectiveness" of the organization's activities, with a
high proportion of contributions, gifts, and grants, as compared to dues and sales, indicating
that the organization is probably providing collective goods. Weisbrod recognizes, however,
that the measure is imperfect and acknowledges that in the case of organizations which provide
collective goods, revenue from dues and sales may actually include a gift component. Weisbrod,
Private Goods, supra note 229, at 150-51.
362. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(6)(i) (1972).
363. I.R.C. § 509(a)(2) (West Supp. 1987). Individuals who are in a position to control the
organization are also "disqualified persons." Id. The formula also puts a 1% of total support
or $5,000 per payor limit on the amount of gross receipts from related business activities that
may be included in the numerator of the support fraction. Id.
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ization's perception of the public interest is shared by at least some minimal
"public." 364 The formulas are a less useful measure of true representation
in the case of organizations which purport to represent the interests of the
"distressed and disadvantaged." The ability of an organization to draw
broad-based financial support does not necessarily correlate with its capacity
to reflect the needs and desires of the distressed and disadvantaged target
group. Insisting upon broad-based support as a condition of eligibility to
engage in unlimited system-focused advocacy would, however, offer some
rough indication that the organization is responding to a widely shared
perception of social inequity. In other words, the market forces that reside
within the broad support requirement can help to identify which organiza-
tions are alleviating equity-based market failures.
As presently defined, however, the placement of the line between private
foundations and non-private foundations is not well matched to the policies
which should drive the system of incentives and constraints. First, non-
private foundation status is not based exclusively on the sources of an
organization's support. Some types of section 501(c)(3) organizations, namely
schools, churches, hospitals, certain medical care and research organi-
zations, governmental units, and certain foundations which support tax-
exempt colleges and universities, are categorically deemed non-private foun-
dations.3 65 Second, the present support formulas are inadequate to identify
advocacy that speaks for otherwise underrepresented interests. An organi-
zation can conceivably derive all of its support from fewer than twenty
donors and still satisfy the one-third support formula.36 While there is no
way to identify precisely how broad the support base ought to be in order
to provide adequate assurance that the organization neither represents a
narrow public interest nor fails to represent a broad one, it seems that a
better indication that the underlying justifications for the incentive are present
would be provided by excluding from the numerator contributions from any
one donor (or group of related donors)367 which exceed one percent of the
organization's total support, and by raising the required proportion of public
support to one-half of total support.
Once the threshold of broad public support is met, additional standards
could be imposed in circumstances which still threaten to exacerbate, rather
364. This would be true even where the organization aligns with well-represented private
interests.
365. I.R.C. § 509(a)(2) (West Supp. 1987).
366. For example, suppose an organization's total support of $1,800,000 is received as
$100,000 contributions from each of 18 individuals. The contributions must be included in full
in the denominator of the support fraction ($1,800,000), while each can be included in the
numerator only up to an amount equal to 2016 of total support ($36,000 per contributor, for
a total of $648,000). Despite the small number of contributors, the one-third public support
test is met.
367. See supra note 362 and accompanying text.
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than alleviate, disparities in access to public policymaking. When an organ-
ization's "charitable" focus is somewhat difficult to identify, either because
it challenges the limits to which the term "charity" has, so far, been extended,
or because its charitable mission is defined, without reference to subject
matter, in terms of providing representation for causes and viewpoints which
cannot otherwise find representation,36" the public support formulas provide
some assurance, but perhaps not enough, that the organization pursues
"public" causes. In these situations, it is appropriate to require the organ-
ization to provide further evidence that its cause is indeed public. Given the
difficulty and danger of evaluating whether such an organization's output
is in the "public interest," it may be appropriate to scrutinize the organi-
zation's decisionmaking processes for added assurance that the organization's
advocacy is not simply a reiteration of private interest views that are already
well represented. Mechanisms modeled on some of the public interest law
firm guidelines of Revenue Procedure 71-3969 could address legitimate con-
cerns about distortion of the section 501(c)(3) exemption for private benefit
without imposing unnecessary and counterproductive restrictions based on
means. The most useful of the guidelines in this respect are the requirement
of an annual report to the IRS which explains the organization's choice of
cases and the basis for the organization's selection of those cases370 and the
requirement of a community-based board. 371
A better-designed reporting process is essential if the aim is to identify
and withhold section 501(c)(3) benefits from purportedly "charitable" or-
ganizations which simply promote private interests. Houck372 points out that
the information required by the present Form 990, on which section 501(c)(3)
organizations submit their annual informational returns, is entirely inade-
quate for accurate characterization of "public interest" law firms that are,
in actuality, promoting private interests. He suggests that requiring a listing
of donors whose contributions equal at least one-half of one percent of the
organization's income, rather than the present two percent threshold, would
more accurately identify those who have a significant interest in the organ-
ization's positions. In addition, Houck proposes that the informational return
include an explanation of any direct or indirect involvement of the organ-
ization's board members or substantial contributors in cases in which the
organization is also involved and an explanation of how the organization's
position diverges from those being promoted by those parties.3 73 This mech-
anism is most comfortably applicable to litigation, since litigation involves
368. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
369. 1971-2 C.B. 575. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
370. Rev. Proc. 71-39 § 3.04, 1971-2 C.B. 575.
371. Rev. Proc. 71-39 § 3.05, 1971-2 C.B. 575, 576.
372. Houck, supra note 54, at 1517.
373. Id. at 1519-20.
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fairly clear-cut cases and since litigation is perhaps the strategy most sus-
ceptible to being used for private gain under the guise of pursuing a "char-
itable" purpose. 74 It could, however, also be well-applied to other non-
traditional strategies, for example, proxy contests, which raise the spectre
of distortion of the section 501(c)(3) form for private interest. This is par-
ticularly true where the claimed basis for the "charitable" description is that
the organization proposes to represent an otherwise unrepresented "public
interest" in the context of a variety of as yet unidentified issues. Enhanced
information gathering, together with the public support formulas, would go
a long way toward ensuring that an organization's advocacy neither results
in private inurement nor simply amplifies the representation of already
represented interests. Once these requirements have been met, it is legitimate
to conclude that the organization's advocacy "product" is the sort toward
which the incentives of section 501(c)(3) exemption and deductibility ought
to be directed.
Nearly all means-specific restrictions beyond these threshold measures are
unnecessary and counterproductive.37 - Once an organization establishes that
its purpose is "charitable" and its support base broad, there is no justifi-
cation for imposing artificial limits on its use of legislative advocacy to
achieve its ends. Removing from the tax law all provisions that limit contacts
with legislators and the public with respect to legislative matters would be
fully consistent with the policies and values that should shape exempt or-
374. Houck provides a detailed examination of how the section 501(c)(3) public interest law
firm form is used by organizations which proudly describe themselves as "advocates for...
economic interests" and whose positions in litigation parallel those of the powerful economic
interests that are represented on the organization's boards.
375. The question of participation in election campaigns presents an exception to the rule
that there should be no means-specific constraints on political activity by section 501(c)(3)
organizations. In this context, there is less reason to provide incentives to promote the aggre-
gation of the voices of the chronically underrepresented. First, it is far more difficult to establish
a causal connection between the election of particular candidates and achievement of an
organization's charitable goals than it is to find such a connection between, for example,
legislative advocacy and the organization's purposes. Given the fact that election of particular
candidates will likely have at least as much effect on an array of issues unrelated to the
organization's focus as it will have on those that relate to the organization's cause, there is
some good reason to differentiate between this strategy and others. Furthermore, associational
aspects of election participation are of only secondary importance; the primary value in this
context is the promotion of full and effective individual participation.
As it has evolved, the present system of constraints on election campaign participation seems
to reflect an implicit distinction between activities which contribute to the working of the
electoral system or promote full and effective individual participation, such as voter registration
activities and neutral publication of voting records, and those which are aimed at promoting
particular election outcomes as a means of achieving substantive charitable goals. Because the
distinction is consistent with the underlying values which should shape the law in this context,
it is appropriate to retain it, so long as election campaign participation is defined clearly and
narrowly. See infra notes 404-08 and accompanying text. Provisions enacted as part of the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 appear to move away from the clear and narrow
definition proposed here. Pub. L. No. 100-203 § 10712 (1987).
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ganization law.3 76 The disfavor Congress has historically shown for grassroots
lobbying 77 should be eliminated in the context of charitable organization
activity. 78 Grassroots activity is especially important to charities in their roles
of innovator, educator of the public, and monitor. The policy considerations
in favor of encouraging these functions argue equally for lifting the limits
on grassroots activity. Furthermore, distinguishing between non-lobbying
advocacy and grassroots lobbying for the purpose of applying limits to the
latter creates difficult line-drawing problems that tend to inhibit activity
which ought to be encouraged.
For years the lobbying limitations have been the object of criticism and
proposals for change. It has been suggested that the restrictions be dropped
altogether, 79 or that the IRS simply administer them with a more even and
tolerant hand.380 Before the 1976 changes to the Tax Code, some commen-
tators urged the adoption of a quantitative approach to determine the "sub-
stantiality" of lobbying activities.3  When the 1976 amendments took this
approach, the calls for reform largely quieted.382 Some commentators have
proposed that a good basis for evaluating the legitimacy of charitable lob-
bying activities would be the relationship of the legislation to the exempt
376. The recently proposed Treasury Regulations, see supra note 2, move in exactly the
opposite direction. They broaden the definition of lobbying by definitely including communi-
cations which do not involve pending legislation. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-2(c)(1). They
broaden the definition of "grass roots" lobbying to include indirect communication with the
public. Id.
377. This is evidenced by the lower limit for grassroots than for direct lobbying under the
provisions of section 501(h) and the non-deductibility of grassroots lobbying expenditures by
businesses under section 162(e).
378. The proposed Treasury Regulations amplify the effect of the disfavor for grassroots
lobbying by.counting against the grassroots expenditure limits the entire amount of a mixed
direct and grassroots expenditure or a mixed advertising and grassroots expenditure unless the
organization can substantiate a different allocation. Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 56.4911-2(c)(iii),
56.4911-2(d).
379. See, e.g., Fogel, supra note 109, at 961. Some commentators have proposed that while
direct lobbying should be unlimited, grassroots lobbying should continue to be subject to
restrictions. See Note, supra note 107, at 236-38.
380. See Clark, supra note 38, at 461-64; Garrett, supra note 108, at 585; Comment, supra
note 149, at 673-74.
It has been suggested that the entire function of supervising the charitable sector might be
removed from the IRS and assigned to another existing or specially-created agency, so as to
separate the governance of philanthropic activities from the tax-policy considerations which
guide the IRS. See Nonprofit Org. Tax Letter (Org. Mgmt., Inc.) at 1 (June 4, 1987) (noting
former IRS Commissioner Sheldon Cohen's proposal that federal oversight of section 501(c)
organizations should be assigned to the Department of Health and Human Services); Donee
Group, supra note 29, at 76-78; Mavity & Ylvisaker, supra note 156, at 830; So long as charities
are exempt and donations deductible, however, it is unlikely that the IRS involvement can be
totally replaced. Furthermore, shifting oversight responsibility from one agency to another
responds to a very small part of the criticism.
381. See, e.g., Caplin & Timbie, supra note 108, at 210; Note, supra note 116, at 1134-36.
382. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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purpose of the organization." 3 This approach would parallel the ability of
a business to deduct expenditures for lobbying with respect to legislation of
"direct interest" to it. Imposing that parallel, however, would retain many
of the problems of definition and administrative discretion that plague the
present system. Furthermore, whatever safeguard such a limitation might
provide against lobbying which deviates unacceptably from the organization's
purpose is already supplied by the basic criteria that the lobbying organization
be "charitable" and that it draw its support from a broad base. If an
organization engages in a significant amount of any activity, including lob-
bying, which does not further charitable goals, it will no longer qualify for
section 501(c)(3) status. If the organization's legislative activity is substan-
tialy unrelated to the organization's announced purpose, those who support
the organization financially will likely begin to redirect their resources. Thus,
the market forces that reside within the public support requirement provide
an additional, self-executing control on the possibility that the exemption
and deductibility incentive will be misapplied.
Some commentators have suggested that the lobbying restrictions be lifted
for all section 501(c)(3) organizations, including private foundations. 3 4 That
proposal raises some of the legitimate concerns that lurk behind the present
system of restrictions. Allowing unlimited legislative action only to publicly
supported charities would avoid the danger of distorting the political process
by large infusions of tax-deductible money to further selfish interests. Private
foundations should, however, be allowed to donate freely to politically active
charitable organizations. The public support requirement would allay fears
of foundation control of the lobbying organization; the initial determination
that the funded organization qualifies as "charitable" will ensure that the
ends pursued with deductible dollars are designed to promote the public
interest.
Requiring a charitable organization to relegate its political activity to a
separate section 501(c)(4) organization does not provide a satisfactory so-
lution. While it is probably true that Congress has, by now, acquiesced in
the IRS-generated and court-approved 5 policy of steering political activity
into the section 501(c)(4) form, it does not appear that Congress originally
383. Caplin & Timbie, supra note 108, at 185-86 (suggesting that this approach, while not
theoretically compelled, would be a workable basis for administering the- constraints); Com-
mission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, Commentary on Commission Recommen-
dations, in I CoMMssIoN ON PRIVATE PmrANTHRoPY AND PUBLiC NEEDS, RESEARCH PAPERS 3,
36-37 (1977).
384. Heimann, Foundations and Government: Perspectives for the Future, in TIE FUTURE
oF FoUNDATIONs 259, 266 (F. Heimann ed. 1973); Williams & Moorhead, An Analysis of the
Federal Tax Distinctions Between Public and Private Charitable Organizations, in 4 ComisSIoN
oN PRIVATE PwLANmTmoPY AND Ptmuc NEEDS, RESEARcH PAPERS 2099, 2119-20 (1977).
385. Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 547-49 (1983).
See supra notes 157-64 and accompanying text.
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contemplated this function for section 501(c)(4). The precursor of section
501(c)(4) was enacted as part of the Tariff Act of 1913,11 apparently in
response to testimony of the United States Chamber of Commerce. The
Chamber of Commerce was seeking to broaden the range of exempt organ-
izations to include "civic and commercial" organizations which could not
qualify as charitable, educational, or religious, but whose activities somehow
benefited the general public.387 The notion that the section 501(c)(4) social
welfare organization category is an appropriate classification for politically
active charitable organizations seems to have originated with the IRS in the
1950's28 It was made explicit in regulations adopted in 1959, which assigned
the label of "action organization" to any legislatively active organization 389
and stated that "[elven though an organization is an 'action organization'
it can qualify as a social welfare organization under section 501(c)(4)." 390
Forcing organizations to split off their legislative, and perhaps other,
advocacy activity to a section 501(c)(4) affiliate is inconsistent with the
policies which should drive the system of exemption and deduction incentives.
It withholds the incentive of deductibility of contributions from system-
focused advocacy in circumstances which warrant special encouragement.
Furthermore, it extends the limited incentive of exemption for advocacy
activity to circumstances where the justifications for the incentive are not
present. Section 501(c)(4) status is available to organizations whose purposes
do not necessarily implicate the collective goods or redistributive effects that
are characteristic of even the broadest reaches of the "charitable" classifi-
cation.39' Furthermore, because section 501(c)(4) incorporates no requirement
of broad-based support, there is no assurance that political activity carried
on by a section 501(c)(4) affiliate of a charitable organization, or any other
section 501(c)(4) organization, for that matter, represents anything but the
views of the organization's founders, staff, or directors. Thus, since there
is no reason to conclude that the section 501(c)(4) organization shares the
386. Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16 § II(G)(a), 38 Stat. 172.
387. See McGovern, supra note 239, at 530 (citing Hearings on Tariff Schedules of the
Revenue Act of 1913 Before the Subcomm. on Finance, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. 2001 (1913));
Peoples Educ. Camp Soc'y, Inc. v. Commissioner, /331 F.2d 923, 930 (2d Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 328 U.S. 839 (1969).
Thompson points out that it is highly unlikely that Congress was motivated to create the
section 501(c)(4) exemption classification by a desire to provide a separate classification for
politically active organizations, since the classification was created well before Congress focused
on the issue of political activities by exempt organizations. Thompson, supra note 76, at 550
n.148.
388. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 55-269, 1955-1 C.B. 29 (discussing the nondeductibility of contri-
butions to a section 501(c)(4) social welfare organization engaged in the promotion of sound
government by means of disseminating literature and occasionally advocating or opposing
pending legislation).
389. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3) (1959).
390. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (1959).
391. See supra notes 251-56 and accompanying text.
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charitable organization's capacity to cure market failure by providing rep-
resentation for disadvantaged or diffuse interests, there is no justification
for providing even the limited incentive of exemption without deduction for
advocacy by section 501(c)(4) organizations which would not meet the stan-
dards for section 501(c)(3) status or the public support formula. Conversely,
there is every reason to provide the incentives of exemption and deductibility
to any organization which does meet these thresholds.319 Thus, the assignment
of politically active charitable organizations to the section 501(c)(4) classi-
fication is without merit.
With the exception of special reporting requirements applicable in certain
circumstances, 393 other means-specific constraints on section 501(c)(3) ad-
vocacy activity should be discarded along with the lobbying restrictions. For
example, many of the other public interest law firm guidelines are redundant.
They add nothing to the controls that would be provided by the basic section
501(c)(3) "charitable" designation and the prohibition against private in-
urement, if those provisions are well-administered.
The fee limitations imposed upon public interest law firims3 are coun-
terproductive. The limitation on an organization's total receipt of court-
awarded fees395 unjustifiably hampers its efforts. 396 The policies which un-
'derlie the statutes providing for the award of attorney's fees to public interest
plaintiffs are closely related to those which argue for tax incentives for
advocacy activity by charitable organizations. Each is motivated by a rec-
ognition that carefully structured incentives can enable and encourage private
vindication of public interests. Furthermore, the prohibition on accepting
fees from clients adds no useful safeguard against use of the section 501(c)(3)
form for private benefit and clashes with the policies upon which the ex-
emption/deduction system should rest. So long as an organization qualifies
as "charitable" and meets the public support test, it is perfectly appropriate
to apply the general rule that "[i]f the activity may be deemed to benefit
the community as a whole, the fact that fees are charged for the organi-
zation's services will not detract from the exempt nature of the activity." 397
392. Weisbrod notes that some section 501(c)(4) organizations rank high on his "collective-
ness" index, which is proposed as a measure of the extent to which an organization produces
collective rather than private goods. Weisbrod, Private Goods, supra note 229, at 164. It is
interesting to note that Weisbrod's examples, namely, the Sierra Club, Common Cause, and
Public Citizen, are all advocacy organizations which represent diffuse interests of the sort which
this Article proposes are appropriate objects of the exemption and deductibility incentives.
393. See supra notes 368-74 and accompanying text.
394. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
395. Rev. Rul. 75-13, 1975-1 C.B. 67.
396. See, e.g., Goldsmith, The IRS Man Cometh: Public Interest Law Firms Meet the Tax
Collector, 13 ARiz. L. R-v. 857, 870-72 (1972); Note, Public Interest Law Firms and Client-
Paid Fees, 33 TAx LAw. 915 (1980).
397. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,459 (July 31, 1980). See also Sound Health Ass'n, 71 T.C. at
158; Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,257 (Sept. 15, 1977); B. HoPKiNs, supra note 49, at 119-23 (discussion
of IRS response to fees for charitable services in a variety of contexts).
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The presence or absence of client-paid fees does not reliably indicate whether
a case implicates the kind of private interest that ought not to be pursued
by a section 501(c)(3) organization. That clients are willing and able to
contribute to the cost of representation of a diffuse or disadvantaged interest
does not necessarily deprive that representation of its collective goods or
redistributive character.3 9s Nor is the representation of a substantial private
interest "charitable" because it is provided without cost to the client. Careful
screening for charitable purpose, absence of private inurement, and public
support are much better standards for assessing whether a section 501(c)(3)
organization's litigation activity merits the exemption/deduction incentive.
The per se ban on client fees is unnecessary to ensure that the section
501(c)(3) form is not being -misused for private gain. Indeed, in certain
circumstances the prohibition may undermine the positive values associated
with system-focused litigation by charitable organizations. The fee prohi-
bition seems designed to ensure that charitable organizations will not provide
representation in cases where a private financial interest would warrant
private representation. 3 9 Under some circumstances, however, clients who
could conceivably find and pay for representation in the private legal service
marketplace cannot find there the level of expertise and enthusiasm for their
cause that a public interest group can provide. 4° So long as the cause has
substantial collective goods or redistribution aspects, a parallel, incidental
private financial interest should not preclude pursuit of the cause by the
sort of organization that is particularly well suited to provide vigorous
representation on issues with important public policy implications. Finally,
the requirement that client fees can never, under any circumstances, support
the organization eliminates an important mechanism of accountability be-
tween the organization and those whose interests it purports to represent.
Thus, the concern that a charitable organization may fail to represent the
underrepresented interests it claims to speak for is fed by mandated financial
independence of lawyer from client. 40
While the proscription on election campaign activity by exempt organi-
zations is beyond the scope of this Article,42 it is impossible to address fully
398. Ability to pay something for representation is not necessarily indicative of sufficient
resources to purchase legal services in the for-profit marketplace. See CoUNcIL FOR PUBLIC
INTEREST LAW, supra note 22, at 354.
399. This criterion for establishing the "charitability" of litigation appears as guideline 3.01
of Rev. Proc. 71-39, 1971-1 C.B. 575. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
400. "[There are many people who ... turn to organizations such as ... [the ACLU],
feeling there is an expertise there; an enthusiasm and energy, and a desire to set things right."
Hearings, supra note 60, at 282, 284 (statement of Lawrence Speiser, Director of American
Civil Liberties Union, Washington, D.C.).
401. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text; Berlin, Roisman & Kessler, supra note
56, at 685-86 (noting that reliance on foundation funding rather than client-paid fees threatens
to compromise public interest law firm accountability to its clients).
402. See supra note 333.
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the limits on legislative advocacy and public education without encountering
difficulties occasioned by the interplay between those limits and the prohi-
bition on campaign activity. Although the present limits on campaign activity
are, for the most part, justified, 403 it would be desirable to minimize the
problems of uncertainty and undue enforcement discretion that arise from
the indistinct separation between election campaign participation, on the one
hand, and grassroots lobbying and general advocacy through public edu-
cation, on the other. This could be accomplished by applying the election
campaign participation restriction only to activities which rise to the level
of "contributions" or "independent expenditures" for purposes of the Fed-
eral Election Campaign Act.4 As construed in Buckley v. Valeo, 4 5 these
terms extend only to direct campaign contributions and expenditures for
"communications that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a
clearly identified candidate." The rationale put forth for so limiting the
term in the context of the Federal Election Campaign Act provides excellent
guidance for locating the demarcation between prohibited election campaign
participation and permitted advocacy in the tax exemption context. The
Buckley Court recognized that:
[c]andidates, especially incumbents, are intimately tied to public issues
involving legislative proposals and governmental actions. Not only do
candidates campaign on the basis of their positions on various public
issues, but campaigns themselves generate issues of public interest....
Discussions of those issues, as well as more positive efforts to influence
public opinion on them, tend naturally and inexorably to exert some
influence on voting at elections.
The Buckley definition of "independent expenditure" was designed to
eliminate uncertainty that "foster[s] 'arbitrary and discriminatory applica-
tion' land] operates[s] to inhibit protected expression by inducing 'citizens
to "steer far wider of the unlawful zone" ' ... than if the boundaries of
403. See supra note 375.
404. 2 U.S.C. § 431(8), (9) (1986).
405. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
406. Id. at 44. "This construction would restrict the application of [the term "independent
expenditure"] to communications containing express words of advocacy of election or defeat,
such as 'vote for,' 'elect,' 'support,' 'cast your ballot for,' 'Smith for Congress,' 'vote against,'
'defeat,' 'reject.' " Id. at 44 n.52. Further, the communication would have to be directed for
or against a "clearly identified" candidate, which would "require that the candidate's name,
photograph or drawing, or other unambiguous reference to his identity appear as part of the
communication." Id. at 44 n.51. See also Federal Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life,
Inc., 107 S. Ct. 616, 621 (1986) (marginally less direct message may be "express advocacy").
Even having narrowly construed the term "expenditure," the Buckley Court struck down
the limitations imposed by the FECA on such expenditures. Nonetheless, the Court's approach
to defining the term in that context provides a useful model for delineating election campaign
activity which ought to be out of bounds for charitable organizations.
407. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 42 n.50 (citation omitted).
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the forbidden areas were clearly marked." 48 Uneasiness about the uncertain
demarcations between permitted and forbidden political activity in the tax
exemption context arises from the same underlying concerns. It is perfectly
fitting, therefore, that the resolution of both be accomplished by the same
formulation.
Finally, redesigning the system of incentives and constraints to fit solidly
upon the underlying rationales logically requires a careful separation of the
section 501(c)(3) categories of exempt purpose. The justifications for en-
couraging advocacy activity are present only in the case of "charitable"
organizations. The collective good provided by organizations which are
exempt because they are "educational" is the process of dissemination of
information and ideas to the public, regardless of the particular content of
the information or ideas disseminated. 41 0 Consequently, when the organi-
zation begins to engage in a different process-that is, advocacy which goes
beyond the dissemination of ideas-the justification for the incentive is lost.
Thus, it would make sense to withhold exemption and deductibility from a
purely "educational" organization's lobbying, litigation, or other activity in
pursuit of system change. However, no constraints should be placed on the
organization's dissemination of information and ideas, even if the infor-
mation and ideas disseminated argue for social change or are controversial. 41'
If there is a "public good" character to purely "religious" endeavors, it
is the value to society at large of the fact that individuals have the freedom
408. Id. at 41 n.48 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972)
(quoting Buggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513, 526 (1958)))).
409. See supra notes 284-333 and accompanying text.
410. See supra notes 264-74 and accompanying text.
411. See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text. Thompson, supra note 76, makes a
careful and convincing case that controversiality of subject matter and ardency of advocacy,
short of legislative involvement, should not disqualify an organization from being classified as
"educational." Thompson also believes that once such an organization ventures into substantial
legislative activity, it should no longer qualify for exempt status.
Thompson's justification for disparate treatment of legislative and non-legislative propaganda
organizations differs from that proposed in this Article. First, Thompson maintains that "al-
lowing exemptions to legislative propaganda groups would benefit those organizations with
access, and would therefore magnify rather than ameliorate the disadvantaged position of
organizations without access to legislators." Id. at 537-38. Second, successful lobbying "will
be imposed on the public by legislative fiat." Id. at 538. Although Thompson does not address
the question of lobbying by "charitable" organizations as they are defined here, see supra
notes 237-63 and accompanying text, his rationales would seem to argue for limiting the lobbying
of those organizations as well. However, the more broadly distributed the opportunity for input
and influence in the legislative process, the more legitimate the result. And since it is the
interests of the groups represented by "charitable" organizations which currently tend to be
ignored in the legislative calculus of interests, and their perspectives that tend to be left out
of the information upon which legislators base their conclusions about the "public interest,"
see supra notes 312-19 and accompanying text, lifting the lobbying restrictions on "charitable"
organizations would tend to relieve (albeit incompletely) the major problems of differential
access.
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and opportunity to pursue spiritual growth and fulfillment.412 As with "ed-
ucational" organizations, the collective good aspect of the religious organ-
ization's endeavors is tied to function, rather than to the substantive content
of its focus. When it moves away from the "special secular function [it
performs] in our society by putting the lives of individuals into cosmic
perspective and by offering answers to the meaning of life, ' 413 and into
active advocacy in the various arenas of public policymaking, it is no longer
supplying that collective good. At this point, then, the justification for
providing the exemption and deduction incentives is absent.
A stronger rationale for exemption of religious organizations is the con-
stitutional mandate to avoid entanglement of church and state.414 Exemption
and deductibility are justified, not as incentives, but because they further
neutrality and non-interference of government with religion.415 That principle
is two-sided, embodying the value of "insulating each from the other." 416
The notion that "both religion and government can best work to achieve
their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its respective
sphere, '417 suggests an additional policy against extending the benefits of
exemption and deduction for advocacy by purely "religious" organizations.
Certainly, providing special encouragement for political advocacy by religious
organizations poses a very real threat of promoting "political division along
religious lines [which] was one of the principal evils against which the first
amendment was intended to protect .... The political divisiveness of such
conflict is a threat to the normal political process. ' 41 1 At the very least, the
rules should not favor religious organizations over other exempt categories.
It would be logical to apply the liberalized approach suggested in this
Article only to "charitable" organizations, and to continue to restrict the
use of deductible dollars for advocacy activity by "educational" and "re-
ligious" organizations, where the justifications are absent. Of course, an
educational or religious organization which also fits the definition of "char-
itable," meets one of the public support tests, and is willing to comply with
enhanced reporting requirements would be entitled to the benefits of the
liberalized "charitable" organization rules.
412. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
413. Schwarz, supra note 277, at 56.
414. See supra notes 278-83 and accompanying text.
415. See Schwarz, supra note 277, at 56 ("This theory rests on the premise that religious
liberty is essential to the survival of our society, and that government must make a special
effort to foster religious liberty by leaving religion alone." (footnote omitted)).
416. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970); Consedine & Whelan,
supra note 277, at 95 ("It may seem paradoxical, but tax exemptions of churches have served
the highest secular purpose: to keep the government itself secular, neutral, and uninvolved with
the internal affairs of churches.").
417. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948).
418. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971) (citation omitted).
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The separation, though logically compelled in theory, would be difficult
to achieve in practice. The separate enumeration of the categories is as old
as the idea of tax exempt status itself, but the actual classification of exempt
organizations over the years reveals a pattern of overlap and imprecision in
assigning the designations of "charitable," "educational," and "religious"
to particular organizations. 4 9 The imprecision has been of little importance,
because the consequences of qualifying for each of the three classifications
are now virtually identical. In a restructured system which attaches important
differences to the categories of qualification for exemption, careful classi-
fication would be essential. To arrive at that careful classification would
require not only a redrafting of the definitions of the categories420 and a
meticulous evaluation in order to classify new organizations accurately, but
also a reevaluation of existing section 501(c)(3) organizations for classification
within the revised scheme. The established tradition might be very difficult
indeed to overcome.
Differentiating between "charitable" organizations, on the one hand, and
"educational" and "religious" organizations, on the other, might pose ad-
ditional difficulties. Even though the underlying justifications for "subsi-
dizing" advocacy activity are absent in the case of religious organizations, 42'
and even though there are additional policy reasons for avoiding such a
"subsidy," 42 other legitimate concerns which arise from the special nature
of the religious context might be sufficient to override the basic premise that
the advocacy rules ought to reflect a consistent response to those underlying
policies.
The fact that the proposed scheme, unlike the present system, extends to
"charitable" organizations a more liberal opportunity to engage in political
activities with deductible dollars than it extends to "religious" organizations
may call forth an argument that the proposed rules would constitute a
preference for non-religiously motivated advocacy which is forbidden by the
establishment clause of the first amendment. 423 The establishment clause
prohibits governmental action which either prefers or disadvantages religion,
unless the act has a secular purpose and a primary secular effect and does
419. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 77-68, 1977-1 C.B. 142.
420. This process would require substantial revision of the section 1.501(c)(3) regulations to
remove the present cross reference between the definitions of "educational" and "charitable."
The basic definitions of these two terms would remain largely as they are now, to reflect the
breadth and flexibility of the two concepts. The definitions themselves should contain no
reference to means; the concepts of "charitable" and "educational" should be consistently
expressed in terms of ends. "Religious" should remain without explicit definition, both because
no important function would be served by setting down a definition and because attempting
to do so would raise serious first amendment problems.
421. See supra notes 412-13 and accompanying text.
422. See supra notes 414-18 and accompanying text.
423. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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not excessively entangle government with religion.424 Under the proposed
scheme, however, the benefit which flows from allowing advocacy activity
to be funded by deductible dollars is not conferred or withheld on the basis
of whether an organization is religious or whether its advocacy is religiously
motivated. Rather, the system is structured to extend the benefit to advocacy
activity based on independent factors which are solidly rooted in principled,
secular purposes. The liberalized standards are available equally to all or-
ganizations, religious and non-religious alike, so long as their advocacy
activity fits the justifications for providing the incentive. A religious organ-
ization that meets the independent criteria of "charitability," broad-based
support, and willingness to disclose, in appropriate circumstances, the basis
of its advocacy-related decisionmaking is not precluded from operating under
the liberalized standards.
Furthermore, the proposed approach threatens no more administrative
entanglement in the affairs of religious organizations than the present system.
Religious organizations would remain subject to essentially the same set of
constraints to which they are now subject. These constraints actually entail
less administrative intrusion than the liberalized standards applicable to
charitable organizations under the proposed approach, which would require
disclosure of substantial information about an organization's support base.425
In fact, the proposed approach would diminish the threat of administrative
entanglement by defiming more narrowly and more distinctly the particular
activities which are subject to limitations or prohibitions. In addition to the
definitions of election campaign participation suggested above, 42s which would
be relevant to all section 501(c)(3) organizations, the reconstructed system
should include a similarly limited definition of "legislative activity," which
would be of consequence to section 501(c)(3) organizations other than "char-
itable" organizations meeting one of the public support formulas. Limiting
the section 501(c)(3) definition of "legislative activity" to instances of clearly
stated support for or opposition to specific, pending legislation and excluding
all communications to bona fide members would draw a clear line between
lobbying and general discussion of social issues for those organizations which
are still subject to different rules with respect to the two types of activity.
Further, it would facilitate enforcement of the remaining limitations while
diminishing the opportunity for subjective evaluation by those charged with
their administration. In the case of religious organizations, this would relieve
424. See generally J. NowAK, R. RoTUNDA & J. YoUrNG, supra note 286, at 1033-34.
425. See supra notes 372-74 and accompanying text.
It is interesting to note, in this connection, that it was at their own urging that churches
were excluded from eligibility to elect the liberalized lobbying limitations of section 501(h),
presumably because they were concerned about the increased information reporting requirements
they expected would accompany the new standard. See Note, supra note 193, at 494-95.
426. See supra notes 403-08 and accompanying text.
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potential problems of administrative entanglement and, perhaps, alleviate
the present apparent reluctance to hold the organizations accountable for
plain violations of the standards. 427 Both results would further the interrelated
policies that should form the basis of the law in this area.
There remains, nonetheless, a concern that the scheme, even though sec-
ularly based, might impose a substantial burden on religious practice. Res-
trictions on the political activity of religious organizations whose doctrine
sincerely directs them to political action, by definition, limit their religious
activity as well. Some have argued that any limitation on political advocacy
by religious organizations necessarily violates the free exercise clause of the
first amendment.4 28 This issue was raised and resolved in Christian Echoes
National Ministry, Inc. v. United States.429 Government may attach condi-
tions to the grant of exempt status to religious organizations, even when the
conditions touch activity that is unarguably religiously motivated. 430 Thus,
a scheme which ties the ability to engage in system-focused advocacy to
qualification as "charitable" and to broad public support is constitutionally
permissible, even if that scheme withholds similar benefits from organizations
that are purely "religious."
The practical and political difficulties of converting to a system which
draws clear lines to separate the "charitable," "educational," and "relig-
ious" classifications may present an overwhelming obstacle to restructuring
the system as proposed. However, to conclude that this is the case should
not lead to an abandonment of the idea of reconstructing the system. The
underlying policies would be furthered, albeit less completely, by lifting the
constraints as proposed, even without distinguishing among the various clas-
ses of section 501(c)(3) organizations. The present system, as applied, tends
to particularly disadvantage the organizations and the activities most worthy
of encouragement. Although the restrictions nominally apply to all, in prac-
tice their effects tend to be felt less by religious organizations and more by
charitable ones. 43' Lifting the restrictions for all would at least reduce the
extent to which the scheme of constraints on system-focused advocacy by
section 501(c)(3) organizations pulls against the values and policies which
should shape it.
427. See supra notes 192-200 and accompanying text.
428. See, e.g., Comffient, Religion in Politics and the Income Tax Exemption, 42 FoRDHAm
L. REv. 397, 415-16 (1973).
429. 470 F.2d 849, 856-57 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973). "A religious
organization that engages in substantial activity aimed at influencing legislation is disqualified
from tax exemption, whatever the motivation." Id. at 854. For a discussion of the case, see
supra note 113.
430. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); Christian Echoes Nat'l
Ministry, 470 F.2d at 849; Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 412 F.2d 1197
(Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1009 (1970).
431. See supra notes 192-200 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
The rules which limit system-change advocacy run counter to the principles
that should shape them. They have been devised in patchwork fashion, often
in response to perceived abuses of the section 501(c)(3) form, and with no
attempt to relate the pieces to a common theoretical foundation. Conse-
quently, they neither provide appropriate incentives for activities that should
be encouraged, nor consistently deny such incentives to activities that either
do not implicate the justifying rationales or that do raise countervailing
concerns which, on balance, argue against incentives. Finally, they are so
uncertain that they leave undue latitude to define the bounds of permitted
activity in the hands of those who are charged with enforcement. The explicit
prohibitions and the cautious nonparticipation induced by the questions left
unanswered conflict with the very strong policy considerations in favor of
allowing, and even encouraging, the active participation of the charitable
sector in the processes of public policymaking.
The system of controls which the tax law imposes on the advocacy activities
of exempt organizations could be redrawn to reflect the underlying rationales,
screen out undesired effects, and limit administrative discretion. As the
Internal Revenue Service and the Congress again turn their attention to the
issue of the section 501(c)(3) limitations on advocacy, it can be hoped that
they will be guided not by the anecdotal evidence of abuses, nor by the
frustrated outcry of the charitable sector. The time has come to focus firmly
upon the underlying principles which should shape the controls on system
reform advocacy by section 501(c)(3) organizations and to fashion a set of
rules that will serve those principles consistently and well.
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